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Abstract
Recent years have seen a growing interest in the implications of monetary policy for
bank risk taking and financial stability. Yet, there has hitherto been limited atten-
tion on how ownership structure affects the relationship between monetary policy
and bank risk. Drawing on three interconnected studies written as journal articles,
this thesis provides novel insights into the role of banks in monetary policy trans-
mission. First, it refines our understanding of the monetary transmission process
via financial intermediaries. Based on a systematic review of 152 articles published
during the 1963–2016 period, this research integrates a highly fragmented body of
evidence into a multidimensional framework that combines the mechanisms of mon-
etary transmission through financial institutions with the conditions underpinning
the functioning of each mechanism. Second, this thesis incorporates concepts from
the property rights and agency theory perspectives into the analysis of the risk-
taking channel. By building a sample of commercial, cooperative and savings banks
from 17 Western European countries over the 1999–2011 period, this study finds
that the impact of lower interest rates on bank risk taking is reduced for stakeholder
banks relative to their shareholder counterparts. Third, this research contributes
to the current debate about how to design a more stable and resilient financial sys-
tem by introducing diversity measures from ecological theories into the study of the
monetary policy–bank risk nexus. After estimating the ownership composition of
the banking sector in terms of relative market shares of shareholder banks vis-à-vis
stakeholder banks, this work shows that the effects of unexpected monetary policy
shocks on banks’ probability of default is dampened in countries with greater own-
ership diversity. Taken together, these findings advance knowledge in this field of
enquiry by highlighting the need to account for differences in ownership structures




Bank risk taking; financial crisis; financial stability; monetary transmission mecha-
nism; ownership diversity; systematic literature review.
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1.1 Research Background and Rationale
The global financial crisis that erupted in 2007 has arguably been the most severe
market downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Hodgson, 2009). Fol-
lowing the collapses of Lehman Brothers in the US and Northern Rock in the UK,
the world was on the verge of an economic meltdown. Since the onset of the re-
cent turmoil, the causes of the financial crisis and ensuing economic contraction
have been at the centre of an intense academic and policy debate (Acharya and
Naqvi, 2012). Many commentators have blamed the ‘too-low-for-too-long’ interest
rate environment until the mid-2000s for changes in risk perception by banks and
the build-up of risks in the economy via a ‘risk-taking channel’ of monetary trans-
mission (Borio and Zhu, 2012). According to the literature (Angeloni et al., 2015;
Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014), there are two main channels through
which monetary policy affects bank risk. The first mechanism is related to the asset
structure of financial intermediaries’ balance sheets. As Cociuba et al. (2016) sug-
gest, a protracted period of relatively low interest rates encourages banks to search
for yield by making risky assets more attractive than safe bonds. Inasmuch as fi-
nancial intermediaries shift their investments towards riskier assets, a greater degree
of procyclical risk taking is introduced in the financial system (Rajan, 2006) and
an equilibrium with weakened bank portfolios, lower and more volatile profits and
higher aggregate credit is realised (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). The second
mechanism underpinning the risk-taking channel operates via the impact of mone-
tary policy on financial intermediaries’ funding side. Since marginal funding costs
1
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are reduced within an expansionary monetary environment, it is more profitable for
banks to finance new loans by increasing leverage (Valencia, 2014). In light of this
evidence, a related discussion has unfolded on whether continued expectations of
exceptionally low interest rates are already sowing the seeds for the next financial
crisis (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013).
Triggered by the global financial turmoil, research on the role of financial in-
termediaries as conduits for monetary policy transmission has grown considerably
during the last few years. This notwithstanding, the variety of topics addressed by
the literature has made it difficult for researchers to build on each other’s work, lead-
ing to a highly fragmented body of knowledge. The lack of an integrated view of the
monetary transmission mechanism through financial intermediaries has hampered
progress in the field, while leaving practitioners and policymakers with virtually no
evidence that takes into account the system as a whole. Furthermore, there appears
to be a paucity of studies on the extent to which monetary policy interacts with bank
ownership in determining financial intermediaries’ appetite for risk. Such a void is
surprising, in that standard property rights (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and agency
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) perspectives point to ownership structure as a
key factor explaining firms’ risk taking. This gap is also at odds with the financial
architecture of many Western European countries, in which profit-maximising banks
(i.e. ‘shareholder banks’) compete alongside a large number of banks that strive to
create value for a multiplicity of stakeholders (i.e. ‘stakeholder banks’). In addition,
despite the growing appreciation of the need to address risk at the systemic level
(May and Arinaminpathy, 2010), little has hitherto been the attention on how the
interactions between banks with different types of ownership influence financial sta-
bility. This seems to be inconsistent with insights from ecology, where the degree
of diversity (or heterogeneity) of an ecosystem is known to have important effects
on its stability (Tilman and Downing, 1994). Such a gap might also bear serious
consequences from a policy standpoint, insofar as diversity of ownership structures
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in banking could account for a differential impact of monetary policy on bank risk
taking.
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives
Against this background, the aim of this thesis is to provide novel insights into the
role of banks in monetary policy transmission. As will become clear hereinafter,
banks play a central and multifaceted role within the monetary transmission mech-
anism, that is, the process through which monetary policy decisions influence real
output and inflation (Taylor, 1995). The overarching research question that is ad-
dressed in this work refers to the extent to which ownership structure affects mone-
tary transmission via the risk-taking channel. Support exists in the literature for the
role of banks’ ownership type in influencing their behaviour, performance and ulti-
mate survival (Fama and Jensen, 1983; O’Hara, 1981; Rasmusen, 1988). Whereas
commercial banks have maximisation of shareholder wealth as their main objective,
cooperative and savings banks aim to generate value for a wider set of stakehold-
ers (Ferri et al., 2014). Among the key features of cooperative banks is that they
are owned by their members, who are entitled to only one vote and their stakes
are generally not marketable. Similar to cooperatives, savings banks tend to have
a dual financial and social mission (i.e. ‘double bottom line’) to serve the com-
munity in which they are located (Ayadi et al., 2009). At the same time, savings
banks differ from cooperatives in that they are owned either by a private founda-
tion or by an organisation that belongs to the government, suggesting that they are
not strictly profit-oriented institutions. Consistent with their property right struc-
ture and the related obstacles—especially for cooperative banks—in raising external
capital (Ayadi et al., 2010), stakeholder banks tend to have lower incentives to en-
gage in risk-taking activities to increase their equity returns than shareholder banks
(Llewellyn, 2017). For these reasons, one would expect monetary policy to have
greater effects on the risk appetite of shareholder banks compared to their stake-
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holder counterparts. It follows that a key motivation behind this thesis is to test
the extent to which the presence of stakeholder banks vis-à-vis shareholder banks
has a bearing on the functioning of the risk-taking channel. As illustrated later in
this manuscript, the decision to focus on this channel of monetary transmission is
a response to the somewhat limited literature in the area in spite of the increas-
ing acknowledgement by policymakers and other observers of the implications that
monetary policy may have for financial stability. In more formal terms, the research
question (RQ) that informs this study can be stated as follows:
RQ. How does ownership structure affect the relationship between monetary policy
and bank risk?
Taking this overarching research question as the point of departure, this thesis
intends to fill the gaps identified in Section 1.1 by focusing on three primary research
objectives: (1) to systematically review the literature on the role of financial inter-
mediaries as vehicles for monetary policy transmission; (2) to investigate how the
risk appetite of shareholder banks vis-à-vis stakeholder banks responds to variations
in monetary conditions; and (3) to evaluate how ownership diversity in banking
influences the risk-taking channel of monetary transmission.
Broadly speaking, this thesis is positioned at the intersection of five major bodies
of literature. First, it contributes to a rapidly evolving strand of research that is
concerned with the implications of monetary policy for risk-taking activities carried
out by financial intermediaries. Studies in this area offer some theoretical as well as
empirical support for a risk-taking channel of monetary transmission that operates
through changes in risk perception and tolerance by banks (Ioannidou et al., 2015;
Jiménez et al., 2014; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2013). Second, this study draws its
theoretical underpinnings from property rights (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and
agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) theories. Taken together, these theories predict
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that the ownership structure of banks has a bearing on their behaviour, performance
and probability of survival (Fama and Jensen, 1983; O’Hara, 1981; Rasmusen, 1988).
Third, my work extends a recent stream of literature that explores the contribution
of diversity in banking to the stability of the financial system and its resilience to
crises (Ayadi et al., 2010; Ferri et al., 2014; Groeneveld and Llewellyn, 2012). In a
nutshell, this literature contends that a financial system characterised by a diversity
of ownership structures, business models and corporate objectives is likely to be more
stable than one dominated by a single model (Llewellyn, 2017). Fourth, this study
joins the body of research that endeavours to uncover the implications of market
structure for the monetary transmission mechanism (Olivero et al., 2011). Within
the context of the risk-taking channel, this body of research shows that bank market
power tends to buffer the impact of monetary policy on bank risk (Brissimis et al.,
2014; Kick and Prieto, 2015). Fifth, this thesis borrows concepts from the field of
ecology, where a community populated by individuals belonging to different species
is generally seen as more stable than a monoculture (Jizhong et al., 1991). Building
on the work by Michie and Oughton (2013), this study treats ownership types (i.e.
commercial, cooperative and savings) as analogous to species in an ecosystem and
computes indices of ownership diversity in the banking sector.
1.3 Summary of Contribution
In addressing the three research objectives identified above, this thesis makes an
important contribution to knowledge.
First, it refines our understanding of the role of financial intermediaries in mon-
etary policy transmission (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and Stein, 2000;
Kishan and Opiela, 2006). By conducting a systematic review of the literature
(Counsell, 1997; Tranfield et al., 2003), this research classifies existing studies within
a multidimensional framework that combines the mechanisms (i.e. the channels
through which financial intermediaries act as conduits for monetary policy trans-
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mission) and the underlying conditions (i.e. the factors impacting on the functioning
of the corresponding mechanism) of the monetary transmission process via financial
institutions. This framework may allow for a more inclusive view of how central bank
interventions are mediated by financial intermediaries’ behaviour, while presenting
researchers with a tool for reviewing the extant literature in a systematic manner
and for positioning their contributions within a broader context. To my knowledge,
the proposed framework constitutes the first attempt to comprehensively organise
the research on the role of financial institutions within the context of monetary pol-
icy transmission. For this reason, the framework developed in this study can be
used as a springboard for future quantitative and qualitative research dealing with
the monetary transmission mechanism via financial intermediaries.
Second, this thesis advances knowledge in the field by incorporating concepts
from the property rights (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and agency theory (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976) perspectives into the analysis of the risk-taking channel. By
estimating the effects of monetary policy on the risk appetite of shareholder and
stakeholder banks, this study extends the literature that investigates the extent to
which monetary conditions prevailing in the economy shape risk-taking incentives by
banks (Borio and Zhu, 2012; Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014). In doing
so, it also contributes to the body of knowledge around the implications of bank
ownership for monetary policy transmission (Drakos et al., 2016; Ferri et al., 2014).
Moreover, this thesis endeavours to redress the paucity of evidence on the role that
stakeholder banks play within the monetary transmission mechanism in general and
the risk-taking channel in particular. It follows that the findings of my research add
to the growing literature on the systemic benefits to be derived from a critical mass
of stakeholder banks operating alongside their shareholder counterparts (Casu and
Gall, 2016; Llewellyn, 2012; Michie, 2011).
Third, this study draws on insights from ecology—where interconnections be-
tween parts of an ecosystem are viewed as key drivers of its stability and resilience
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(Tilman and Downing, 1994)—and provides novel insights into how ownership diver-
sity in banking influences financial stability (Groeneveld, 2012; Haldane and May,
2011; Llewellyn, 2017). To this end, this thesis builds on the work by Michie and
Oughton (2013) and estimates the ownership composition of the banking system
in terms of relative market shares of shareholder banks vis-à-vis stakeholder banks.
By introducing measures commonly used in ecology to quantify diversity into the
study of the risk-taking channel, my research contributes to the somewhat lim-
ited literature around the effects of industry-related factors on the functioning of
the risk-taking channel (Brissimis et al., 2014; Kick and Prieto, 2015). This thesis
also makes an important methodological contribution, in that it borrows from the
field of ecology and derives indices of ownership diversity for 17 Western European
countries over the 1999–2011 period. These indices could be employed by future
studies exploring the implications of diversity in banking for a number of financial
and economic phenomena, while contributing further to the development of mea-
sures through which ownership diversity can be quantified, monitored and reported
(Michie and Oughton, 2013).
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organised in the ‘paper format’, that is, it is structured so as to deliver
its intellectual contribution through a series of distinct chapters in the format of
journal articles (as advised by the Cranfield University’s guidelines for the format
of PhD theses). Each chapter represents a self-contained description of all aspects
related to the individual packages of work and includes a literature review, method-
ology, results and discussion addressing one of the three research objectives stated
in Section 1.2. Taken together, the chapters describe a single programme of research
and contribute towards the overall aim of the work. Among the major advantages
associated with this style of thesis are the availability of a set of manuscripts for
submission to peer-reviewed journals and the opportunity to gain experience in writ-
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ing stand-alone, concise academic papers. The remainder of the thesis proceeds as
follows.
Chapter 2 focuses on the first research objective that guides this study, namely
to systematically review the literature on the role of financial intermediaries as
vehicles for monetary policy transmission. The chapter starts off by explaining the
methodology adopted in the paper and by detailing the key steps followed while
planning and conducting the review. Thereafter, it offers a descriptive overview
and a thematic analysis of the results. A synthesis of the review findings is then
presented in the form of a multidimensional framework, which serves to define the
wider context within which the whole thesis is located. The implications of the
proposed framework for practitioners and policymakers are discussed, together with
a research agenda for advancing knowledge in the field. The paper concludes by
highlighting some opportunities for gradually repositioning this topic as a legitimate
area of theoretical and empirical analysis in management and organisation studies.
Chapter 3 is linked to the second research objective of this thesis, that is, to
investigate how the risk appetite of shareholder banks vis-à-vis stakeholder banks
responds to variations in monetary conditions. In doing so, it fills some of the
gaps in the literature identified in Chapter 2. The first part of the manuscript
surveys the related literature and formulates a series of testable predictions. It
proceeds by describing the process that was followed in building the sample and in
computing the variables used in the analysis. Consequently, the chapter specifies the
econometric model estimated and considers some of the empirical challenges that
arise when investigating the monetary policy–bank risk taking nexus. The results
from the main estimations as well as from a series of additional robustness tests are
then reported. The last part of the paper discusses the significance of the findings
in light of existing research and clarifies the contribution of my study. The policy
implications of the findings, along with the main limitations characterising the paper
and some directions for future research, are also examined.
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Chapter 4 takes the findings reported in Chapter 3 as the point of departure and
addresses the third research objective underpinning my work, i.e. to evaluate how
ownership diversity in banking influences the risk-taking channel of monetary trans-
mission. As a result, this chapter moves the analysis one step further and provides
evidence on how the interactions between banks with different ownership structures
affect the relationship between monetary policy and bank risk. The initial part of the
paper includes an overview of the literature on the risk-taking channel and develops
the main hypotheses. The chapter then illustrates how the sample was constructed
and how the indices of ownership diversity, alongside the other variables used in the
empirical estimations, were derived. The benchmark model and estimation method
are also described. Subsequently, the results from the baseline estimations and from
various robustness checks are presented. Specific attention is devoted to explain-
ing how the findings contribute to knowledge and what implications they have for
monetary authorities as well as banking regulators. The manuscript concludes with
a list of fruitful research avenues that originate from this paper and which could
advance knowledge in this field of enquiry.
Chapter 5 brings the findings from the different papers together and discusses the
overall contribution of the thesis at the theoretical, methodological and empirical
levels. A detailed description of the implications that my research has for practi-
tioners and policymakers is also reported. In addition, the chapter summarises the
efforts that I have made thus far to disseminate my findings and provides a list of
my academic papers, awards and presentations throughout my registration period.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the main limitations of my thesis and
with some suggestions on how my research could be taken forward.
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Chapter 2
Financial Firms as Vehicles for
Monetary Policy Transmission: A
Systematic Literature Review and
Future Directions
Abstract
Research on the role of financial firms as conduits for monetary policy transmission
has grown rapidly over the last few years. This notwithstanding, the scholarly de-
bate has been confined almost exclusively to the disciplines of finance and economics,
while individual contributions have remained scattered. Drawing on the Systematic
Literature Review (SLR) methodology and a sample of 152 articles published over
the 1963–2016 period, this paper organises the extant knowledge within a multidi-
mensional framework that combines (1) the mechanisms through which monetary
policy is transmitted to the real economy via financial intermediaries and (2) the
conditions underpinning the functioning of these mechanisms. The review finds
support for a multifaceted role of financial institutions as mediators between central
bank interventions and economic outcomes. A key finding is that the response of
financial firms to changes in monetary policy matters not only for economic perfor-
mance, but also for the soundness of the financial system. The proposed framework
allows scholars to review the existing literature in a systematic manner and locate
their work into a wider context, while contributing towards a more holistic approach
to the review topic. The implications of the framework for practitioners and policy-
makers are identified, alongside a concrete agenda for furthering our understanding
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of this important field of research. Some opportunities for gradually repositioning
this topic as a legitimate area of theoretical and empirical analysis in management
studies are also highlighted.
Keywords: Bank risk taking; economic performance; financial crisis; financial sector;
financial stability; monetary transmission mechanism.
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2.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in institutions and organisations, as
demonstrated by the growth in institutional research and the use of the institution
concept across a range of disciplines such as management, economics, sociology and
geography. According to North (1991, p. 97), institutions provide the formal and
informal ‘rules of the game’ that structure political, economic and social interaction.
As a result, institutions are viewed as the type of structures that matter the most
within society, since “they make up the stuff of social life” (Hodgson, 2006, p. 2). If
institutions define the rules of the game, organisations and their entrepreneurs are
seen as the players (North, 1994). Organisations are considered as the most impor-
tant institution in modern society (Zucker, 1977), since they represent a significant
source of variability as well as prominent actor (Greenwood et al., 2014). There is
nowadays considerable agreement among scholars on the need to develop a greater
understanding of not only the nature of institutions and organisations (Green and
Li, 2011), but also their role in shaping economic outcomes (Acemoglu et al., 2001;
Buchanan et al., 2014; Chang, 2011).
A vivid illustration of how institutions in general and organisations in particular
may influence the course of the economy is offered by the ‘great crash’ of 2008 (Hodg-
son, 2009), arguably the most severe economic downturn since the Great Depression
of the 1930s. Among the plethora of explanations behind the global financial crisis, a
growing strand of the literature places the spotlight on monetary policy and the role
it played in influencing organisational behaviour (Borio and Zhu, 2012; Dell’Ariccia
et al., 2014). In the aftermath of the dot-com bust, a number of central banks
throughout the world tackled fears of an economic slowdown by gradually decreas-
ing nominal interest rates. By the mid-2000s, these policies resulted in nominal
rates reaching historically low levels. In the US, money market rates dropped from
6.26% in 2000 to 3.22% in 2005, with a record low of 1.13% in 2003. Similarly, in
the euro area money market rates fell from 4.12% in 2000 to 2.09% in 2005, while
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in the UK they went down from 5.84% in 2000 to 4.68% in 2005. This environment
of relatively low interest rates—the theory goes—triggered excessive risk taking by
financial firms through underlying changes in risk perception and aversion, thereby
contributing to the build-up of risks in the economy. In a nutshell, this line of
argument elaborates that ‘too-low-for-too-long’ interest rates led to a reduction in
information asymmetries and bank profits (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). In an
attempt to counterbalance the negative effects on their margins, financial interme-
diaries reacted by loosening lending standards, thus raising the level of risk in their
portfolios and the associated probability of failure.1
Spurred by the recent economic meltdown, research on the mediating role of
financial firms as vehicles for monetary policy transmission has grown rapidly over
the last few years. These works have addressed a number of aspects associated with
this complex phenomenon, such as the effects of asymmetric information in credit
markets on the monetary transmission mechanism (e.g. Neyer, 2007),2 the conse-
quences of increased globalisation of banking for the propagation of international
shocks (e.g. Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011) and the implications of active balance
sheet management by financial firms for monetary policy effectiveness (e.g. Adrian
and Shin, 2010). Although some of these issues may go beyond the scope of man-
agement studies, a growing number of contributions have been concerned with a
variety of aspects that are more micro-founded. Some examples include the lending
supply reactions of shareholder- vis-à-vis stakeholder-oriented banks to variations
in the monetary stance (Ferri et al., 2014), the different risk-taking behaviours of
banks with varying degrees of capitalisation in response to monetary policy changes
(Jiménez et al., 2014) and the importance of relationship lending for the price-setting
1In explaining why Citigroup continued financing loans despite soaring risks, its former Chair-
man Chuck Prince said: “[w]hen the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated.
But, as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing” (Financial
Times, July 9, 2007).
2According to Taylor (1995), the monetary transmission mechanism describes the process
through which monetary policy decisions affect real output and inflation.
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behaviour of banks (Gambacorta, 2008). These aspects are indeed not outside the
scope of managerial theory and practice, as they show how the transmission of mon-
etary impulses to the real economy depends critically on the strategies and actions
of financial firms (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000). Yet, the
diversity of topics examined by the literature has made it difficult for researchers to
build on each other’s work, resulting in a highly fragmented body of evidence and
hindering progress in this important field of research.
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to develop an integrated view
of the role of financial firms as vehicles for monetary policy transmission by con-
ducting a systematic review of the extant literature. Drawing on the Systematic
Literature Review (SLR) methodology (Counsell, 1997; Tranfield et al., 2003), this
study evaluates existing contributions on the monetary transmission process via fi-
nancial institutions in terms of what is known about (1) the mechanisms (i.e. what
are the channels through which monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy
via financial firms?) and (2) the conditions (i.e. what variables affect the ability of
financial firms to act as conduits for monetary policy transmission and at what level
do they operate?). In addressing these questions, this review makes a twofold con-
tribution. On the one hand, it organises existing studies within a multidimensional
framework that combines mechanisms and underlying conditions of the monetary
transmission mechanism via financial firms, thereby allowing scholars to review the
existing literature in a systematic manner and locate their research efforts into a
wider context. On the other hand, this paper suggests complementary avenues for
future research and highlights some opportunities for gradually repositioning this
topic as a legitimate area of theoretical and empirical analysis in management stud-
ies. In light of the discussion that has ensued on whether the current environment
of exceptionally low interest rates is already sowing the seeds for the next financial
crisis, this review appears to be particularly timely.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2.2 explains the
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methodology used in this study and details the main steps followed while planning
and conducting the review. Section 2.3 presents a descriptive overview and a the-
matic analysis of the results, along with a synthesis of the review findings in the
form of a multidimensional framework. Section 2.4 discusses the results, advances
suggestions for future research and describes the implications as well as limitations
of this paper. Section 2.5 offers some reflections and concludes.
2.2 Methodology
Originally developed in the field of medical sciences during the early 1980s, the SLR
approach has emerged as a rigorous means of finding, investigating and combining
evidence about the effectiveness of alternative healthcare interventions (Counsell,
1997). Since then, the SLR has spread to a number of other disciplines as a useful
tool for providing practitioners and policymakers with a reliable basis on which to
make decisions (Tranfield et al., 2003). According to its proponents, the systematic
approach to reviewing the literature helps minimise potential biases by means of a
replicable, transparent and scientific review process (Denyer and Tranfield, 2009).
The primary aim is to select, appraise and integrate all the existing studies that are
relevant to the review being undertaken, regardless of their place of publication or
disciplinary background (Thorpe et al., 2005). For this reason, the SLR is generally
viewed as a “good scientific practice” (Rousseau et al., 2008, p. 479) and “an efficient
technique for hypothesis testing” (Petticrew, 2001, p. 99), thereby being invoked as
a robust alternative to traditional narrative reviews (Denyer and Neely, 2004).
2.2.1 Review Strategy
In line with the approach suggested by Tranfield et al. (2003), the review was con-
ducted on the basis of three major stages: (1) development of a review plan; (2)
selection, analysis and synthesis of relevant studies; and (3) reporting and dissemi-
nation of the review findings. Prior to embarking on the review, a panel was formed
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consisting of four scholars with expertise in the area being examined and three (two
academics and a librarian) systematic review specialists. The purpose of the panel
was to provide guidance on the review process and resolve any dispute regarding
the inclusion and exclusion of studies. Following the institution of a review panel, a
scoping study was produced with the aim of assessing the relevance and size of the
literature as well as delimiting the subject area (Tranfield et al., 2003).
On the basis of the scoping study, I set my objective as the systematic assess-
ment of the theoretical, conceptual and empirical evidence on the micro-foundations
of the monetary transmission mechanism via financial firms. Drawing on the CIMO
(Context, Intervention, Mechanism and Outcome) logic put forward by Denyer and
Tranfield (2009), the following overarching question to be addressed in the system-
atic review was formulated: what role do financial firms play in monetary policy
transmission? Specifically, the review was driven by two closely intertwined sub-
questions: (1) what are the mechanisms (M) through which monetary policy (I)
is transmitted to the real economy via financial intermediaries (O)? and (2) under
what conditions (C) are these mechanisms operative?
Consistent with the principles underpinning the SLR methodology (Tranfield
et al., 2003), the above decisions were formalised into a review protocol. Besides
including the aim and question as well as sub-questions underlying the review, this
document contains detailed information pertaining to four additional areas: (1) the
search strategy; (2) the inclusion and exclusion criteria; (3) the standards for quality
appraisal; and (4) the plan for data extraction and synthesis. After framing the
review question, the next step involved the identification of appropriate keywords
and search terms. In an attempt to ensure that all the relevant references could
be retrieved, keywords were selected on the basis of a careful examination of the
literature included in the scoping study. This process yielded a final list of 19
keywords, 9 of which associated with the concept of ‘monetary policy’ (Category A)
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and 10 related to the term ‘financial intermediary’ (Category B).3 The terms from
Category A were then combined with the keywords from Category B via the Boolean
operator ‘AND’, resulting in a total of 9 × 10 = 90 search strings (e.g. ‘monetary
polic*’ AND ‘financial firm*’, ‘monetary transmission’ AND ‘financial intermedia*’
and ‘interest rate*’ AND ‘bank*’).
Following the definition of the search strategy, specific efforts were made to de-
velop valid criteria for the inclusion and exclusion of studies.4 First, I limited the
sources to peer-reviewed journals. As suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2005), academic
journals are usually regarded as containing validated knowledge that is likely to have
the highest impact in the field. Moreover, I followed an approach similar to Meier
(2011) and considered only publications in scholarly journals with an Impact Factor
greater than or equal to the Median Impact Factor for the relevant category (e.g.
‘Business, Finance’) in the 2016 Journal Citation Reports R© by Clarivate Analytics.5
While allowing to draw conclusions based on a group of authoritative contributions,
this criterion served as a useful device for reducing the scope of the review which
could otherwise be overwhelming. As to the more substantive criteria, I included
theoretical, conceptual and empirical articles with a specific focus on the role played
by financial firms in monetary policy transmission, along with some evidence of the
micro-foundations of the monetary transmission mechanism via financial institu-
tions. In addition, a broad definition of monetary policy was adopted as consisting
of any operation through which the central bank pursues its mandate by targeting
3The keywords used in the review were the following: ‘monetary polic*’, ‘monetary shock*’,
‘monetary expansion*’, ‘monetary impulse*’, ‘monetary contraction*’, ‘monetary tightening*’,
‘monetary transmission’, ‘interest rate*’, ‘policy rate*’ (Category A) and ‘bank*’, ‘financial inter-
media*’, ‘financial institution*’, ‘financial firm*’, ‘financial system*’, ‘financial sector*’, ‘financial
industr*’, ‘financial friction*’, ‘credit friction*’, ‘credit market*’ (Category B). Furthermore, 35
additional keywords were excluded because not productive when run individually against another
keyword.
4The full list of the inclusion and exclusion criteria with their underlying rationale is included
in Appendix Table A.1.
5My approach differs from Meier (2011) in that I decided not to set a subjective threshold (i.e. a
5-Year Impact Factor higher than 1.5), but instead focused on the position of each journal relative
to the overall distribution of journals within the relevant category.
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either financial market prices (e.g. short-term interest rates) or financial market
quantities (e.g. money supply). Similarly, I did not delimit the focus of the review
with respect to the type of financial institutions and included studies dealing not
only with banking firms, but also with other categories of financial institutions (e.g.
broker-dealers, insurance companies and pension funds).
Finally, the review protocol contains two sections dedicated to the criteria for
quality appraisal and the plan for data extraction and synthesis. On the one hand,
I chose not to fix an a priori list of standards to be used for quality appraisal, but
instead developed an ad hoc checklist by looking at the reviewer guidelines from the
journals included in the analysis. On the other hand, I devised a data extraction
form aimed at assisting with the analysis and synthesis of data. As a last component
of the review plan, I developed a strategy for integrating findings across studies
based on the methodology known as ‘realist synthesis’ (Pawson, 2002). In light
of its emphasis on the causal mechanisms underlying different types of intervention
(Mays et al., 2005), this approach is particularly well suited to addressing my review
question.
2.2.2 Data Collection
After formulating the review strategy, the search strings developed in my protocol
were used to investigate eight citation databases: ABI/INFORM Complete, EBSCO
Business Source Complete, Emerald Insight, ScienceDirect, Scopus, Taylor & Francis
Online and Web of Science.6 This initial search yielded a total of 24,332 hits, with
an average of 3,476 references per database. The citation data and abstract of each
study were exported to RefWorks, where references were organised in alphabetical
order per primary author and duplicates removed. At the end of this process, I was
left with 12,133 citations to be examined on title and abstract. These references
6Since Taylor & Francis Online did not allow a search on the basis of truncated terms, for this
database all the possible variant word endings were considered and a final list of 39 keywords (17
for Category A and 22 for Category B) was used.
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were reviewed according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria, resulting in 11,835
citations being rejected because not meeting the set criteria.7
The remaining group of 298 articles was considered for full-text analysis. After
screening the text of each study on the basis of the inclusion and exclusion criteria, I
was able to separate references into A (highly relevant), B (moderately relevant) and
C (non-relevant) lists.8 To account for the possible rigidity of the search strategy,
the A-list of 139 articles was used to perform a series of additional checks. First, with
the aim of triangulating the results of the main search, I systematically investigated
the websites of the 12 journals in the sample with a number of references greater
than the average.9 Furthermore, I ranked the studies according to the number of
times they had been cited in Web of Science and tracked the citations of those
articles with above mean annual values.10 Third, the reference section of all the
included studies was examined carefully to check for relevant articles that were not
retrieved through the keyword search.11 This procedure resulted in 21 more articles
being added to the sample.
The 160 references that were left following the aforementioned stages were finally
7The majority of the studies were eliminated because, although being peer-reviewed journal
articles, they were either not focused on the role played by financial firms in the monetary trans-
mission mechanism or they were published in journals with an Impact Factor below the identified
threshold.
8The B list contains articles that, even though not providing evidence on the micro-foundations
of the monetary transmission mechanism through financial firms, were somewhat relevant to the
topic under review (e.g. focus on the macroeconomic implications of financial frictions, link between
financial intermediaries and business cycle fluctuations or the optimal conduct of monetary policy
in the presence of financial frictions). Conversely, the C-list studies were excluded because not
meeting the assessment criteria (e.g. not a full-text journal article, focus on non-financial firms or
emphasis on the wider role played by financial intermediaries in the economy).
9The journals selected were the following: Journal of Banking and Finance; Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking ; Journal of International Money and Finance; American Economic Review ;
Journal of Policy Modeling ; European Economic Review ; International Journal of Central Banking ;
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money ; Journal of Finance; Journal
of Monetary Economics; German Economic Review ; Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
10When data on the citation count were not available in Web of Science, the relevant information
was retrieved from Scopus, EBSCO Business Source Complete or Google Scholar.
11The checks led to the inclusion of 12 studies that, although being published in sources with an
Impact Factor below the specified threshold, appear to have influenced significantly the relevant
debates in the subject area.
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evaluated against a set of predetermined criteria. Drawing on the guidelines for
reviewers available at the websites of the journals considered in the review, a 15-
point checklist aimed at helping determine the overall quality of each article was
created.12 After assessing all the studies according to the quality criteria, I decided
to exclude eight citations that seemed to raise some concerns with respect to one
or more of the five areas making up the quality appraisal tool.13 Therefore, the
selection process led to the identification of 152 studies as being highly relevant to
the review question and fulfilling the quality requirements. This list of articles was
then imported into NVivo for data extraction purposes and constitutes the basis
on which the claims in this paper are made. Figure 2.1 summarises the selection
process followed in the review.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 2.1 reports the distribution of the 152 articles included in the final sample
according to their source title. At a glance, the Journal of Banking and Finance
and the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking appear to be the major outlets
for the dissemination of scholarly research on the topic, accounting for 14% and
9%, respectively, of the overall number of studies selected for the review. At a
closer look, the academic debate in the subject area seems to be located primarily
between the fields of finance and monetary economics, while the majority of the
contributions come from either US- or European-based journals. At the same time,
academic research concerned with the role played by financial intermediaries as
12The full list of questions included in the checklist is reported in Appendix Table A.2.
13While five references were rejected because of a somewhat serious neglect of key contributions
in the field when building the relevant theoretical framework, three articles were not included due
to substantial concerns over the existence of sufficient information to support the recommendations
being put forward.
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References identified through database searching: n = 24,332
   - ABI/INFORM Complete: n = 3,983
   - EBSCO Business Source Complete: n = 7,158
   - Emerald Insight: n = 56
   - ScienceDirect: n = 2,002
   - Scopus: n = 5,671
   - Taylor & Francis Online: n = 578
   - Web of Science: n = 4,884
References reviewed on title and abstract: n = 12,133
Duplicates removed: n = 12,199
References excluded after perusal of title and abstract: n = 11,835
References considered for full-text analysis: n = 298
References excluded with reason based on full text: n = 159
   - (B) Moderately relevant references: n = 102
   - (C) Non-relevant references: n = 57
References included after reading full text: n = 139
   - (A) Highly relevant references: n = 139
Additional references included through further checks: n = 21
   - References identified from journal websites search: n = 1
   - References identified via citation tracking: n = 5
   - References identified through ‘snowballing’: n = 15
References considered for quality appraisal: n = 160
References excluded after quality appraisal: n = 8
References included in the review: n = 152
Figure 2.1 Summary Diagram of the Selection Process
Notes: The figure illustrates the steps that were followed in selecting the review sample. Continuous
lines denote stages in which references were included, whereas dotted lines represent steps where
references were excluded.
vehicles for monetary policy transmission has observed a significant increase over
the last decade. Figure 2.2 shows the number of articles by year of publication from
1963 (the year of the oldest study in the sample) to 2016 (the year of the most recent
contributions included in the review). Whereas the annual number of studies has
been somewhat constant until the late 1990s, there is evidence of a spike around
the mid-2000s and a fairly important increase during the most recent years. The
cumulative number of publications grew from 46 in 2005 to 152 in 2016, representing
an increase of approximately 230%. Broadly speaking, this somewhat crude data
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appears to reflect a revived interest in the topic, in line with the ongoing debate over
the interplay between financial firms’ behaviour and monetary authorities’ decisions.
Table 2.1 Distribution of Articles by Source Title
Source title No. of articles % of sample
Journal of Banking and Finance 22 14%
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 13 9%
Journal of International Money and Finance 9 6%
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and
Money
8 5%
American Economic Review ; Journal of Policy Modeling 7 5%
European Economic Review ; International Journal of Central
Banking ; Journal of Finance
6 4%
International Review of Economics and Finance; Journal of
Monetary Economics
5 3%
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control ; Journal of
Financial Stability
4 3%
Econometrica; Economic Inquiry ; Economic Policy ; Economica;
European Financial Management ; IMF Economic Review
(formerly IMF Staff Papers); International Review of Financial
Analysis; Journal of Applied Econometrics; Journal of Financial
Services Research; Journal of the European Economic
Association; Journal of the Japanese and International
Economies; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Review of
Financial Studies
2 1%
AEA Papers and Proceedings; Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity ; Cambridge University Press; China Economic Review ;
De Nederlandsche Bank Research Memoranda WO&E ; ECB
Working Paper Series; Emerging Markets Review ; Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series; Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Economic Policy Review ; Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Staff Reports; German Economic Review ;
IMF Working Papers; Journal of Comparative Economics;
Journal of Economic Perspectives; Journal of Economic Theory ;
Journal of Economics and Business; Journal of Financial
Economics; Journal of Financial Intermediation; NBER
Working Paper Series; RAND Journal of Economics; Regional
Studies; Review of Economic Dynamics; Review of Finance;
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
1 1%
Notes: The table shows the distribution of articles by source title. The number of articles and
the percentage of sample are calculated on a per title basis. The sample period goes from 1963 to
2016.
In terms of the composition of the sample, Figure 2.3 presents a breakdown of



































































































Figure 2.2 Number of Articles per Year of Publication
Notes: The figure depicts the number of articles by year of publication. The sample period goes
from 1963 to 2016.
the articles by paper type, whereas Figure 2.4 illustrates the distribution of empiri-
cal studies according to their geographical focus. The most common type of papers
is constituted by empirical articles (84%), with a greater emphasis on theory testing
(65%) than on theory building (19%). The number of theoretical studies is rather
limited (13%), whilst conceptual articles represent the smallest share (3%). Among
the empirical papers, 39% of the articles offer evidence drawn from the European
context, while about one third of the studies place their emphasis on the US. Par-
ticularly interesting is the somewhat limited number of contributions dealing with
mixed evidence from industrial (10%) or developing (4%) countries. A few arti-
cles offer empirical findings related to Asian (9%) or other (4%) geographical areas.
Taken together, this data seems to show—perhaps not surprisingly—that the schol-
arly dialogue on the role of financial institutions in monetary policy transmission is














Figure 2.3 Breakdown of Articles by Paper Type














Figure 2.4 Breakdown of Empirical Articles by Geographical Focus
Notes: The figure presents the distribution of empirical articles by geographical focus. The sample
period goes from 1963 to 2016.
2.3.2 Thematic Analysis
Consistent with the adoption of a realist synthesis approach (Pawson, 2002), all of
the 152 articles were coded by drawing particular attention to two key themes: (1)
the mechanisms through which monetary policy is transmitted to the economy via
financial firms; and (2) the conditions under which these mechanisms are operative.
After extracting the relevant data and identifying the emergent themes as well as
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sub-themes, the studies were grouped according to their overarching themes. The
full list of themes was then examined to search for higher order concepts, result-
ing in a final set of six superordinate themes: (1) ‘interest rate pass-through’; (2)
‘credit channel’; (3) ‘bank lending channel’; (4) ‘balance sheet channel’; (5) ‘bank
capital channel’; and (6) ‘risk-taking channel’. Although some of these areas are
not discrete and partially overlap, each of the identified themes corresponds to a
different mechanism of monetary policy transmission in which financial firms are
deemed to play a central role. The bank lending channel (n = 55) and the interest
rate pass-through (n = 37) are the two most recurrent themes among the selected
papers. By contrast, fewer articles focus on either the risk-taking channel (n = 25)
or the credit channel (n = 19), whilst the smallest portion is represented by con-
tributions dealing with the bank capital channel (n = 10) and the balance sheet
channel (n = 3). In addition, only a handful of papers (n = 3) examine more than
one channel simultaneously. With the aim of understanding “what works for whom
in what circumstances” (Pawson, 2002, p. 342), the studies within each of the six
domains listed above were finally grouped by looking at the specific conditions under
which the corresponding mechanism is likely to be operative.
2.3.2.1 Interest Rate Pass-Through
As the textbook IS–LM model postulates, monetary policy affects the real economy
through the impact of interest rates on aggregate demand. According to the money
view of the monetary transmission mechanism, it is therefore paramount that fi-
nancial intermediaries pass on changes in market rates to lending and deposit rates.
Notwithstanding the critical role played by financial firms within the so-called ‘in-
terest rate channel’, it is only recently that researchers have started to place specific
emphasis on the pass-through of policy rates to bank retail rates. While pointing to
the lack of a theoretical framework capable of informing empirical research, Kopecky
and VanHoose (2012) develop a dynamic model of bank adjustment costs and show
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that each determinant of retail rates is directly linked to the competitive structure of
the market. Furthermore, in an attempt to provide a theoretical foundation for the
interplay between bank pricing rules and monetary policy, Agénor and El Aynaoui
(2010) demonstrate that excess liquidity may induce greater stickiness to deposit
rates following a monetary tightening and translate into lower lending rates.
Turning to the empirical literature, a substantial body of evidence has investi-
gated the extent to which the structure of the financial system influences the interest
rate pass-through. In what is widely viewed as the seminal contribution in the area,
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) point to the existence of a market for negotiable
short-term instruments and the absence of constraints on banking competition as
two of the main structural features enhancing lending rate flexibility. Building on
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Mojon (2000) focuses on the euro area and shows
that market deregulation in general and competition in particular are two important
factors underpinning the pass-through to credit and deposit rates.
A second question addressed by scholars concerns the implications of market
concentration and—consequently—banking competition for bank pricing behaviour.
The studies in this area suggest that banks operating in more concentrated markets
exhibit greater price rigidity (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992)
and benefit from wider margins for loans and deposits compared to banks in more
competitive industries (Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002; De Graeve et al., 2007). In
addition, there is evidence that the degree of price rigidity is higher for banks of
smaller size (Hannan and Berger, 1991) and with a larger capital buffer (De Graeve
et al., 2007). In a similar vein, banking competition affects the pass-through to both
loan rates (Brämer et al., 2013) and the volume of bank lending (Adams and Amel,
2011), whilst the speed of the adjustment process for deposit rates varies depending
on whether the stimulus for a change is upwards or downwards (Hannan and Berger,
1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992).
Following the pioneering contribution by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), a grow-
32 CHAPTER 2. PAPER 1
ing strand of the literature has tested empirically for the validity of the ‘complete-
ness’ and ‘symmetry’ hypotheses. Despite the somewhat heterogeneous nature char-
acterising this body of work, it is worth highlighting three primary conclusions
reached by these studies: (1) in the short run, the adjustment of retail rates to
money market rates is incomplete (Burgstaller and Scharler, 2010; Gambacorta,
2008; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004);14 (2) the degree of pass-through differs across fi-
nancial institutions (Chong et al., 2006; Heffernan, 1997) and products (Belke et al.,
2013; de Bondt, 2005; Chong et al., 2006; Égert et al., 2007; Heffernan, 1997; Kwapil
and Scharler, 2010); and (3) the speed of the adjustment process depends on the
sign of the policy rate change (Fuertes et al., 2010)15 and on whether retail rates
are above or below their equilibrium levels (Chong et al., 2006; Scholnick, 1996).
Besides explanations related to the structure of the financial system, contributions
in this area identify bank capital (Fuertes et al., 2010; Gambacorta, 2008), rela-
tionship lending (Gambacorta, 2008; Kitamura et al., 2016), product diversification
(Fuertes et al., 2010) and geographical location (Montagnoli et al., 2016) as some of
the bank-level variables influencing the interest rate pass-through.
Taken together, the aforementioned bodies of empirical literature share an im-
portant shortcoming, namely the neglect of interest rate expectations by financial
firms. This seems problematic, since not accounting for the role of expected market
rates when estimating models of interest rate pass-through may lead to erroneous
conclusions. Consonant with this observation, scholars have recently started to in-
vestigate how anticipated and unanticipated changes in the monetary policy stance
affect retail rates. This literature submits that market rate expectations play a
significant part in determining not only bank retail rates (Banerjee et al., 2013;
Kwapil and Scharler, 2013), but also the speed of the pass-through in loan markets
(Kleimeier and Sander, 2006). A transparent and well-communicated monetary pol-
14Evidence of an incomplete pass-through in relation to some financial products even in the
longer term is offered by Hofmann and Mizen (2004), Chionis and Leon (2006) and Rocha (2012).
15A different result is provided by Scholnick (1999).
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icy is thus seen as a key requirement for a faster and more homogeneous pass-through
(Kleimeier and Sander, 2006; Liu et al., 2008; Perera and Wickramanayake, 2016).
One spectacular feature of the global financial crisis was the apparent breakdown
in the link between policy and money market rates in many jurisdictions. As a
result, a new line of research has placed at the centre of its agenda the study of
the interest rate pass-through during periods of financial distress. According to
Karagiannis et al. (2010), disturbances in the functioning of the money markets
in Europe and the US were reflected in a widening of retail rate spreads, thereby
prompting additional measures by central banks in order to restore the effectiveness
of monetary policy. Moving on from these premises, Hristov et al. (2014) show that
the pass-through in the euro area has been significantly altered after the outbreak
of the crisis, primarily as a result of changes in the structural parameters of the
economies and a large increase in the average size of structural shocks. Similar
findings are presented by Aristei and Gallo (2014), who point to an opportunistic
behaviour by financial firms and a lack of confidence on their stability within the
money markets as the major factors explaining the lower degree of pass-through.
More recently, evidence has also been found in support of the key role played by
government bond spreads for the pass-through in countries that were hit by the
eurozone sovereign debt crisis (Cifarelli and Paladino, 2016), while non-standard
monetary policy appears to have complemented standard monetary interventions in
reducing bank lending rates (von Borstel et al., 2016).
2.3.2.2 Credit Channel
Another strand of the literature has moved analysis away from the traditional in-
terest rate mechanism to examine the implications of frictions in credit markets for
the propagation of monetary impulses. According to the credit view, the conven-
tional interest rate effects are amplified by virtue of a ‘credit channel’ of monetary
transmission (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). In a nutshell, researchers in this area
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contend that monetary policy affects the external finance premium in credit markets
via its impact on the supply of loans by depository institutions (‘bank lending chan-
nel’) and on borrowers’ balance sheets (‘balance sheet channel’). In one of the first
attempts to provide a theoretical foundation for the role of bank portfolios and—
hence—bank credit in monetary transmission, Silber (1969) shows that a monetary
policy-induced expansion in loans may be larger and generate more immediate effects
than an expansion via bank purchases of securities (e.g. government bonds) from the
public. Adopting a similar perspective, Labadie (1995) suggests that the influence
of inflation on real returns to lending is important for explaining the propagation
of monetary impulses via bank credit, while Repullo and Suarez (2000) argue that
the behaviour of market lending becomes ambiguous if one includes some elements
of the bank lending channel.
Following early evidence on the link between bank portfolio adjustments and
monetary policy transmission (Barth et al., 1977; Bryan and Carleton, 1967; Camp-
bell, 1978; Shearer, 1963), Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992) present the first em-
pirical study supporting the existence of a credit channel of monetary transmission.
By developing a variant of the IS–LM model that allows roles for both money and
credit, Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992) find that monetary policy affects—at
least in part—real activity by altering the composition of bank assets. Building on
this line of research, scholars have begun to test for the existence of a credit channel.
Notwithstanding the variety of empirical strategies employed to identify loan supply
shocks, this body of evidence shows that monetary policy does influence bank loans
(Ciccarelli et al., 2015; Hülsewig et al., 2006; Kashyap et al., 1993; Morgan, 1998;
Peek et al., 2003). Nonetheless, in a famous critique to this strand of the literature,
Romer and Romer (1990) offer evidence in support of the traditional money view
of the transmission mechanism and argue that monetary policy is likely to operate
mostly through bank liabilities (i.e. transactions balances) rather than bank assets
(i.e. bank lending). Furthermore, recent findings suggest that the monetary expan-
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sion pursued by the Federal Reserve over the past 15 years has neutralised the credit
channel of monetary transmission (Orlowski, 2015).
In an attempt to provide a better picture of the transmission mechanism via
the credit channel, few researchers have used disaggregated data to evaluate the
relative importance of the two sub-channels within the credit view. Drawing on
European data, de Bondt (1998) presents evidence consistent with the existence of
both a bank lending channel and a balance sheet channel of monetary transmission,
with the impact of monetary policy being stronger for relatively illiquid and small
banks (bank lending channel) and as loan demand interacts with bank size (balance
sheet channel). Contradictory results are nevertheless put forth by Aysun and Hepp
(2013), who consider loan-level data for the US and show that the credit channel
operates mostly through fluctuations in the sensitivity of bank lending to borrowers’
balance sheets.
2.3.2.3 Bank Lending Channel
A growing body of literature has drawn attention to the bank lending channel of
monetary policy transmission. Following Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), schol-
ars have made specific efforts to offer further theoretical support for the lending
channel. While Stein (1998) shows that a drain in reserves indeed causes a cutback
in loan supply, Aliaga-Dı́az and Olivero (2010) demonstrate that an augmented ver-
sion of the bank lending channel that accounts for firm heterogeneity should not be
rejected in favour of alternative mechanisms. In contrast to this line of research,
Diamond and Rajan (2006) cast doubts on the conceptual underpinnings of the
traditional view à la Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), suggesting a ‘financial
liquidity channel’ of monetary transmission operating via the impact of monetary
policy on real liquidity. In a similar vein, Disyatat (2011) claims that the emphasis
on the central bank’s ability to drain deposits is misplaced and presents an alter-
native formulation of the lending channel that operates mainly via the effects of
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monetary policy on banks’ balance sheet strength and risk perception.16 Moreover,
it has been established that banks’ capacity to raise additional volume of deposits
after a monetary restriction is dependent upon bank ownership (Andries and Billon,
2010).
A considerable number of studies have been concerned with testing empirically
for the existence of a bank lending channel. Early findings from the US show
that banks with less liquid balance sheets (Kashyap and Stein, 2000), smaller size
(Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000) and a lower degree of capital-
isation (Kishan and Opiela, 2000) are more responsive to changes in the monetary
policy stance, consistent with the lending view of monetary transmission.17 How-
ever, there is evidence that monetary impulses propagated via the bank lending
channel may be limited (Jayaratne and Morgan, 2000) and not linked to the real
economy (Ashcraft, 2006; Driscoll, 2004; Perez, 1998), while bank loan portfolios are
found to behave in a somewhat unpredicted manner following a monetary tighten-
ing (den Haan et al., 2007). Contrary to the assumptions underpinning the lending
view, support has also been found for an alternative model in which banks adjust
traded assets and liabilities to take advantage of profit opportunities arising in loan
markets (Fama, 2013).
Perhaps even less conclusive is the evidence from Europe, where the prominent
role played by banks in ensuring an effective functioning of the financial system has
stimulated extensive research in the area. Focusing primarily on the first link within
the bank lending channel (i.e. the relationship between monetary policy and bank
loan supply), much of this literature has attempted to uncover the distributional
effects of monetary actions across banks. A number of studies document significant
cross-sectional differences in the way banks with varying size (Akinci et al., 2013;
16The reformulated bank lending channel à la Disyatat (2011) finds empirical support in
Halvorsen and Jacobsen (2016).
17More recent evidence in favour of a bank lending channel in the US is offered by Dave et al.
(2013).
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Matousek and Sarantis, 2009), liquidity (Chatelain et al., 2003; Ehrmann et al.,
2003; Gambacorta, 2005; Jiménez et al., 2012; Matousek and Sarantis, 2009) and
capitalisation (Akinci et al., 2013; Altunbas et al., 2002; Gambacorta, 2005; Jiménez
et al., 2012) react to monetary actions. This notwithstanding, a concurrent strand
of research submits that differences in banks’ responses to monetary policy changes
are not important enough for the bank lending channel to be a quantitatively sig-
nificant mechanism (Favero et al., 1999; Frühwirth-Schnatter and Kaufmann, 2006).
Furthermore, the relative strength and ultimate existence of a lending channel are
shown to depend upon bank type (Kakes and Sturm, 2002; Küppers, 2001), mar-
ket structure (De Santis and Surico, 2013) and de jure deposit guarantees (Opiela,
2008).
Despite the growing attention on the bank lending channel, little is the empirical
evidence drawn from either non-US or non-European contexts. This is surprising,
as such evidence could offer beneficial insights into the economic importance of this
mechanism. One of the few contributions is advanced by Brissimis and Delis (2009),
who consider a sample of six OECD countries and find that a bank lending channel
is operative only in Japan and Greece. Similarly, Hosono (2006) shows that the
impact of monetary policy on bank lending is stronger for smaller, less liquid and
better capitalised banks, thereby suggesting that a lending channel is at work in
Japan. Additional support in favour of the significant effects of monetary impulses
on bank loan supply is put forward by Sun et al. (2010), who establish the existence
of long-run relationships between monetary policy, bank balance sheet variables (i.e.
deposits, loans and securities) and real activity within the Chinese context. More
recently, Ramos-Tallada (2015) has examined the determinants of the bank lending
channel in Brazil and found that various types of market uncertainty (e.g. interest
rate volatility) have a bearing on the functioning of this channel.
Motivated by recent developments in financial markets, some studies have ad-
dressed the question of whether asset securitisation affects the bank lending channel.
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According to Loutskina and Strahan (2009), securitisation is moving the banking
model away from the traditional ‘originate-and-hold’ approach to one of ‘originate-
to-distribute’, thus possibly mitigating banks’ financial constraints along with their
willingness to extend credit. Consonant with this proposition, greater securitisa-
tion activity is shown to alter the bank lending channel, by virtue of its impact on
banks’ ability to insulate loan supply from changes in monetary policy (Altunbas
et al., 2009; Loutskina, 2011). Interestingly, this result appears to hold even if the
entire Off-Balance-Sheet (OBS) portfolio of banks is considered rather than only
securitised assets (Perera et al., 2014).
An area that has been investigated more recently by the lending channel lit-
erature pertains to the implications of banking competition for the functioning of
this mechanism. Although this strand of research indicates that the competitive
conditions characterising the banking industry impact on the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy, there seems to be disagreement about the sign of this relationship.
Whereas evidence from Asia and Latin America suggests that increased competi-
tion in banking impairs the transmission of monetary impulses via the bank lending
channel (Olivero et al., 2011a; Yang and Shao, 2016), the opposite holds true in
relation to the euro area (Fungácová et al., 2014; Leroy, 2014).18 An explanation for
these conflicting results is advanced by Khan et al. (2016), who collect bank-level
data for five South-East Asian countries and show that the effects of competition on
the bank lending channel depend crucially on the competition measure being used.
Moreover, it is found that the strength of the lending channel is affected negatively
by the degree of consolidation in the banking sector, with these effects being more
pronounced among banks of smaller size (Olivero et al., 2011b).
Besides securitisation activity and banking competition, the literature on the
lending channel has pointed to a number of other factors influencing the effectiveness
18Similar evidence is put forward by Brissimis et al. (2014), who focus on a sample of US and
euro-area banks and find that market power buffers the impact of monetary policy on bank lending
and risk taking.
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of this channel. This body of evidence shows that the strength of the lending channel
varies depending on variables such as bank ownership (Bhaumik et al., 2011; Ferri
et al., 2014), bank business models (Gambacorta and Marqués-Ibánez, 2011), banks’
financing costs (Breitenlechner et al., 2016), internal capital markets (Campello,
2002; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012), interest rate derivatives (Purnanandam, 2007),
bank risk (Altunbas et al., 2010), involuntary excess reserves (Nguyen and Boateng,
2013), bank networks (Ehrmann and Worms, 2004), foreign bank penetration (Wu
et al., 2011), sovereign risk (Cantero-Saiz et al., 2014), deposit rate ceilings (Koch,
2015) and central bank’s liquidity injections (Salachas et al., 2016).
2.3.2.4 Balance Sheet Channel
While scholars have dedicated increasing attention to the bank lending channel,
fewer attempts have been made to explore the effects of monetary policy on the
demand for loans. According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), fluctuations in the
quality of borrowers’ financial positions induced by changes in the monetary policy
stance may affect their investment and spending decisions, thereby potentially alter-
ing their demand for bank sources of funding. A handful of US-based studies have
tested for the existence of a balance sheet channel, along with the variables that
may impact on the strength of this channel. By looking at internal capital markets
in financial conglomerates, Ashcraft and Campello (2007) identify a demand-driven
transmission mechanism that works via borrowers’ creditworthiness and is indepen-
dent from the bank lending channel. Similarly, Aysun and Hepp (2011) provide ev-
idence consistent with a credit channel operating through borrowers’ balance sheets
and being stronger for banks that securitise some of their assets. Additional support
in favour of a balance sheet channel is put forth by Alpanda and Aysun (2012), who
suggest that its effectiveness has increased over time as a result of the growth in
global banking. A recent attempt to uncover this mechanism of monetary trans-
mission outside of the US is offered by Popov (2016), who focuses on eight Central
40 CHAPTER 2. PAPER 1
and Eastern European (CEE) countries and shows that easier monetary conditions
lower the number of credit-constrained firms in the economy.
2.3.2.5 Bank Capital Channel
A fifth major strand of research has placed its emphasis on the role played by bank
capital and macroprudential regulation in the propagation of monetary impulses
to bank lending. From a theoretical perspective, Van den Heuvel (2002) argues
that the standard interest rate mechanism is enhanced by way of a ‘bank capital
channel’ of monetary transmission. Based on the existence of market imperfections
that modify the standard results of the Modigliani–Miller (Modigliani and Miller,
1958) theorem (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004), this thesis postulates that mon-
etary shocks under risk-based capital requirements and an imperfect market for
bank equity are likely to influence the supply of loans through their impact on the
capital accumulation process. In line with the bank capital channel hypothesis,
Kopecky and VanHoose (2004) demonstrate that binding capital requirements al-
ter the responsiveness of bank loans to changes in reserves and are therefore not
innocuous for monetary policy. Likewise, Chami and Cosimano (2010) show that
monetary policy changes affect banks’ ability to provide credit through variations
in the option value of holding capital, while Bolton and Freixas (2006) find support
for a credit-crunch equilibrium in the presence of high endogenous cost of capital.
Furthermore, Baglioni (2007) develops a heterogeneous agents model with a capital
requirement and demonstrates that well-capitalised banks act as important conduits
for monetary policy transmission irrespective of the market structure.
The empirical literature has endeavoured to uncover the implications of capital
requirements for the transmission of monetary policy. Early evidence on the relation-
ship between capital regulation and loan supply is advanced by Peek and Rosengren
(1995), who find that a lending channel disappears in the presence of binding capital
constraints on banks. Similarly, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) provide support
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for a capital channel working primarily through small banks with a larger maturity
mismatch in their balance sheets, while Kishan and Opiela (2006) suggest that less
capitalised banks are adversely affected by a tightening and not an expansionary
monetary policy only in the post–Basel/FDICIA period. Moreover, Cecchetti and
Li (2008) focus on the interplay between monetary policy and capital regulation and
establish that the central bank’s attempt to ensure a sufficient supply of loans may
be negatively influenced by the introduction of capital requirements. A somewhat
less decisive result is reached by Thakor (1996), who shows that—under risk-based
capital requirements—the effects of monetary policy on bank lending depend on its
impact on the term structure of interest rates.
2.3.2.6 Risk-Taking Channel
Fuelled by the recent economic downturn, a growing number of studies have pointed
to an additional channel of monetary transmission operating through the risk ap-
petite of financial firms. According to Borio and Zhu (2012), changes in official rates
affect either risk perceptions or tolerance via a ‘risk-taking channel’ of monetary
policy transmission.19 Broadly speaking, this channel works via three main mecha-
nisms: (1) the impact of interest rates on valuations, incomes and cash flows (Borio
and Zhu, 2012); (2) the existence of ‘sticky’ target rates of return (Rajan, 2006);
and (3) the reaction function and communication policies of the central bank (Cao
and Illing, 2015; Farhi and Tirole, 2012).20 Among these mechanisms, particular at-
tention has been devoted to the link between interest rates and the search-for-yield
effect (Rajan, 2006). The central tenet of this theory is that a prolonged period
of low interest rates may induce banks to soften their lending standards, thereby
generating an equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower and more volatile
19An alternative explanation is offered by Kishan and Opiela (2012), who identify a ‘risk-pricing
channel’ of monetary transmission operating via the risk pricing of uninsured bank debt in the
market for jumbo certificates of deposit.
20The relationship between the monetary policy reaction function and financial firms’ risk expo-
sure is also examined by de Groot (2014).
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profits and higher aggregate credit (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). Specifically,
the existence of a link between interest rates and bank risk taking is shown to depend
upon the bank capital structure (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014), the size of the monetary
shock (Valencia, 2014) and collateralised interbank borrowing (Cociuba et al., 2016).
Drawing on the theoretical framework above, the literature has recently started
to investigate empirically the relationship between monetary policy and banks’ ap-
petite for risk. In what is generally seen as one of the pioneering contributions in
the area, Jiménez et al. (2014) use a micro-level dataset for Spain and find support
for a risk-taking channel operating through less-capitalised banks. In a similar vein,
Ioannidou et al. (2015) focus on the Bolivian credit market and show that an ex-
pansionary monetary policy indeed increases banks’ appetite for risk. Besides these
seminal studies, evidence in favour of a risk-taking channel is found for both the US
(Adrian and Shin, 2010; Angeloni et al., 2015; Bruno and Shin, 2015; Buch et al.,
2014; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013) and Europe (Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Maddaloni
and Peydró, 2013). In addition, these results appear to hold even if somewhat more
heterogeneous samples are considered (Adrian et al., 2010; Altunbas et al., 2014;
Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011).
Despite the evidence of a statistically and economically significant relationship
between monetary policy and risk-taking incentives at financial institutions, schol-
ars seem to be divided on the determinants of this relationship. The empirical
literature suggests that the effects of interest rates on banks’ risk exposure dif-
fer according to bank capital (Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013;
Jiménez et al., 2014), bank liquidity (Ioannidou et al., 2015), bank type (Buch et al.,
2014), foreign funds (Ioannidou et al., 2015), involuntary excess reserves (Nguyen
and Boateng, 2015), bank ownership (Drakos et al., 2016), securitisation activity
(Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011), macroprudential policy
(Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011, 2013) and corruption (Chen et al., 2015). Moreover,
whilst evidence from the US reveals that the impact of monetary policy on banks’
2.3. RESULTS 43
appetite for risk is less pronounced for poorly capitalised banks (Dell’Ariccia et al.,
2013), the opposite appears to hold in the case of Europe (Delis and Kouretas, 2011;
Jiménez et al., 2014).
2.3.3 Synthesis of Review Findings
Taken together, the contributions reviewed in this paper portray a complex role
of financial firms as vehicles for monetary policy transmission. Following the early
studies acknowledging the importance of bank portfolios and—hence—bank credit
for the propagation of monetary impulses, the literature has pointed to several mech-
anisms that are deemed to amplify the traditional interest rate channel. This review
has discerned six major mechanisms through which monetary policy is transmitted
to the real economy via financial firms: (1) the interest rate pass-through; (2) the
credit channel; (3) the bank lending channel; (4) the balance sheet channel; (5) the
bank capital channel; and (6) the risk-taking channel. Although disagreement exists
with respect to the relative strength of the above channels, the evidence presented
in this paper has established a number of conditions underpinning the different
mechanisms. Broadly speaking, these conditions may be grouped into three pri-
mary categories: (1) firm-level (e.g. size, ownership and geographical location);
(2) industry-specific (e.g. banking competition, market concentration and financial
innovation); and (3) macroeconomic and regulatory (e.g. macroprudential policy,
financial deregulation and corruption) variables.21
By combining each of the six mechanisms of monetary transmission with the
three sets of conditions, one may obtain a comprehensive picture of the current
state of knowledge in the field. Table 2.2 presents a multidimensional framework of
the monetary transmission process via financial firms, where each of the 18 cells mak-
ing up the framework includes a set of conditions that—according to the literature
reviewed in this paper—are deemed to affect the functioning of the corresponding
21A model of the monetary transmission mechanism via financial firms as postulated by the
literature reviewed in this paper is illustrated in Appendix Figure A.1.
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mechanism. Whereas some of the factors influencing the ability of financial firms
to act as conduits for monetary policy transmission appear to be specific to a given
mechanism (e.g. product diversification for the interest rate pass-through and in-
terest rate gap for the risk-taking channel), there is evidence consistent with other
variables playing an important role across various channels. For instance, the litera-
ture shows that banking competition is not only a major determinant of the degree
of interest rate pass-through, but also one of the factors affecting both the bank
lending and risk-taking channels. At the same time, it is worth highlighting how
some variables (e.g. securitisation activity and globalisation of banking operations)
may produce differential effects on monetary policy transmission depending upon
the channel being examined. Taken together, these findings point to the central role
of financial firms in linking central bank interventions to economic outcomes, thus
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2.4 Discussion
As the results of the systematic review vividly highlight, the body of literature on
the role played by financial firms in monetary policy transmission appears to be
rather fragmented. All in all, the theoretical and empirical evidence tends to be
clustered around channels of monetary transmission, with few attempts made by
researchers to adopt a multi-channel approach. Furthermore, although the atten-
tion of scholars seems to be gradually shifting towards the implications of monetary
policy for bank risk taking, most of the extant literature is still concentrated on
the bank lending channel of monetary transmission. To the extent that this single-
channel approach leads to the creation of new, separate sub-fields within each of the
six areas identified in this review, the literature may become even more fragmented.
Researchers might be interested in exploring a single phenomenon without consid-
ering the system as a whole. However, practitioners and policymakers need and
should be provided with sound evidence that takes into account the overall com-
plexity surrounding the system. My main contribution has been to integrate this
fragmented body of knowledge into a comprehensive, multidimensional framework,
thereby depicting a more inclusive view of the monetary transmission process via
financial institutions. To my knowledge, the consolidating framework advanced in
this paper represents the first attempt to comprehensively structure the research
around the role of financial firms as vehicles for monetary policy transmission. It
follows that such a framework can be used as a springboard for future quantitative
and qualitative studies concerned with how central bank interventions are mediated
by financial institutions’ behaviour. By doing so, my hope is that not only can this




This study points to several areas in need of further research. In light of the current
period of exceptionally low interest rates, scholars could offer additional insights
into how the interplay between monetary authorities and market regulators might
shape the risk-taking incentives of financial firms. This work could shed light on
whether monetary policy and the degree of concentration in the financial sector
jointly affect credit risk appetite, thus possibly providing legitimacy to stricter an-
titrust regulations (e.g. how does market concentration impact on the risk-taking
channel of monetary transmission?). Following the unprecedented measures taken
by a number of central banks since the onset of the financial crisis, it would also
be worth investigating the extent to which such measures alter the role of finan-
cial institutions as conduits for monetary policy transmission. Notwithstanding the
empirical challenges, researchers could estimate the effects that purchases of assets
owned by non-financial firms (i.e. ‘quantitative easing’) might have on the propa-
gation of monetary impulses via the risk-taking channel (e.g. how does quantitative
easing influence the risk-taking channel of monetary transmission?). Furthermore,
a fruitful line of enquiry would be to explore how the formal institutional environ-
ment of a country might influence the monetary transmission process via financial
intermediaries. On this front, a possible research avenue could be to use the com-
prehensive Institutional Quality Dataset proposed by Kuncic (2014) and examine
the extent to which legal, political and economic institutions interact with central
bank policies in determining financial firms’ appetite for risk (e.g. to what extent
does a country’s institutional environment shape financial intermediaries’ ability to
act as vehicles for monetary policy transmission?). Finally, the field would bene-
fit from a more micro-founded approach to the study of the factors underpinning
differential responses by financial firms to monetary policy changes. For instance,
future research might examine how various features of intermediaries’ ownership
structures influence the functioning of the risk-taking channel (e.g. how does man-
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agerial compensation affect the transmission of monetary policy via the risk appetite
of banks?). By departing from the extant literature, this research could take indi-
viduals (e.g. senior executives or loan officers) as the unit of analysis—instead of
the whole organisation—and provide deeper insight into what drives risk appetite
at financial firms. Indeed, this is an endeavour that seems to call for specific efforts
on the part of management and organisation studies scholars.
2.4.2 Managerial Implications
The review findings have a number of implications for practitioners. A major area
of interest to managers is to be found in the identification of a set of factors that
may allow financial institutions to shield their loan supply from changes in monetary
policy. For instance, the review presented in this paper has shown that banks estab-
lishing long-term relationships with customers and operating within bank networks
may be able to insulate their loan portfolios better from fluctuations in interest
rates. Second, a key managerial implication of this study lies in the provision of
somewhat robust evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk tak-
ing. As a result, banks that raise the level of risk associated with their lending
activities via a softening in credit standards should expect lower and more volatile
profits, thereby potentially undermining their financial health. Third, the results
of this review may increase practitioners’ awareness of the role that their decisions
play in ensuring a smooth functioning of the financial and economic system. This
means that the consequences of their decisions on the whole system may become
more transparent. As the preceding discussion hints, greater cognisance of how fi-
nancial firms’ responses to variations in central bank policies may foster or hinder
economic growth is ultimately in the interest of financial firms.
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2.4.3 Policy Implications
The framework developed in this paper points to a number of factors that should
be accounted for in the central bank’s reaction function. In light of the link be-
tween interest rates and financial firms’ appetite for risk, the findings suggest that
monetary policy indeed matters for financial stability. For this reason, this study
lends support to the additional responsibilities of monetary authorities on macro-
prudential regulation and supervision, as epitomised by the new roles of the Federal
Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) in monitoring systemic risk. More-
over, the framework highlights the implications of financial innovation—proxied by
securitisation activity and banking globalisation—on the ability of financial firms
to act as conduits for monetary policy transmission. As a result, it appears critical
for central banks to monitor the developments in financial markets and to calibrate
their policy actions accordingly. Third, there is evidence that a transparent and
well-communicated monetary policy can not only strengthen the pass-through from
official to retail rates, but also contribute to the overall stability of the financial
system. It seems therefore imperative for monetary authorities to invest time and
effort in ensuring an effective communication of their policies, whereby enhancing
both the credibility and certainty surrounding future policy moves.
2.4.4 Limitations
As a first attempt to provide a systematic assessment of the literature on the role
played by financial intermediaries in monetary policy transmission, it is acknowl-
edged that this study is not free from limitations. First, following the decision to
limit the analysis to peer-reviewed journals, it is conceivable that some potentially
relevant articles might have been excluded from the sample. By means of the addi-
tional checks that were performed to account for the possible rigidity of the search
strategy, it is nonetheless believed that the selected list of contributions covers the
key studies in the field. Second, the analysis has been concerned with offering a
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holistic view of the topic rather than a detailed account of the different sub-fields.
While arguing that this feature represents at the same time one of the strengths of
this paper, it is left for future research a deeper examination of one or more of the
six strands of the literature identified in this study. Furthermore, another limita-
tion might be associated with the overall generalisability of the findings. Given the
predominant focus of the articles included in this review on either Europe or the
US, caution should be taken when extending the conclusions of this paper to other
economic contexts.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper set out to systematically review the literature on how the interplay be-
tween financial firms and monetary policy may shape economic outcomes, with the
twofold aim of uncovering the mechanisms through which central bank interventions
are transmitted to the economy via financial intermediaries and the conditions un-
derpinning the functioning of these mechanisms. By conforming to the principles of
the SLR methodology, this review found support for a multifaceted role of financial
firms as vehicles for monetary policy transmission. My main contribution has been
an integration of the current state of knowledge into a multidimensional framework,
whereby a comprehensive picture of the monetary transmission process via financial
institutions may be portrayed. A major lesson that can be drawn from the findings
is that the response of financial firms to changes in monetary policy matters not
only for economic performance, but also for the stability of the financial system.
While noting that the role of financial institutions in mediating the propagation
of monetary impulses should be of great interest to management and organisation
studies, this paper observed that the relevant scholarly debate is located primarily—
and almost exclusively—between the fields of finance and monetary economics. As
an ‘eclectic’ discipline (Zanko and Dawson, 2012), management is particularly well
suited to providing richer insights into and progressing our understanding of this im-
2.5. CONCLUSIONS 53
portant area of research. For this reason, this study calls for management scholars
to take up this challenge and make use of a variety of theoretical as well as re-
search approaches that may allow for complementing the existing body of specialist
knowledge. What is still largely concealed from the debate over the role of financial
intermediaries as conduits for monetary policy transmission is that these phenomena
are ultimately shaped by the actions and strategies of organisational agents. My
hope is that the contribution advanced in this paper will help draw greater attention
on the part of management scholars and reposition this topic within the scope of
management and organisation studies.
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monetary policy. Journal of Financial Stability, 6(3):121–129.
Altunbas, Y., Gambacorta, L., and Marqués-Ibánez, D. (2014). Does monetary
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Maddaloni, A. and Peydró, J.-L. (2013). Monetary policy, macroprudential policy,
and banking stability: evidence from the euro area. International Journal of
Central Banking, 9(1):121–169.
Matousek, R. and Sarantis, N. (2009). The bank lending channel and monetary
transmission in Central and Eastern European countries. Journal of Comparative
Economics, 37(2):321–334.
Mays, N., Pope, C., and Popay, J. (2005). Systematically reviewing qualitative and
quantitative evidence to inform management and policy-making in the health
field. Journal of Health Services Research and Policy, 10(1):6–20.
Meier, M. (2011). Knowledge management in strategic alliances: a review of empir-
ical evidence. International Journal of Management Reviews, 13(1):1–23.
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance
and the theory of investment. American Economic Review, 48(3):261–297.
Mojon, B. (2000). Financial structure and the interest rate channel of ECB monetary
policy. ECB Working Paper Series, 40.
Montagnoli, A., Napolitano, O., and Siliverstovs, B. (2016). Regional interest rate
pass-through in Italy. Regional Studies, 50(8):1404–1419.
66 CHAPTER 2. PAPER 1
Morgan, D. P. (1998). The credit effects of monetary policy: evidence using loan
commitments. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 30(1):102–118.
Neumark, D. and Sharpe, S. A. (1992). Market structure and the nature of price
rigidity: evidence from the market for consumer deposits. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 107(2):657–680.
Neyer, U. (2007). Asymmetric information and the transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy. German Economic Review, 8(3):428–446.
Nguyen, V. H. T. and Boateng, A. (2013). The impact of excess reserves beyond
precautionary levels on bank lending channels in China. Journal of International
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 26:358–377.
Nguyen, V. H. T. and Boateng, A. (2015). An analysis of involuntary excess reserves,
monetary policy and risk-taking behaviour of Chinese banks. International Review
of Financial Analysis, 37:63–72.
North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1):97–112.
North, D. C. (1994). Economic performance through time. American Economic
Review, 84(3):359–368.
Olivero, M. P., Li, Y., and Jeon, B. N. (2011a). Competition in banking and the
lending channel: evidence from bank-level data in Asia and Latin America. Jour-
nal of Banking and Finance, 35(3):560–571.
Olivero, M. P., Li, Y., and Jeon, B. N. (2011b). Consolidation in banking and the
lending channel of monetary transmission: evidence from Asia and Latin America.
Journal of International Money and Finance, 30(6):1034–1054.
Opiela, T. P. (2008). Differential deposit guarantees and the effect of monetary
policy on bank lending. Economic Inquiry, 46(4):610–623.
Orlowski, L. T. (2015). Monetary expansion and bank credit: a lack of spark.
Journal of Policy Modeling, 37(3):510–520.
Pawson, R. (2002). Evidence-based policy: the promise of ‘realist synthesis’. Eval-
uation, 8(3):340–358.
REFERENCES 67
Peek, J. and Rosengren, E. S. (1995). Bank lending and the transmission of monetary
policy. In Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series, volume 39, pages
47–68, Boston. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
Peek, J., Rosengren, E. S., and Tootell, G. M. B. (2003). Identifying the macroe-
conomic effect of loan supply shocks. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
35(6):931–946.
Perera, A., Ralston, D., and Wickramanayake, J. (2014). Impact of off-balance
sheet banking on the bank lending channel of monetary transmission: evidence
from South Asia. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and
Money, 29:195–216.
Perera, A. and Wickramanayake, J. (2016). Determinants of commercial bank re-
tail interest rate adjustments: evidence from a panel data model. Journal of
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 45:1–20.
Perez, S. J. (1998). Causal ordering and ‘the bank lending channel’. Journal of
Applied Econometrics, 13(6):613–626.
Petticrew, M. (2001). Systematic reviews from astronomy to zoology: myths and
misconceptions. British Medical Journal, 322(7278):98–101.
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Bachrach, D. G., and Podsakoff, N. P. (2005).
The influence of management journals in the 1980s and 1990s. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal, 26(5):473–488.
Popov, A. (2016). Monetary policy, bank capital, and credit supply: a role for dis-
couraged and informally rejected firms. International Journal of Central Banking,
12(1):95–141.
Purnanandam, A. (2007). Interest rate derivatives at commercial banks: an empir-
ical investigation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(6):1769–1808.
Rajan, R. G. (2006). Has finance made the world riskier? European Financial
Management, 12(4):499–533.
Ramos-Tallada, J. (2015). Bank risks, monetary shocks and the credit channel in
68 CHAPTER 2. PAPER 1
Brazil: identification and evidence from panel data. Journal of International
Money and Finance, 55:135–161.
Repullo, R. and Suarez, J. (2000). Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitor-
ing: a model of the credit channel. European Economic Review, 44(10):1931–1950.
Rocha, M. D. (2012). Interest rate pass-through in Portugal: interactions, asymme-
tries and heterogeneities. Journal of Policy Modeling, 34(1):64–80.
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (1990). New evidence on the monetary transmission
mechanism. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1990(1):149–213.
Rousseau, D. M., Manning, J., and Denyer, D. (2008). Evidence in management and
organizational science: assembling the field’s full weight of scientific knowledge
through syntheses. Academy of Management Annals, 2(1):475–515.
Salachas, E. N., Laopodis, N. T., and Kouretas, G. P. (2016). The bank-lending
channel and monetary policy during pre– and post–2007 crisis. Journal of Inter-
national Financial Markets, Institutions and Money.
Sander, H. and Kleimeier, S. (2004). Convergence in euro-zone retail banking? What
interest rate pass-through tells us about monetary policy transmission, competi-
tion and integration. Journal of International Money and Finance, 23(3):461–492.
Scholnick, B. (1996). Asymmetric adjustment of commercial bank interest rates:
evidence from Malaysia and Singapore. Journal of International Money and Fi-
nance, 15(3):485–496.
Scholnick, B. (1999). Interest rate asymmetries in long-term loan and deposit mar-
kets. Journal of Financial Services Research, 16(1):5–26.
Shearer, R. A. (1963). The expansion of bank credit: an alternative approach.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 77(3):485–502.
Silber, W. L. (1969). Monetary channels and the relative importance of money
supply and bank portfolios. Journal of Finance, 24(1):81–87.
Stein, J. C. (1998). An adverse-selection model of bank asset and liability manage-
ment with implications for the transmission of monetary policy. RAND Journal
REFERENCES 69
of Economics, 29(3):466–486.
Sun, L., Ford, J. L., and Dickinson, D. G. (2010). Bank loans and the effects
of monetary policy in China: VAR/VECM approach. China Economic Review,
21(1):65–97.
Taylor, J. B. (1995). The monetary transmission mechanism: an empirical frame-
work. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4):11–26.
Thakor, A. V. (1996). Capital requirements, monetary policy, and aggregate bank
lending: theory and empirical evidence. Journal of Finance, 51(1):279–324.
Thorpe, R., Holt, R., Macpherson, A., and Pittaway, L. (2005). Using knowledge
within small and medium-sized firms: a systematic review of the evidence. Inter-
national Journal of Management Reviews, 7(4):257–281.
Tranfield, D., Denyer, D., and Smart, P. (2003). Towards a methodology for devel-
oping evidence-informed management knowledge by means of systematic review.
British Journal of Management, 14(3):207–222.
Valencia, F. (2014). Monetary policy, bank leverage, and financial stability. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 47:20–38.
Van den Heuvel, S. J. (2002). Does bank capital matter for monetary transmission?
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 8(1):259–265.
von Borstel, J., Eickmeier, S., and Krippner, L. (2016). The interest rate pass-
through in the euro area during the sovereign debt crisis. Journal of International
Money and Finance, 68:386–402.
Wu, J., Luca, A. C., and Jeon, B. N. (2011). Foreign bank penetration and the
lending channel in emerging economies: evidence from bank-level panel data.
Journal of International Money and Finance, 30(6):1128–1156.
Yang, J. and Shao, H. (2016). Impact of bank competition on the bank lending
channel of monetary transmission: evidence from China. International Review of
Economics and Finance, 43:468–481.
Zanko, M. and Dawson, P. (2012). Occupational health and safety management
70 CHAPTER 2. PAPER 1
in organizations: a review. International Journal of Management Reviews,
14(3):328–344.
Zucker, L. G. (1977). The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. Amer-
ican Sociological Review, 42(5):726–743.
APPENDIX A 71
Appendix A
Table A.1 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
Criterion Rationale
Inclusion
Publication as a scholarly
(peer-reviewed) journal article
A peer-reviewed journal article is likely to be of higher
quality compared to non-scholarly types of publication such
as working papers, conference proceedings or policy reports.
Publication in an academic
journal with an Impact Factor
greater than or equal to the
Median Impact Factor for the
relevant category (e.g.
‘Business, Finance’, ‘Economics’
and ‘Management’) according to
the 2016 Journal Citation
Reports R© by Clarivate
Analytics
The adoption of an Impact Factor threshold may allow to
draw conclusions on the basis of a set of authoritative
contributions, while providing a useful method for limiting
the scope of the review.
Any publication date Besides the lack of consensus among scholars with respect to
the seminal work in the field, the major reason behind the
decision not to include a starting date relates to the attempt
to identify the pioneering studies in the area being reviewed.
Theoretical, conceptual or
empirical paper
Although empirical research might constitute the most
common approach to the phenomenon being studied,
theoretical and conceptual articles play an essential role in
advancing knowledge in the field.
All countries The review aims to offer insights into the international
academic debate on the topic being examined, thereby
presenting literature concerned with a variety of geographical
contexts.
Focus on the role played by
financial firms in the monetary
transmission mechanism
The purpose of the review is to shed light on the mechanisms
through which monetary policy is transmitted to the real
economy via financial firms and the conditions under which
these mechanisms are operative.
Micro evidence The analysis endeavours to uncover the micro-foundations of
the monetary transmission mechanism by assessing the
implications of financial firms’ behaviour for monetary policy
transmission.
Broad definition of monetary
policy
In light of the different instruments and objectives adopted
by central banks around the world, monetary policy is
defined as any operation through which the monetary
authority pursues its mandate by targeting either financial
market prices (e.g. short-term interest rates) or financial
market quantities (e.g. money supply).
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Table A.1 (Continued)
Criterion Rationale
Any type of financial
institutions
Even though banking firms represent a key player within the
monetary transmission mechanism, other types of financial
institutions (e.g. broker-dealers, insurance companies and
pension funds) may have an important role as vehicles for
monetary policy transmission.
Exclusion
Publication in a non-English
language
A publication in a non-English language may not be
accessible to a wider audience, thus possibly jeopardising the
transparency and replicability of the review.
Commentary, editorial and
literature or book review
Since the aim of the study is to provide recommendations
based on either theoretical, conceptual or empirical papers,
other forms of academic publications are excluded from the
review and used as background information to assist with the
analysis.
Non-financial firms A study dealing with the role of non-financial firms in the
monetary transmission mechanism does not address the
review question and hence falls outside the scope of this
paper.
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Table A.2 Quality Appraisal Criteria
Area Criterion
Research purpose Is there an accurate description of what the research hopes to achieve and
a clear account of the problem being studied?
Does the article include a succinct statement of the research objectives or
question(s)?
Theory Does the article contain a well-developed theoretical framework and an
explanation of what other authors’ findings are being challenged or
extended?
Is there any major body of theory or important work that has been
omitted?
Research design Is there a comprehensive description of the research design?
Would the information provided allow the replication of the research?
If the article adopts new methods, are they explained in detail?
Is the design suitable for answering the question(s) addressed?
Are the sampling and data collection appropriate?
Data analysis Is there a detailed account of data analysis?
Is data analysis suitable for answering the question(s) addressed?
Are the research findings presented clearly and in a logical sequence?
Argument and
contribution
Is there sufficient information to support the claims being made?
Does the article provide an indication of how the results relate to previous
research?
Is there an explanation of how the research findings move the body of
scientific knowledge forward and contribute to policy/practice?
















































































































































































































































































































Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary
Transmission and Financial
Stability: What Role for
Stakeholder Banks?
Abstract
This paper examines how ownership structure interacts with monetary policy in
shaping financial intermediaries’ risk appetite. By constructing an unbalanced panel
of commercial, cooperative and savings banks from 17 Western European countries
over the 1999–2011 period, this study finds that differences in bank ownership influ-
ence the transmission of monetary policy via the risk-taking channel. While share-
holder banks appear to adjust the riskiness of their portfolios more actively over the
business cycle, there is evidence that the effects of lower interest rates on systemic
risk are dampened by the presence of stakeholder banks. These results suggest that
omitting ownership type may lead to incomplete conclusions about the impact of
monetary actions on bank risk taking. From a policy perspective, the findings point
to the systemic benefits to be derived from ‘biodiverse’ ownership structures in the
European banking sector.
Keywords: Bank risk taking; financial crisis; monetary transmission mechanism;





The global financial crisis has once again highlighted the wide-ranging implications
of a sound financial system for real growth and economic welfare. What triggered
this crisis and the ensuing economic contraction is likely to intrigue scholars and
other observers for years (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). A growing line of thought
places the spotlight on monetary policy and the role it plays in influencing financial
intermediaries’ behaviour (Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014). In the
aftermath of the dot-com bust, a number of central banks throughout the world
tackled fears of an economic slowdown by gradually decreasing nominal interest
rates. By the mid-2000s, nominal rates had reached historically low levels. In the
US, money market rates dropped from 6.26% in 2000 to 3.22% in 2005, with a
record low of 1.13% in 2003. Similarly, in the euro area money market rates fell
from 4.12% in 2000 to 2.09% in 2005, while in the UK they went down from 5.84%
in 2000 to 4.68% in 2005. This ‘too-low-for-too-long’ interest rate environment—the
theory goes—spurred risk taking by banks through changes in risk perception and
aversion, thereby adding to the build-up of risks in the economy via a ‘risk-taking
channel’ of monetary transmission (Borio and Zhu, 2012).
Notwithstanding the closer link between monetary conditions and bank risk tak-
ing, little has hitherto been the attention on how ownership structure interacts
with monetary actions in influencing banks’ appetite for risk. This is surprising,
since standard property rights (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and agency (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976) theories suggest that the type of ownership is a key determi-
nant of firms’ risk taking. In addition, whilst the banking literature abounds with
attempts to quantify risk taking with respect to profit-maximising banks (i.e. ‘share-
holder banks’), there has been somewhat limited focus on the contribution of banks
that pursue social as well as financial objectives (i.e. ‘stakeholder banks’) towards
financial system stability (Hesse and Cihák, 2007). Such a void is at odds with
the financial architecture of many European countries, in which shareholder banks
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coexist with a substantial—sometimes even dominant—stakeholder banking sector
(Ferri et al., 2013). For instance, this is the case in Germany, Italy and Austria,
where customer-owned cooperatives and not-for-profit savings banks far outweigh
in number their commercial peers. The debate over the benefits of a ‘biodiverse’
banking sector to ensure stability in the financial system has witnessed a renewed
interest during most recent years, as stakeholder banks weathered the financial tur-
moil somewhat unscathed (Ayadi et al., 2009). A case in point is the high resilience
exhibited by cooperative banks, which suffered a relatively small portion of the
total losses incurred by European banks and hardly required government support
(Groeneveld, 2011).1
Against this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to reconsider the role of stake-
holder banks in monetary economics by examining how bank ownership affects the
transmission of monetary policy via the risk-taking channel. This study intends to
shed light on the implications that the interplay between monetary policy and own-
ership type has for banks’ risk-taking incentives.2 Broadly speaking, this article lies
at the intersection of three major bodies of literature. It joins the growing discussion
around the link between interest rates and banks’ appetite for risk. As anticipated
above, this strand of research provides empirical support for a risk-taking chan-
nel of monetary transmission operating through bank risk perception and tolerance
(Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014), yet it is silent on whether differences
in ownership structure influence this transmission mechanism. Furthermore, this
paper is related to the body of evidence on the implications of bank ownership for
monetary policy effectiveness. As this line of enquiry shows (Drakos et al., 2016;
Ferri et al., 2014), differences in ownership type indeed matter for the reactions of
banks to monetary policy changes. My research also draws its theoretical founda-
1According to Groeneveld (2011), the cooperative banking sector is responsible for 8% of all
direct losses and write-downs of European banks during the crisis, whilst UBS and HSBC alone
accounted for 12% and 10%, respectively.
2To my knowledge, the only paper that accounts for differences in bank type—among other
aspects—while examining the risk-taking channel of monetary policy is Jiménez et al. (2014).
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tion from the literature on bank ownership and financial stability. Consistent with
underlying differences in their ownership structure, empirical evidence suggests that
stakeholder banks are generally more stable (Ayadi et al., 2010) and behave less
cyclically (Meriläinen, 2016) than their shareholder counterparts.
This paper makes a threefold contribution. First, in responding to recent calls
for a better understanding of banks’ incentives to take on risk (Gambacorta and
Marqués-Ibánez, 2011), this study brings concepts from the property rights (Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972) and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) perspectives
into the analysis of the risk-taking channel. By estimating the differential effects
of monetary interventions on bank risk taking owing to ownership structure, my
findings present an enhanced picture of the role played by financial institutions as
conduits of monetary policy transmission. Second, this article adds to the paucity
of evidence on the functioning of the risk-taking channel during periods of financial
distress.3 As the sample includes the euro area sovereign debt crisis alongside the
global financial crisis, it allows for the investigation of the extent to which risk-taking
behaviours of banks with alternative types of ownership vary over the business cycle.
Third, this research deals with the financial and economic benefits stemming from
a diversity of ownership types in the banking sector (Ayadi et al., 2009; Ferri et al.,
2013; Llewellyn, 2012). On this front, novel insights into how the interplay between
monetary policy and ownership structure shapes banks’ risk-taking incentives may
be of particular interest to policymakers, especially in countries that are consider-
ing processes of mandatory conversion of financial cooperatives to limited company
status (Casu and Gall, 2016).
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the
related literature and advances the theoretical predictions. Section 3.3 describes the
process that was followed in selecting the sample and constructing the variables,
3A notable exception is Maddaloni and Peydró (2013), who use the answers from the Bank
Lending Survey for the euro area and find that interest rates, together with long-term liquidity
provision, led to a softening in lending standards even after the start of the 2008 crisis.
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alongside the econometric model estimated. Section 3.4 illustrates the empirical
results and discusses the implications, as well as limitations, of the findings. Section
3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Monetary Policy and Bank Risk Taking
Fuelled by the recent economic downturn, a growing strand of the literature has
pointed to an additional channel of monetary transmission operating through the
risk-taking incentives of banks. According to Borio and Zhu (2012), changes in
official rates affect either risk perception or tolerance via a risk-taking channel of
monetary policy.4 In a nutshell, this channel works via three primary mechanisms:
(1) the impact of interest rates on valuations, incomes and cash flows (Borio and
Zhu, 2012); (2) the existence of ‘sticky’ target rates of return (Rajan, 2006); and
(3) the reaction function and communication policies of the central bank (Farhi and
Tirole, 2012). Among these mechanisms, particular attention has been devoted by
researchers to the link between interest rates and the search-for-yield effect. Simply
put, this theory posits that a prolonged period of low interest rates may induce a
degree of procyclical risk taking in the financial system (Rajan, 2006), eventually
generating an equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower and more volatile
profits and higher aggregate credit (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). Specifically,
the relationship between interest rates and bank risk taking is shown to depend on
the bank capital structure (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014) and the size of the monetary
shock (Valencia, 2014).
Drawing on the theoretical framework above, empirical evidence has recently
started to explore the link between monetary policy and banks’ appetite for risk. In
4An alternative explanation for monetary policy-induced changes in bank risk taking is put
forward by Kishan and Opiela (2012), who identify a ‘risk-pricing channel’ of monetary transmission
operating through the risk pricing of uninsured bank debt in the market for jumbo certificates of
deposit.
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what is generally viewed as one of the pioneering contributions in the field, Jiménez
et al. (2014) use a micro-level dataset for Spain and find support for a risk-taking
channel operating through less capitalised banks. In a similar vein, Ioannidou et al.
(2015) focus on the Bolivian credit market and show that an expansionary monetary
policy causes the granting of new loans to less creditworthy borrowers. By building a
panel of ‘shadow banks’, broker-dealers and commercial banks for the US, Germany,
UK and Japan, Adrian et al. (2010) uncover a joint dynamics between monetary
conditions, intermediaries’ appetite for risk and the macro risk premium.
In addition to these seminal studies, evidence of a risk-taking channel is found
for both the US and European financial systems. Using US data for market-based
financial intermediaries vis-à-vis commercial banks, Adrian and Shin (2010) submit
that short-term interest rates are important in determining the balance sheet size
of financial institutions. Further support for a risk-taking channel in the US is
offered by Paligorova and Santos (2013), who collect data at the Bank Holding
Company (BHC) level and find that banks charge riskier borrowers (compared to
safer borrowers) lower loan spreads in periods of monetary easing than in periods
of monetary tightening. Moreover, the relationship between policy rates and bank
risk taking appears to be more pronounced for domestic banks of smaller size (Buch
et al., 2014) and for better capitalised banks (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013). Within
the European context, early evidence of a link between interest rates and bank risk
taking is put forward by Delis and Kouretas (2011), who construct a sample of
commercial, savings and cooperative banks from 16 euro area countries and show
that the impact of loose monetary policy on risk assets is amplified for banks with
less equity capital as well as more Off-Balance-Sheet (OBS) items. Moreover, the
strength of the risk-taking channel is found to be reduced by means of a more
stringent prudential policy on either bank capital or the Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratio
(Maddaloni and Peydró, 2013). Interestingly, the negative relationship between
interest rates and bank risk seems to hold even if one considers somewhat more
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heterogeneous samples (Altunbas et al., 2014; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011).
3.2.2 Bank Ownership and Monetary Policy Transmission
In line with the revived interest in the ownership structure of banks and its implica-
tions for financial intermediation (Cull and Mart́ınez Peŕıa, 2013), a recent strand
of research has begun to examine how banks with different types of ownership react
to variations in monetary policy. By focusing primarily on the bank lending channel
of monetary transmission (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, 1992), this literature has
been concerned with the consequences of bank ownership for the transmission of
monetary impulses via the loan supply of banks. One of the first contributions in
this area is advanced by Andries and Billon (2010), who develop a theoretical model
to analyse the effects of state ownership and deposit insurance on monetary trans-
mission. By considering a representative bank whose ownership is shared between
the government and the private sector, Andries and Billon (2010) show that lending
provided by state-owned banks tends to be less responsive to changes in monetary
policy than lending provided by private banks due to the former’s superior ability
to raise additional deposits.
Turning to the empirical evidence, support for heterogeneous reactions of dif-
ferent types of banks to variations in the monetary policy stance is provided by
Bhaumik et al. (2011). Drawing on bank-level data for India, Bhaumik et al. (2011)
find that during periods of monetary tightening state-owned, old private—that is,
privately owned banks that have been operating since well before the banking sector
reforms introduced by the Indian government in 1992—and foreign banks cut back
on lending following an increase in interest rates, whilst during periods of monetary
easing higher interest rates are associated with a greater disbursal of credit only by
old private banks. A different approach to studying the lending channel–bank own-
ership nexus is advanced by Ferri et al. (2014), who test for the existence of different
lending policies between stakeholder- and shareholder-oriented banks. By employing
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euro-area data over a period covering the global financial crisis, Ferri et al. (2014) of-
fer evidence which suggests that stakeholder banks attempt to smooth financial con-
ditions for their customers by adopting less procyclical lending policies—regardless
of their financial situation or the general economic environment—than shareholder
banks. A recent effort to take the ownership status of banks into account when esti-
mating the link between interest rates and bank risk taking is presented by Drakos
et al. (2016). On the basis of a panel of commercial, savings and cooperative banks
from 10 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as well as Russia, Drakos
et al. (2016) submit that the risk behaviours of foreign, well-capitalised banks from
CEE countries appear to be more responsive to declining short-term rates than the
risk behaviours of other banks in the sample.
3.2.3 Ownership Structure and Financial Stability
There is plenty of evidence in the literature suggesting that banks’ ownership type
has a bearing on their behaviour, performance and ultimate survival (Fama and
Jensen, 1983; O’Hara, 1981; Rasmusen, 1988). While commercial banks are driven
by maximisation of shareholder wealth, cooperative and savings banks strive to cre-
ate value for a larger set of stakeholders. The distinguishing feature of cooperative
banks is that they are owned by their members, thus implying the absence of any
formal separation between owner-customers and non-owner-customers (Ayadi et al.,
2010). Furthermore, members are entitled to only one vote, stakes are generally
not marketable5 and the distribution of profits is limited, consistent with cooper-
atives being built around an intergenerational endowment for the benefit of both
current and future customers (Fonteyne, 2007; Groeneveld and Llewellyn, 2012).
Like cooperatives, savings banks are not strictly profit-oriented institutions and are
characterised by a dual financial and social mission (i.e. ‘double bottom line’) to
serve the community in which they operate (Ayadi et al., 2009). However, savings
5In some cases, it is nonetheless possible for members to sell their ownership stakes back to the
bank.
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banks differ from cooperatives in that they are owned either by an organisation that
belongs to the government or by a private foundation, suggesting that customers
of savings banks have less ownership rights than those of cooperative banks (Ferri
et al., 2013). For these reasons, it is unlikely that the property right structure of
stakeholder banks will lead to profit-maximising behaviour (Amess, 2002). Simi-
larly, the lower incentives for stakeholder banks to use leverage in an attempt to
increase the expected return on equity (Ayadi et al., 2009), along with significant
obstacles—at least for cooperative banks—in raising external capital (Ayadi et al.,
2010), may make stakeholder banks less prone to risk taking (Llewellyn, 2017).
Consonant with theoretical predictions, empirical research points to a number of
differences in the behaviour of stakeholder banks vis-à-vis shareholder banks. Draw-
ing on Italian data over the 2007–2010 period, Bolton et al. (2013) find that banks
oriented towards relationship lending charge higher spreads in normal times, but de-
liver stable lending at more favourable terms than transaction banks during a crisis.
In addition, there is evidence that lending rates for banks other than cooperatives
tend to increase with the length of the relationship for all customers, whereas in
the case of cooperative banks this is true only for non-member customers (Angelini
et al., 1998). Similarly, Foos (2009) focuses on Germany and provides evidence that
cooperative and savings banks adjust their loan rates less cyclically compared to
commercial banks. Using a sample of banks from 18 Western European countries,
Meriläinen (2016) finds that the lending growth of cooperative and publicly owned
savings banks was less affected by the global financial crisis and the subsequent
sovereign debt crisis than that of commercial banks, while cooperative banks did
not contribute to excessive lending in the run-up to the two crises.
Most importantly, the literature lends support to the view that stakeholder banks
are major contributors to financial stability. In line with their ‘stakeholder-value
ethos’ (Ayadi et al., 2009), early evidence from the US suggests that stakeholder
banks are generally less risk-inclined than their shareholder peers. While O’Hara
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(1981) finds that stock associations hold substantially higher amounts of Real Estate
Owned (REO) property and rely more on borrowed funds than mutual associations,
Verbrugge and Goldstein (1981) offer support for a poorer quality of the stocks’
loan portfolio relative to mutuals. Moreover, there is evidence that stock firms
exhibit higher concentration in those lines of business and geographic areas with
the greatest risk (Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993), together with the adoption of
high-risk strategies through an investment in risky assets and a mismatch between
assets and liabilities (Esty, 1997).
Further support in favour of a different appetite for risk between stakeholder and
shareholder banks is found in some countries in Europe, where the large presence
of cooperative and savings banks alongside commercial banks has contributed to an
increased interest by academics and policymakers in the stakeholder banking model
(Groeneveld, 2011). Ayadi et al. (2009, 2010) compute Z-scores for six Western
European countries and show that stakeholder banks are generally more stable than
shareholder banks. Likewise, Garćıa-Marco and Robles-Fernández (2008) focus on
the Spanish context and submit that savings banks have a lower insolvency risk
than their commercial counterparts. In addition, empirical support is found for
significant differences between the two ownership types in terms of loan quality,
with stakeholder banks having lower non-performing loans (Beck et al., 2009) and
loan loss provisions (Iannotta et al., 2007) compared to shareholder banks. Among
the explanations for the relatively low levels of bad debts held by stakeholder banks
is the lower branch manager turnover characterising these firms (Ferri, 1997), which
may lead to improved customer relationships and greater ability to allocate loans.
The higher stability of stakeholder banks compared to their shareholder peers is also
confirmed by findings from a wider sample of developed countries (Hesse and Cihák,
2007), which emphasise the role played by the stakeholder banking sector in fostering
financial stability. Therefore, it comes at no surprise that the discussion around the
systemic benefits arising from a mix of ownership structures in the banking sector has
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gained momentum over the last few years, especially in light of stakeholder banks’
ability to navigate through the recent crisis relatively unaffected (Ayadi et al., 2009;
Groeneveld, 2011).
Taken together, the three major bodies of literature reviewed above combine to
make a key testable prediction, that is, bank ownership affects the transmission of
monetary impulses via the risk-taking channel. Specifically, one may expect mon-
etary policy to exert a greater impact on the risk appetite of shareholder banks
vis-à-vis stakeholder banks. In other words, it is posited that the risk-taking be-
haviours of banks that strive to balance the interests of a multiplicity of stakeholders
respond less to variations in monetary conditions relative to banks that focus almost
exclusively on maximising shareholder wealth. To disentangle the effects of owner-
ship type on bank risk taking, the econometric specifications include a number of
other bank-level characteristics (e.g. size, capitalisation and profitability) that are
deemed important by the literature in explaining risk-taking incentives at banks.
3.3 Data and Methodology
3.3.1 Sample Selection
The primary source of data is Bankscope, a global database of banks’ financial state-
ments and ownership structures maintained by Bureau van Dijk. To my knowledge,
this is the most comprehensive database that allows comparisons of both listed and
unlisted financial institutions worldwide.6 I use annual report data for a panel of
banks operating in 17 Western European countries, including 15 that joined the
European Union before the 2004 accession (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
6Although Bankscope provides balance sheet and income statement data in a global format,
some differences in accounting practices—particularly for the period before the adoption of the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)—may still exist. I attempt to account for
these differences by including country and time fixed effects in the estimations.
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Spain, Sweden and the UK) as well as Norway and Switzerland.7 The validity of
employing annual data when studying the risk-taking channel of monetary transmis-
sion is supported by Delis and Kouretas (2011), who build a quarterly dataset with
information collected from Bloomberg and find that their results are not sensitive
to the frequency of the underlying data.8 The sample starts in 1999 (the year in
which the euro was officially launched) and ends in 2011 (the last year for which
data on the regulatory indices is available).9 This time window is interesting, as it
encompasses the global financial crisis alongside the eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
I started off with 10,375 financial intermediaries classified by Bankscope under
the headings ‘commercial banks’, ‘savings banks’, ‘cooperative banks’, ‘real estate
and mortgage banks’, ‘specialised governmental credit institutions’ and ‘bank hold-
ings and holding companies’. To mitigate survivorship bias, all active and inactive
banks with at least one year of accounts between 1999 and 2011 were included.10
To avoid double counting, I use data from unconsolidated statements if available,
otherwise from consolidated statements.11 I decided to work with unconsolidated ac-
counts for two main reasons. First, the large majority of stakeholder banks included
in the sample report at an unconsolidated level. Second, consolidated statements
might end up duplicating the data (Micco et al., 2007). Furthermore, I ensured
7While the bulk of the observations comes from euro-area countries, unreported correlations of
GDP growth and inflation across these countries point to significant heterogeneity in their business
cycles.
8Further evidence suggesting that annual observations are sufficient to capture the effects of
monetary policy on bank behaviour is presented by Ashcraft (2006) and Gambacorta (2005).
9The survey results used to construct the regulatory indices are available at four points in time
(i.e. 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2011) and cover the period from 1999 to 2011. A discussion of the
results can be found in Barth et al. (2013).
10Since Greece qualified to join the euro area in 2000 and was admitted in 2001, Greek banks
enter the sample in 2001.
11Specifically, I consider financial statements with consolidation codes U1 (unconsolidated state-
ment with no consolidated companion), U2 (unconsolidated statement with a consolidated compan-
ion) and U* (additional unconsolidated statement). Whenever banks do not report unconsolidated
accounts, I employ consolidated statements C1 (consolidated statement with no unconsolidated
companion), C2 (consolidated statement with an unconsolidated companion) and C* (additional
consolidated statement). To prevent double entries, accounts with consolidation code A1 (aggre-
gated statement with no companion) have been dropped.
88 CHAPTER 3. PAPER 2
subsidiaries were excluded. Intermediaries are considered at the institutional level,
as many BHCs and holding companies may own financial firms of a different nature.
The most demanding part of the sample selection has been the categorisation
of financial institutions into commercial, cooperative and savings banks. Following
Ferri et al. (2013), I have initially reclassified UK and Irish building societies that
survived the recent wave of consolidation and demutualisation as cooperative banks,
since they are owned by—and run in the interests of—their members. The list of
stakeholder banks has been extended to include a number of savings banks that have
been found among the group of specialised governmental credit institutions, such as
state-owned German Landesbanken or Swiss Kantonalbanken.12 Moreover, several
intermediaries that had been originally categorised as BHCs and holding companies
have been added to the set of commercial banks. In a second step, the profile of
each institution that was classified by Bankscope as either commercial, cooperative
or savings bank has been examined.13 This screening has led to a series of major
refinements. I have changed the categorisation of most of the Swiss cooperatives
in the Raiffeisen Group, as these had been classified as savings banks. Likewise,
the specialisation of some of the German Volksbanken that had been found within
the group of savings banks has been modified accordingly. I have also re-coded
the ownership status of a number of savings banks in Belgium, Italy and Spain for
which the private foundation ceased to be the ultimate owner. In addition, since
the analysis requires deposit-taking and loan-making institutions, financial firms
that cannot be reasonably considered as either commercial, cooperative or savings
banks have been excluded.
To ensure that the results are not driven by Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As),
I have reviewed the M&A history of all banks included in the sample. Consistent
12In line with the literature (Ayadi et al., 2009), savings banks were defined as financial inter-
mediaries that are owned by either a municipality or a private foundation and have a primary
mandate to serve the community in which they operate.
13Where the information provided by Bankscope is not sufficiently detailed, banks’ individual
websites alongside a variety of other sources have been accessed.
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with the literature (Claessens and van Horen, 2014; Iannotta et al., 2013), banks
that either merged with or were acquired by other entities remain in the sample
until the year prior to the takeover, while from that year onwards only the accounts
of the merged or acquiring bank have been kept. The information on M&A activ-
ity has been retrieved mainly from Bankscope, although in many instances it has
been complemented by data collected from Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum. After
controlling for M&As, I have an unbalanced panel of 5,677 commercial, cooperative
and savings banks. Table 3.1 shows the composition of the sample by country and
ownership structure, while Figure 3.1 depicts the relative size of the stakeholder
banking sector in each economy. The diversity of ownership types in European
banking is epitomised by the cross-country differences in the number of stakeholder
and shareholder banks. Whereas the German and Italian financial systems—among
others—appear to be characterised by an overwhelming majority of stakeholder
banks (92.34% and 74.39%, respectively), shareholder banks have a dominant pres-
ence in countries such as Luxembourg (96.92%) and the UK (69.72%). Besides Italy
(68.92%) and Germany (67.29%), other countries that exhibit a large number of
cooperative banks are Austria (52.45%) and Switzerland (45.55%). Savings banks
are strongly present in the Scandinavian region, especially in Norway (85.52%) and
Sweden (82.73%). In terms of total assets, the stakeholder banking sector is partic-
ularly large in Austria (58.10%) and Germany (55.73%), whilst it is relatively small
in Belgium (1.65%) and Greece (3.24%). The greatest aggregate size of cooperative
banks is found in France (37.61%) and savings banks constitute a major player in
Spain (43.54%). Interestingly, the sum of total assets for the 148 Spanish coopera-
tive and savings banks is almost twice the corresponding value for the 639 Italian
stakeholder banks.
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Table 3.1 Distribution of Banks by Country and Ownership Structure
Shareholder Cooperative Savings Stakeholder Total
No. TA No. TA No. TA No. TA No. TA
Austria 77 144.374 171 115.463 78 84.706 249 200.168 326 344.542
Belgium 52 966.652 12 9.748 11 6.443 23 16.191 75 982.843
Denmark 62 633.343 9 1.219 64 32.349 73 33.569 135 666.911
Finland 10 232.810 4 69.293 8 7.054 12 76.348 22 309.157
France 186 3107.848 165 1874.613 13 2.123 178 1876.736 364 4984.583
Germany 183 3467.631 1607 1046.405 598 3318.368 2205 4364.772 2388 7832.403
Greece 19 252.328 2 1.953 1 6.498 3 8.451 22 260.779
Ireland 23 536.213 3 21.046 0 0.000 3 21.046 26 557.258
Italy 220 1896.308 592 483.623 47 139.957 639 623.580 859 2519.888
Luxembourg 126 634.265 2 1.995 2 45.645 4 47.640 130 681.905
Netherlands 45 977.641 1 450.506 2 4.075 3 454.582 48 1432.223
Norway 19 225.838 2 1.631 124 98.534 126 100.164 145 326.002
Portugal 39 306.066 4 2.258 3 18.678 7 20.936 46 327.002
Spain 88 1242.678 87 84.357 61 1023.361 148 1107.717 236 2350.395
Sweden 19 556.229 0 0.000 91 21.009 91 21.009 110 577.238
Switzerland 159 1452.735 225 92.522 110 324.911 335 417.433 494 1870.168
UK 175 4481.792 68 401.634 8 3.025 76 404.659 251 4886.451
EA-12 1068 13 764.812 2650 4161.259 824 4656.907 3474 8818.166 4542 22 582.979
EU-15 1324 19 436.176 2727 4564.112 987 4713.291 3714 9277.403 5038 28 713.579
Total 1502 21 114.749 2954 4658.265 1221 5136.735 4175 9795.000 5677 30 909.749
Notes: The table shows the composition of the sample by country and ownership structure. Share-
holder are commercial banks, while stakeholder include cooperative and savings banks. TA is the
annual average of total assets in billions of US dollars. EA-12 are the founding euro area coun-
tries, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. EU-15 are the economies that joined the European Union before
the 2004 accession, that is, the EA-12 countries plus Denmark, Sweden and the UK. The sample
period goes from 1999 to 2011. Sources: Bankscope; author’s calculations.
3.3.2 Variable Construction
3.3.2.1 Bank Risk Taking
The risk-taking behaviour of banks is measured with two proxies commonly used in
the literature, namely the ratio of risk assets to total assets (asset risk) and the ratio
of loan loss provisions to total loans (credit risk). Risk assets are calculated as the
difference between total assets and the sum of loans and advances to banks, govern-
ment securities and cash. Therefore, this ratio includes all assets with non-negligible
credit and market risk (Gropp et al., 2011) and captures the overall riskiness of bank
portfolios at any point in time (Delis and Kouretas, 2011). The loan loss provision
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Figure 3.1 Size of the Stakeholder Banking Sector
Notes: The figure depicts the relative size of the stakeholder banking sector in each of the economies
included in the sample. Percentage values refer to the annual average of total assets (in billions of
US dollars) for stakeholder banks over the annual average of total assets for commercial, cooperative
and savings banks in the country. Darker colours indicate greater size of the stakeholder banking
sector vis-à-vis its shareholder counterpart. Sources: Bankscope; author’s calculations.
variable is defined as the sum of provisions against possible losses on non-performing
loans over net loans (i.e. residential mortgage loans, other mortgage loans, other
consumer loans, corporate and commercial loans and other loans minus reserves for
loan losses). This variable reflects the quality of loan portfolios (Bertay et al., 2015)
and offers a more direct proxy for credit risk (Iannotta et al., 2007), with a higher
ratio denoting a poorer credit quality. Therefore, these measures of bank risk taking
describe the level of asset and credit risk taken on by banks in response to changing
monetary conditions.
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Data for the risk-taking proxies is collected from Bankscope and descriptive
statistics are summarised in Table 3.2.14 Over the sample period, asset risk has an
average value of 80.256% and a standard deviation of 16.097%. The lowest mean
value is observed in 1999 (76.746%) and the highest in 2004 (80.094%), suggesting
a 4.36% increase in the average risk-taking behaviour of banks until the mid-2000s.
In turn, credit risk is characterised by a mean of 0.684% and a standard deviation
of 1.019%. While the credit risk appetite of banks seemed at its highest in 2002
(0.889%), it reached its lowest level in 2011 (0.278%). Table 3.3 presents summary
statistics for the dependent variable by dividing the sample according to ownership
type. At a first glance, one can notice several important differences among banks
with alternative ownership structures. Whereas the average value of asset risk for
stakeholder banks is higher than for their shareholder peers, the lower standard de-
viation for cooperative and savings banks implies less volatility in their risk-taking
behaviours relative to commercial banks. On average, stakeholder banks are also
characterised by a lower and less volatile credit risk compared to shareholder banks.
Interestingly, the standard deviation of asset and credit risk for stakeholder banks
(10.899% and 0.831%, respectively) is about half that for their shareholder counter-
parts (24.488% and 1.554%).
3.3.2.2 Monetary Policy
Since the onset of the global financial crisis, market observers have blamed the
relatively low interest rate environment in the first half of 2000s for the softening
of lending standards by banks and the subsequent materialisation of risks in the
economy. More recently, a related discussion has ensued on whether the current
environment of exceptionally low interest rates is already sowing the seeds for the
14To mitigate the impact of outliers, the accounting variables are winsorized at the first and 99th
percentiles of their sample distributions.
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Obs Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Bank risk taking
Asset risk 44271 80.256 16.097 7.965 75.931 84.844 90.606 99.460
Credit risk 44271 0.684 1.019 −5.480 0.198 0.533 0.951 10.000
Monetary policy
Overnight rate 44271 2.508 1.386 −0.001 0.906 2.740 3.860 7.346
Bank-level controls
Size 44271 6.512 1.690 2.481 5.357 6.285 7.454 12.462
Capitalisation 44271 8.379 6.317 1.074 5.002 6.684 9.821 79.114
Deposits 44271 87.512 13.489 35.690 83.135 93.086 97.020 99.615
Securitisation 44271 10.123 14.565 0.011 3.326 5.756 10.809 175.657
Profitability 44271 0.662 0.851 −5.202 0.299 0.541 0.917 7.891
Efficiency 44271 68.587 16.352 15.111 60.471 68.317 75.452 198.086
Income diversity 44271 0.494 0.194 0.000 0.375 0.485 0.606 0.979
Industry-specific controls
Concentration 44271 992.130 891.137 329.211 433.597 662.005 944.727 6116.742
Activity restrictions 44271 6.704 2.796 2.000 5.000 7.000 9.000 12.000
Capital stringency 44271 6.131 1.596 2.000 5.000 6.000 8.000 9.000
Supervisory power 44271 9.584 2.214 4.000 8.000 10.000 11.000 14.000
Deposit insurance 44271 1.812 0.847 0.000 1.000 2.000 2.000 4.000
Private monitoring 44271 7.928 0.842 5.000 7.000 8.000 9.000 10.000
Macroeconomic controls
Institutions 44271 1.362 0.371 0.346 1.240 1.457 1.586 1.986
GDP growth 44271 1.499 2.366 −8.864 0.707 1.711 3.270 8.442
Inflation 44271 1.728 0.849 −4.480 1.104 1.666 2.298 4.880
Volatility 44271 22.138 7.626 7.952 15.196 22.087 27.690 54.706
House prices 44271 1.230 4.067 −15.487 −1.745 0.466 3.818 18.992
Notes: The table summarises descriptive statistics for the main regression variables. Asset risk is
the ratio of risk assets to total assets; Credit risk is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans;
Overnight rate is the annual average of the daily overnight interbank rate; Size is the natural
logarithm of real total assets; Capitalisation is the ratio of equity to total assets; Deposits is
the ratio of deposits to total liabilities; Securitisation is the ratio of OBS items to total assets;
Profitability is the ratio of profit before tax to total assets; Efficiency is the ratio of cost to total
income; Income diversity is a measure of income diversification; Concentration is the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index of market concentration; Activity restrictions is an index of the extent to which
banks can engage in a number of activities; Capital stringency is an index of the regulatory oversight
of bank capital; Supervisory power is an index of the power of the supervisory authority to influence
the behaviour on the part of banks; Deposit insurance is an index of each country’s explicit deposit
insurance regime; Private monitoring is an index of the degree to which regulatory and supervisory
policies affect the private monitoring of banks; Institutions is a composite measure of country-level
governance; GDP growth is the annual growth rate of real GDP; Inflation is the annual change
in the CPI; Volatility is the annual average of the daily historical volatility of the country’s stock
market index; House prices is the annual change in the residential property price index (divided
by the GDP deflator).
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics of Bank-Level Variables by Ownership Structure
Shareholder Cooperative Savings Stakeholder
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Asset risk 66.795 24.488 82.148 11.303 86.584 9.321 83.591 10.899
Credit risk 0.828 1.554 0.653 0.777 0.638 0.934 0.648 0.831
Size 7.379 1.980 5.949 1.408 7.019 1.542 6.297 1.537
Capitalisation 11.340 10.750 7.747 4.113 7.434 4.648 7.645 4.297
Deposits 85.745 14.327 87.324 14.280 89.249 10.638 87.950 13.237
Securitisation 19.476 25.195 7.669 8.289 8.089 10.232 7.806 8.969
Profitability 0.932 1.489 0.592 0.540 0.603 0.646 0.595 0.577
Efficiency 67.972 26.928 70.132 12.391 65.849 11.930 68.739 12.406
Income diversity 0.561 0.255 0.486 0.180 0.459 0.153 0.478 0.172
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the bank-specific variables by dividing the sam-
ple according to ownership type. Shareholder are commercial banks, while stakeholder include
cooperative and savings banks. Asset risk is the ratio of risk assets to total assets; Credit risk is
the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans; Size is the natural logarithm of real total assets;
Capitalisation is the ratio of equity to total assets; Deposits is the ratio of deposits to total liabili-
ties; Securitisation is the ratio of OBS items to total assets; Profitability is the ratio of profit before
tax to total assets; Efficiency is the ratio of cost to total income; Income diversity is a measure of
income diversification.
next financial crisis (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013). For this reason, the main measure of
monetary policy used in this paper is the short-term interest rate (overnight rate),
computed as the annual average of the daily overnight interbank rate. Figure 3.2
illustrates the movements in money market rates in the period from 1999 to 2011.
Looking at the time window before the outbreak of the crisis, there is evidence of
strong cross-country commonalities in the conduct of monetary policy, as overnight
rates declined considerably in all economies included in the sample and reached
their lowest levels around 2005. During this period, money market rates were par-
ticularly low in Switzerland (with an average value of 0.17% in 2003) and dropped
substantially in Norway (with an annual decrease of 52.09% between 2003 and 2004).
In the wake of the credit crisis, policy rates were rapidly lowered towards the
zero lower bound. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the third quarter of
2008, many central banks attempted to provide financial and economic stability by
implementing an unprecedented set of non-standard monetary policy measures. As a
result, central bank balance sheets in many advanced economies expanded sharply,
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largely reflecting the increase in the amount of liquidity provided to the banking
sector (Gambacorta et al., 2014). Between 2008 and 2011, the assets of the Bank
of England tripled, while the size of the balance sheets of the Eurosystem and the
Swiss National Bank doubled. Significant was also the growth in the asset size of
the Sveriges Riksbank and the Danmarks Nationalbank, whereas the Norges Bank
expanded its balance sheet only in the period following the Lehman bankruptcy.15
To disentangle the effects of these measures on bank riskiness from those due to
variations in short-term rates, the estimations for the crisis period also include the
ratio of central bank assets to nominal GDP (central bank assets) as a proxy for
unconventional monetary policy.16
3.3.2.3 Control Variables
To avoid omitted-variable bias, I control for a number of bank-level, industry-specific
and macroeconomic factors that might affect banks’ appetite for risk. At the mi-
cro level, I account for a possible ‘too-big-to-fail’ phenomenon by including bank
size (size), defined as the natural logarithm of real total assets.17 Although the
existence of a relationship between bank size and risk is well documented in the
literature, its sign appears to be fairly ambiguous (Iannotta et al., 2007; Mohsni
and Otchere, 2014). Similarly, there is some evidence that banks with higher capital
invest in riskier projects (Williams, 2014), whilst other studies find a more prudent
behaviour by well-capitalised intermediaries (Delis and Kouretas, 2011). Therefore,
15For the Norges Bank, central bank assets are calculated as total assets minus investments in
the Government Pension Fund Global (Gambacorta et al., 2014).
16As a robustness check, the unconventional monetary policy instrument is captured using the
ratio of monetary base to nominal GDP. Since there is evidence that central bank assets are a better
gauge of non-standard monetary policy than the monetary base (Gambacorta et al., 2014), the
former is used in the benchmark specifications. Although support for the use of central bank assets
and the monetary base as measures of unconventional monetary policy is found in the literature
(Fungácová et al., 2014; Gambacorta and Marqués-Ibánez, 2011), it is acknowledged that these
proxies may not capture the qualitative component of non-standard interventions (i.e. ‘qualitative
easing’).
17To ensure comparability across banks, all balance sheet and income statement data are con-
verted to US dollars using the relevant exchange rates at each closing date.
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Figure 3.2 Overnight Interbank Rates
Notes: The figure illustrates the movements in money market rates in the period from 1999 to
2011. CH, Switzerland: call money rate; DK, Denmark: tomorrow/next rate; EA, euro area: Euro
OverNight Index Average (EONIA); GB, United Kingdom: Sterling OverNight Index Average
(SONIA); NO, Norway: Norwegian Overnight Weighted Average (NOWA); SE, Sweden: tomor-
row/next STockholm InterBank Offered Rate (STIBOR). Sources: Datastream; national data.
these conflicting predictions are tested for by considering the ratio of equity to total
assets (capitalisation). As recent empirical evidence suggests that banks’ ability
for funding is important in explaining their risk positions (Altunbas et al., 2014;
Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibánez, 2013), I control for the liability structure of inter-
mediaries’ balance sheets. For this purpose, the deposits-to-total-liabilities ratio
(deposits) is used. Likewise, the shift from the traditional ‘originate-to-hold’ to the
‘originate-to-distribute’ model observed over the last two decades may have reduced
banks’ funding needs in the event of a monetary tightening (Altunbas et al., 2009),
thereby leading to a change in their risk exposure (Loutskina, 2011). To proxy for
asset securitisation (securitisation), the ratio of OBS items to total assets is in-
cluded.18 Furthermore, the ratio of profit before tax to total assets is added as a
measure of bank profitability (profitability). It is argued that poorly performing in-
18Taken together, the above characteristics may also allow for the disentangling of the risk-taking
channel from the partially overlapping bank lending channel (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, 1992).
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termediaries have reasons to embark in riskier activities to regain profitability (Casu
et al., 2011), while a positive link appears to exist when current profits are used to
expand the proportion of assets carrying credit and market risk (Garćıa-Marco and
Robles-Fernández, 2008). In turn, technically efficient banks may have a better abil-
ity to manage risk and—ceteris paribus—a greater willingness to adopt risky balance
sheets (Drakos et al., 2016), whereas the opposite appears to hold as lower efficiency
seems to encourage banks to take on greater risk in an attempt to generate profits
(Dong et al., 2014). Bank efficiency (efficiency) is proxied by the cost-to-income
ratio, with higher values indicating less efficient operations. As empirical findings
show that diversification away from traditional lines of business influences bank risk
taking (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Hesse and Cihák, 2007), I also include a variable
to control for differences in banks’ income (income diversity). Building on Laeven
and Levine (2007), this variable is calculated as follows:
Income diversity = 1 −
∣∣∣∣Net interest income−Other operating incomeTotal operating income
∣∣∣∣ (3.1)
The set of industry-related controls comprises the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
as a proxy for market concentration (concentration), computed as the sum of squared
market shares of all banks in a country.19 I do not have a clear assumption about
the concentration–risk nexus, since the literature suggests that more concentrated
markets are conducive to either higher or lower levels of banking stability (Beck
et al., 2006; Schaeck et al., 2009). To capture the regulatory environment, five
indices are constructed using data from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey
(BRSS) conducted by the World Bank and described in Barth et al. (2001, 2004,
2006, 2012). Activity restrictions measures the extent to which banks can engage
in a number of activities (e.g. securities underwriting, brokering and dealing), with
19In alternative specifications, the Lerner Index is used as a direct measure of market power,
computed following the approach in Demirgüç-Kunt and Mart́ınez Peŕıa (2010).
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higher numbers indicating more regulatory impediments on non-lending activities.
Restrictions on the operations of financial institutions either discourage risk taking
(Garćıa-Kuhnert et al., 2015) or increase the fragility of the system by preventing
banks from diversifying outside their traditional lines of business (Beck et al., 2006).
Capital stringency proxies for the regulatory oversight of bank capital, with higher
values denoting more stringent guidelines on the nature and sources of regulatory
capital. While stricter capital regulations are often negatively related to bank risk
due to the option value of deposit insurance (Keeley and Furlong, 1990), greater
capital stringency may lead banks to adjust their portfolios towards riskier structures
through a decrease in leverage (Kim and Santomero, 1988). Supervisory power
reflects the right of the supervisory agency to take actions such as forcing banks to
change their organisational structures, suspending directors’ decisions to distribute
dividends and declaring insolvency, with a higher index implying greater supervisory
power. From a theoretical perspective, one would expect more supervisory power to
constrain risk-taking incentives by banks, although empirical studies show conflicting
findings (Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Lee and Hsieh, 2013). Deposit insurance captures
each country’s explicit deposit insurance regime, with greater values pointing to
higher protection of depositors in case of bank default. In light of the moral hazard
problem induced by deposit insurance (Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010; Forssbaeck,
2011), I anticipate a positive relationship between the aforementioned index and
intermediaries’ appetite for risk. Private monitoring shows the degree to which
regulatory and supervisory policies affect the private monitoring of banks—in this
case, higher numbers reflect greater incentives for market discipline. I do not have
a strong prior on this index, as the literature submits that higher incentives to
scrutinise financial institutions on the part of the private sector can either encourage
or curtail risk taking by banks (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Delis and Kouretas, 2011).
At the country level, I account for an array of institutional and macroeconomic
variables that are likely to influence the risk-taking choices of banks. Since there
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is evidence that greater institutional development contributes to financial stability
(Beck et al., 2006; Hesse and Cihák, 2007), the econometric estimations include a
composite measure of country-level governance (institutions) constructed using the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by Kaufmann et al. (2010).20 Following
Beltratti and Stulz (2012), I average the six indicators (i.e. ‘voice and account-
ability’, ‘political stability and absence of violence’, ‘government effectiveness’, ‘reg-
ulatory quality’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘control of corruption’) into a single index per
country. As a wealth of studies suggests (Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014; Lee and
Hsieh, 2013), general economic conditions have a bearing on the riskiness of finan-
cial intermediaries. For this reason, I control for the growth rate of real GDP (GDP
growth) and the annual change in the CPI (inflation). Furthermore, I capture
developments in stock markets by computing a measure of share price volatility
(volatility), calculated as the annual average of the daily historical volatility of a
country’s stock market index.21 To the extent that improvements in stock markets
promote riskier budgets and present banks with incentives to take on additional
risks (Borio and Zhu, 2012; Paligorova and Santos, 2013), a negative link between
the volatility proxy and banks’ appetite for risk is hypothesised. Finally, the empir-
ical setup aims to distinguish the risk-taking channel from the standard ‘financial
accelerator’ à la Bernanke et al. (1999), given that easing monetary conditions might
lead banks to expand their lending due to increases in borrowers’ net worth (Mat-
suyama, 2007). Hence, the annual change in the residential property price index
(divided by the GDP deflator) is included as a measure of the value of borrowers’
collateral (house prices). Table 3.4 reports the correlation coefficients for the set
of explanatory variables, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to affect the
20Alternatively, institutional quality is also proxied using the Corruption Perceptions Index by
Transparency International, which scores countries based on how corrupt their public sector is
perceived to be.
21In unreported regressions, stock market conditions are captured by the annual change in the
total return index (divided by the GDP deflator).
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parameter estimates.22
22Definitions and sources of all variables used in the analysis are detailed in Appendix Table B.1.
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3.3.3 Econometric Model
The equation to be estimated has the following functional form:
yi,k,t = α + βyi,k,t−1 + ηxk,t + θxk,t × zi,k + λW i,k,t + τU k,t + φk + ψt + εi,k,t (3.2)
with i = 1, ..., N , k = 1, ..., 17 and t = 1, ..., T , where N is the number of banks, k is
the country and T is the final year. Although it is acknowledged that shareholder-
and stakeholder-oriented banks are to some extent different in each of the selected
countries, the use of panel data appears to be well suited to my empirical setting as
it allows to control for individual heterogeneity as well as to study the dynamics of
adjustment (Baltagi, 2013). The dependent variable, yi,k,t, for bank i headquartered
in country k at time t is proxied by either asset risk or credit risk.23 Since evidence
is found of a relatively high persistence of risk over time (Delis and Kouretas, 2011;
Jiménez and Saurina, 2006), the lagged dependent variable is included among the
regressors. The variable xk,t is the main measure of monetary policy, namely the
overnight interbank rate. In line with the risk-taking channel literature (Borio and
Zhu, 2012; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014), the coefficient η is expected to be negative. The
differential effects of interest rates on banks’ appetite for risk owing to ownership
structure are captured by interacting the monetary policy variable with an ownership
dummy, zi,k, which equals 1 for stakeholder banks as a group (or for cooperative
and savings banks separately) and 0 otherwise. To address multicollinearity issues
due to the inclusion of the multiplicative term alongside the interest rate variable,
the latter variable is mean-centred prior to forming the product term.24 Consistent
23As asset risk is bounded between 0 and 100, I allow the dependent variable to range from nega-







Similarly, the credit quality variable is constructed as the natural logarithm of the ratio between
loan loss provisions and total loans to reduce the skewness of the credit risk distribution.
24The ownership dummy is not listed separately in Equation 3.2 due to the severe multicollinear-
ity between the dummy and its interactive term with the monetary policy variable.
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with the theoretical predictions advanced in Section 3.2, I anticipate the parameter
θ to be positive. As central banks loosen monetary conditions, cooperative and
savings banks are expected to take on less risk when compared with their commercial
peers. The bank-specific controls are contained in the vector W i,k,t, while U k,t
represents the set of industry- and macro-level variables. To account for unobserved
country-specific factors and time-varying common shocks that may influence bank
risk taking, all econometric specifications include country, φk, as well as time, ψt,
fixed effects.
The estimation of Equation 3.2 presents a number of empirical challenges. A
major identification limitation when examining the monetary policy–bank risk tak-
ing nexus is that monetary conditions might be endogenous to the risk observed in
the banking sector (Jiménez et al., 2014). Within this context, an endogeneity prob-
lem can arise if monetary policy actions are also determined by financial stability
objectives. This might be particularly true since the onset of the financial crisis, as
central banks’ concerns regarding the financial situation of the banking sector led
to a rapid expansion on the set of conventional and unconventional policy measures
(Altunbas et al., 2014). Although one can expect endogeneity not to be a major
concern in the sample countries, given that their central banks have primarily an
inflation-targeting objective, this potential issue is mitigated further by the use of
an appropriate econometric method. From an econometric standpoint, endogene-
ity implies that the interest rate variable, xk,t, may be correlated with the error
term, εi,k,t, thereby potentially biasing my estimates. In addition, the inclusion of
the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side may induce autocorrelation
in the residuals and render the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator biased
and inconsistent even if the idiosyncratic errors are not serially correlated (Baltagi,
2013). To obtain consistent and unbiased estimates of the interplay between mon-
etary policy, ownership structure and bank risk taking, the econometric model is
estimated using the dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) introduced
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by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) and further developed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).25 By building a ‘stacked’
system of equations in both levels and differences, this estimator allows to control
for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and the dynamic relationship between
past realisations of the dependent variable and current values of the explanatory
variables (Wintoki et al., 2012). Therefore, it ensures the efficiency and consistency
of the estimated parameters (Gambacorta and Marqués-Ibánez, 2011), provided that
there is no second-order serial correlation and the instrument set is valid.
In line with Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), endoge-
nous and predetermined variables are instrumented by their own lags in levels in the
first-difference equation and by their lagged first differences in the level equation,
while exogenous regressors are instrumented by themselves. This generates a system
of equations that takes the following form: yi,k,t
∆yi,k,t
















+ φk + ψt + εi,k,t (3.3)
where j is the number of lags. Besides the lagged dependent and the monetary
policy variables, I treat as endogenous all bank-specific characteristics with the ex-
ception of size. This means that for endogenous variables their second and further
lags are available as instruments, while first and deeper lags can be employed for
variables that are predetermined but not strictly exogenous. I consider as predeter-
mined the set of regulatory indices, implying that banks are aware of their size and
25The ‘system GMM’ is preferred over the ‘difference GMM’ due to the improvement in effi-
ciency when the autoregressive parameter is particularly high and the time-series dimension of the
underlying data is moderately small (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
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the regulatory environment when deciding the level of risk taking to adopt.26 To
avoid overfitting, the proxy for market concentration and all macroeconomic con-
trols are taken as exogenous. Following Roodman (2009), instrument proliferation is
prevented by using a collapsed instrument matrix and limiting lag depth.27 I use the
two-step estimator with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected standard errors
clustered by bank.
3.4 Results and Discussion
3.4.1 Main Estimations
Table 3.5 presents the results of the main empirical estimations when stakeholder
banks are considered as a group.28 The Arellano–Bond test for autocorrelation in
the errors rejects the presence of second-order serial correlation, AR(2), while the
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions confirms the validity of the instrument
set. The estimations for the full period are reported in the first two columns of
Table 3.5, where bank risk taking is proxied by either asset risk or credit risk.29 The
coefficient on overnight rate is negative and strongly significant under both speci-
fications, suggesting that lower interest rates alter the composition of commercial
banks’ portfolios towards riskier positions. In a nutshell, this evidence is consistent
with a risk-taking channel that operates via the risk decisions of shareholder banks.
The interaction term between monetary policy and the stakeholder bank dummy has
a positive and highly significant coefficient, indicating that the effects of monetary
26A similar treatment of endogenous and predetermined variables in risk equations is adopted
by Delis and Kouretas (2011).
27Regressions are performed using the xtabond2 command in Stata. The collapse option indicates
that xtabond2 should create one instrument for each variable and lag distance instead of one for
each time period, variable and lag distance.
28Before running my estimates, panel unit-root tests are used to ensure that the continuous
variables included in the model are stationary. The results of Fisher-type (Choi, 2001) tests
strongly reject the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root.
29Only the first lag of the dependent variable is considered among the regressors, since the
coefficient on the second lag is not found to be statistically significant.
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conditions on the riskiness of financial intermediaries are lower for stakeholder banks
(−0.299 + 0.038 = −0.261, when bank risk taking is measured by asset risk). These
results offer support for my initial hypothesis, in that the risk-taking behaviours of
banks characterised by alternative ownership structures appear to respond differ-
ently to variations in the monetary policy stance. With respect to the bank-specific
variables, a lower deposits-to-total-liabilities ratio seems to reduce banks’ capacity
to take on risk, while less profitable but more efficient intermediaries tend to have
greater levels of asset risk. In turn, whereas better capitalised banks exhibit higher
credit quality, greater diversification across income sources translates into higher
credit risk taking. In line with the concentration–stability view (Beck et al., 2006),
financial institutions in more concentrated markets tend to have lower incentives to
take on risk. Interestingly, this paper finds support for a moral hazard problem in-
duced by explicit deposit insurance, while only the stringency of capital regulations
is likely to restrain banks from engaging in greater risk taking. Consistent with
other empirical findings (Lee and Hsieh, 2013), financial intermediaries operating in
countries with higher rates of GDP growth and inflation hold less risky portfolios.
In addition, credit risk is found to be negatively linked to share price volatility and
to changes in borrowers’ net worth.
As noted in Section 3.3, the last few years covered by the estimations have seen
the adoption by many central banks of unprecedented actions aimed at restoring fi-
nancial stability. For this reason, this study provides an insight into the functioning
of the risk-taking channel during times of financial distress by distinguishing between
two periods, namely the years before the outbreak of the crisis (i.e. 1999–2007) and
the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (i.e. 2008–2011).30 The results
for the former period largely resemble those for the whole sample period. Lower
30The validity of splitting the sample around 2008 is tested by replacing the vector of time-fixed
effects included in the full-period estimates with a dummy variable that equals 1 for the crisis
years and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on the dummy is strongly significant, possibly suggesting
fundamental differences in the operation of the risk-taking channel between the crisis and non-crisis
periods.
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Table 3.5 Main Estimations: Stakeholder Banks as a Group
1999–2011 1999–2007 2008–2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged asset risk 0.874∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.044) (0.046)
Lagged credit risk 0.622∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.117) (0.153)
Overnight rate -0.299∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.049 -0.002
(0.062) (0.002) (0.062) (0.004) (0.047) (0.002)
Overnight rate × Stakeholder 0.038∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.014) (0.000) (0.022) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001)
Central bank assets 0.001 0.000
(0.009) (0.000)
Central bank assets × Stakeholder 0.017∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.000)
Bank-level controls
Size 0.008 -0.001 -0.036 -0.001 0.139∗∗ -0.001
(0.031) (0.001) (0.035) (0.001) (0.068) (0.002)
Capitalisation -0.008 -0.002∗∗∗ 0.007 0.000 -0.022 -0.002∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.013) (0.001)
Deposits 0.007∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.000∗∗
(0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Securitisation 0.001 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.010 -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
Profitability -0.153∗ 0.001 -0.410∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.008∗
(0.091) (0.002) (0.104) (0.003) (0.082) (0.005)
Efficiency -0.020∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.040∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.000∗
(0.007) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Income diversity -0.087 0.039∗∗∗ 1.428∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ -1.819∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.281) (0.008) (0.340) (0.011) (0.264) (0.007)
Industry-specific controls
Concentration -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Activity restrictions -0.018 0.001 0.028 -0.001∗ 0.064∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.000) (0.035) (0.001) (0.021) (0.001)
Capital stringency 0.024 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗ 0.001 0.014 -0.000
(0.015) (0.000) (0.022) (0.001) (0.033) (0.001)
Supervisory power 0.007 0.001∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ 0.020 0.002∗∗
(0.010) (0.000) (0.031) (0.001) (0.021) (0.001)
Deposit insurance 0.058∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.060 -0.003
(0.024) (0.001) (0.026) (0.001) (0.069) (0.003)
Private monitoring 0.014 0.004∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.095∗ 0.001
(0.022) (0.001) (0.034) (0.002) (0.053) (0.002)
Macroeconomic controls
Institutions 0.180 -0.002 -0.026 0.004 -1.027∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.005) (0.164) (0.003) (0.326) (0.015)
GDP growth -0.043∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.109∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.007 0.000
(0.007) (0.000) (0.015) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000)
Inflation 0.017 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.001∗ 0.003 0.000
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Table 3.5 (Continued)
1999–2011 1999–2007 2008–2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.011) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.016) (0.001)
Volatility 0.001 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.005 -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
House prices 0.003 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 40256 38414 26407 25024 13849 13390
No. of instruments 63 63 59 59 58 58
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.162 0.514 0.240 0.947 0.140 0.994
Hansen χ2 (p-value) 0.139 0.102 0.239 0.279 0.187 0.190
Notes: The table presents the results of the main empirical estimations with stakeholder banks
considered as a group. Asset risk is the ratio of risk assets to total assets; Credit risk is the ratio
of loan loss provisions to total loans; Overnight rate is the annual average of the daily overnight
interbank rate; Stakeholder is a dummy that equals 1 for either cooperative or savings banks
and 0 otherwise; Central bank assets is the ratio of central bank assets to nominal GDP; Size
is the natural logarithm of real total assets; Capitalisation is the ratio of equity to total assets;
Deposits is the ratio of deposits to total liabilities; Securitisation is the ratio of OBS items to
total assets; Profitability is the ratio of profit before tax to total assets; Efficiency is the ratio of
cost to total income; Income diversity is a measure of income diversification; Concentration is the
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of market concentration; Activity restrictions is an index of the extent
to which banks can engage in a number of activities; Capital stringency is an index of the regulatory
oversight of bank capital; Supervisory power is an index of the power of the supervisory authority
to influence the behaviour on the part of banks; Deposit insurance is an index of each country’s
explicit deposit insurance regime; Private monitoring is an index of the degree to which regulatory
and supervisory policies affect the private monitoring of banks; Institutions is a composite measure
of country-level governance; GDP growth is the annual growth rate of real GDP; Inflation is the
annual change in the CPI; Volatility is the annual average of the daily historical volatility of the
country’s stock market index; House prices is the annual change in the residential property price
index (divided by the GDP deflator). All econometric specifications include country as well as time
fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) are reported in parentheses. *,
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
interest rates are associated with an increase in the appetite for risk by shareholder
banks, with this effect being stronger when the dependent variable is proxied by
asset risk. However, the impact of looser monetary policy on intermediaries’ risk
taking is dampened by the presence of stakeholder banks, as denoted by the posi-
tive and highly significant coefficient on the multiplicative term. This evidence is
consistent with recent empirical findings (Ferri et al., 2014), according to which the
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loan supply of stakeholder banks prior to the start of the crisis was less influenced
by changing monetary conditions. Again, this paper finds that banks with lower
profitability but greater efficiency have riskier balance sheets, while capitalisation
and deposits are not important in explaining differences in the riskiness of financial
institutions. As indicated by other studies (Hesse and Cihák, 2007), the results
reported in Table 3.5 suggest that higher income diversity tends to increase bank
risk. At the industry level, market concentration is negatively linked to banks’ ap-
petite for risk, although this relationship is statistically significant only under the
specification that considers credit risk as the dependent variable. Regarding the
regulatory environment, greater stringency in terms of capital regulations, power of
the supervisory authority and market discipline seems to be effective in limiting the
risk-taking incentives by banks (particularly when bank risk is captured by asset
risk), whilst further support is provided for a risk-shifting effect associated with
deposit insurance. Moreover, macroeconomic conditions have a bearing on banks’
portfolio risk, yet at varying degrees. Whereas GDP growth is negatively related
to both of the proxies for bank risk taking, the rate of inflation is found to have
some influence only on the quality of loan portfolios. Consonant with theoretical
predictions (Paligorova and Santos, 2013), lower stock market volatility offers finan-
cial firms incentives to take on additional risk. Moreover, the findings for the years
before the crisis appear to confirm that a boost in house prices raises the value of
borrowers’ collateral and improves credit quality.
Turning to the crisis period, one can note several striking results. The coefficient
of the Overnight rate is insignificant in both specifications, implying that a risk-
taking channel is no longer operative for shareholder banks. This is not surprising,
as the havoc wrought by the financial turmoil resulted in an average increase in risk
aversion and a widespread seizure of liquidity in financial markets (Acharya et al.,
2009). Conversely, this study finds that standard monetary policy is still effective in
influencing the composition of stakeholder banks’ portfolios, although this impact is
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lower in absolute value compared to the non-crisis period (0.049 − 0.074 = −0.025
for the crisis years compared to −0.262 + 0.063 = −0.199 for the pre–crisis years
when the dependent variable is asset risk). In showing that the appetite for risk by
stakeholder banks is more stable over the business cycle relative to their shareholder
counterparts, my evidence is in line with the literature that points to a less cycli-
cal behaviour by stakeholder banks (Meriläinen, 2016). To account for the effects
of unconventional monetary policy on the functioning of the risk-taking channel, I
add to the estimations the ratio of central bank assets to GDP (central bank as-
sets) and its interaction with the stakeholder bank dummy. At a first glance, the
positive coefficients on these two terms when bank risk is measured by asset risk
seem to denote an important role played by non-standard measures in counteracting
the shift by intermediaries towards riskless assets.31 Nevertheless, a closer look at
the coefficients reveals that the expansion of central bank assets is associated with
a change in portfolio composition only for stakeholder banks, suggesting that—at
times of financial distress—monetary authorities might exert an impact on the non-
financial sector via the risk-taking behaviours of cooperative and savings banks.
Non-standard monetary policy is also found to influence credit risk taking only for
stakeholder banks, with an increase in central bank assets leading to a decline in
loan loss provisioning by cooperative and savings banks.32 Concerning bank-level
controls, one can note that banks of a larger size and with a higher share of deposits
to total liabilities exhibit a greater exposure to asset and credit risk, respectively,
whereas capitalisation and securitisation are found to have a negative relationship
with credit risk. Contrary to the pre–crisis period, the results for the crisis years
indicate that more diversified banks are less inclined to take on asset risk. Interest-
31Similar evidence of a positive relationship between unconventional monetary policy measures
and risk assets is put forward by Lambert and Ueda (2014). Within the context of the bank
lending channel, support is also found for a positive impact of central bank assets on loan growth
(Fungácová et al., 2014).
32The negative coefficient on the interaction between central bank assets and stakeholder is
consistent with Lambert and Ueda (2014), who show that an expansion in central banks’ balance
sheets may delay loss provisioning on existing loans.
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ingly, banks operating in economies characterised by higher degrees of concentration
and greater restrictions on banking activities hold more assets with non-negligible
credit and market risk on their balance sheets. In turn, the incentives for interme-
diaries to alter their credit quality are curtailed by more stringent regulations on
banking operations and are exacerbated by greater supervisory power. As expected,
a reduction in share price volatility and in borrowers’ collateral increases credit risk
taking by banks, whilst greater institutional development is associated with lower
exposure to both asset and credit risk.
Although—as observed in Section 3.2—cooperative and savings banks share the
main objective of creating value for a wider array of stakeholders, some important
differences exist between these two types of financial intermediaries. While cooper-
ative banks are owned by their members, savings banks belong either to an organi-
sation that is part of the government or to a private foundation. This is particularly
the case in countries such as Germany and Switzerland, where savings banks are
characterised by multi-level (i.e. municipal or regional) governance structures with
an ownership stake held by the government (Ferri et al., 2013). For this reason, it is
postulated that differences in risk appetite exist not only between shareholder and
stakeholder banks, but also between cooperative and savings banks. To test this
prediction, Table 3.6 presents the results of the main empirical estimations after
disaggregating stakeholder banks into cooperative and savings banks. Looking at
the full period, one may note that the dampening role played by cooperative and
savings banks within the risk-taking channel is confirmed by the positive and sta-
tistically significant coefficients on both interaction terms. However, the size of the
individual coefficients reveals some key differences between the two groups of stake-
holder banks, as savings banks are found to take on less asset and credit risk relative
to cooperative banks in a looser monetary environment. These findings are mirrored
by the results for the pre–crisis period, in which the risk-taking incentives of savings
banks appear to be the least affected by relatively low interest rates. During the
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years since the outbreak of the crisis, conventional monetary policy seems to be still
exerting an impact on the risk decisions of both cooperative and savings banks, with
this impact being lower for cooperative banks. In addition, the expansion in central
bank assets is linked to a change in the risk exposure of the two types of stakeholder
banks to approximately the same extent. Taken together, the results for cooperative
and savings banks separately confirm the results for stakeholder banks as a group,
in that both cooperative and savings banks are found to conduct less procyclical
risk-taking policies relative to their commercial counterparts.
3.4.2 Robustness Tests
To evaluate the robustness of the results, a number of additional tests are performed.
As correctly quantifying risk taking by financial intermediaries is a fairly challenging
task, I first examine whether the results are sensitive to an alternative way of defining
the dependent variable. For this purpose, I consider a measure of bank riskiness that
has been used extensively in the literature, namely the Z-score (Dong et al., 2014;
Garćıa-Kuhnert et al., 2015; Mohsni and Otchere, 2014).33 The Z-score is a proxy
for distance from insolvency (probability of default) and is computed as follows:
Z-score =
µ (ROA) + CAR
σ (ROA)
(3.4)
where ROA is the Return On Assets and CAR is the Capital-to-Asset Ratio. Specif-
ically, a time-varying Z-score is constructed following the approach proposed by
Lepetit and Strobel (2013), which is found to exhibit a relatively low level of in-
tertemporal volatility on a per bank basis. This approach considers mean and stan-
dard deviation estimates of ROA calculated over the full sample and combines them
33A discussion of the applicability of the Z-score to the estimation of bank risk across different
types of intermediaries is offered by Hesse and Cihák (2007).
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Table 3.6 Main Estimations: Cooperative and Savings Banks Separately
1999–2011 1999–2007 2008–2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged asset risk 0.875∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.045) (0.043)
Lagged credit risk 0.656∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.111) (0.152)
Overnight rate -0.297∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.069 -0.002
(0.062) (0.002) (0.062) (0.003) (0.047) (0.002)
Overnight rate × Cooperative 0.034∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.001∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.014) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.014) (0.001)
Overnight rate × Savings 0.042∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.015) (0.000) (0.023) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001)
Central bank assets 0.002 0.000
(0.008) (0.000)
Central bank assets × Cooperative 0.018∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.006) (0.000)
Central bank assets × Savings 0.018∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.000)
Bank-level controls
Size 0.010 -0.000 -0.043 -0.001 0.149∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.030) (0.001) (0.035) (0.001) (0.057) (0.001)
Capitalisation -0.009 -0.002∗∗∗ 0.008 0.000 -0.017 -0.002∗∗
(0.008) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.013) (0.001)
Deposits 0.007∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.000∗∗
(0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Securitisation 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.000 0.008 -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
Profitability -0.138 0.002 -0.406∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.089) (0.002) (0.103) (0.002) (0.085) (0.005)
Efficiency -0.019∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.040∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.000∗
(0.006) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Income diversity -0.136 0.039∗∗∗ 1.479∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ -1.739∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.289) (0.009) (0.344) (0.008) (0.273) (0.007)
Industry-specific controls
Concentration -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Activity restrictions -0.018 0.000 0.031 -0.001∗ 0.056∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.000) (0.035) (0.001) (0.018) (0.001)
Capital stringency 0.022 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗ 0.001 -0.016 -0.000
(0.014) (0.000) (0.022) (0.001) (0.032) (0.001)
Supervisory power 0.008 0.001∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.036 0.002∗∗
(0.010) (0.000) (0.031) (0.001) (0.023) (0.001)
Deposit insurance 0.057∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.078 -0.004
(0.025) (0.001) (0.027) (0.001) (0.064) (0.003)
Private monitoring 0.014 0.004∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗ 0.001
(0.022) (0.001) (0.034) (0.001) (0.038) (0.002)
Macroeconomic controls
Institutions 0.192 -0.001 -0.053 0.004 -1.066∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
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Table 3.6 (Continued)
1999–2011 1999–2007 2008–2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.163) (0.004) (0.168) (0.002) (0.338) (0.015)
GDP growth -0.042∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.110∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.010 0.000
(0.007) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)
Inflation 0.016 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.003 0.000
(0.011) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.016) (0.001)
Volatility 0.001 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.006 -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
House prices 0.003 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 40256 38414 26407 25024 13849 13390
No. of instruments 64 64 60 60 60 60
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.149 0.501 0.252 0.976 0.155 0.989
Hansen χ2 (p-value) 0.106 0.108 0.271 0.383 0.134 0.158
Notes: The table presents the results of the main empirical estimations with cooperative and
savings banks considered separately. Asset risk is the ratio of risk assets to total assets; Credit
risk is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans; Overnight rate is the annual average of the
daily overnight interbank rate; Cooperative is a dummy that equals 1 for cooperative banks and
0 otherwise; Savings is a dummy that equals 1 for savings banks and 0 otherwise; Central bank
assets is the ratio of central bank assets to nominal GDP; Size is the natural logarithm of real
total assets; Capitalisation is the ratio of equity to total assets; Deposits is the ratio of deposits to
total liabilities; Securitisation is the ratio of OBS items to total assets; Profitability is the ratio of
profit before tax to total assets; Efficiency is the ratio of cost to total income; Income diversity is
a measure of income diversification; Concentration is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of market
concentration; Activity restrictions is an index of the extent to which banks can engage in a number
of activities; Capital stringency is an index of the regulatory oversight of bank capital; Supervisory
power is an index of the power of the supervisory authority to influence the behaviour on the
part of banks; Deposit insurance is an index of each country’s explicit deposit insurance regime;
Private monitoring is an index of the degree to which regulatory and supervisory policies affect
the private monitoring of banks; Institutions is a composite measure of country-level governance;
GDP growth is the annual growth rate of real GDP; Inflation is the annual change in the CPI;
Volatility is the annual average of the daily historical volatility of the country’s stock market
index; House prices is the annual change in the residential property price index (divided by the
GDP deflator). All econometric specifications include country as well as time fixed effects. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the bank level) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
with current values of CAR (Lepetit and Strobel, 2013).34 Therefore, the Z-score
captures the number of standard deviations the bank’s ROA has to fall before equity
is depleted and the bank becomes insolvent. A higher value denotes greater bank
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stability (lower risk taking). Since the Z-score is highly skewed, this paper follows
Laeven and Levine (2009) and employs its natural logarithm.
Table 3.7 presents summary statistics for the alternative measure of bank risk
taking as well as its components by dividing the sample according to ownership
type. Consistent with other empirical evidence (Ayadi et al., 2009, 2010; Hesse
and Cihák, 2007), the average values of the Z-score for cooperative and savings
banks are higher than for their commercial counterparts, suggesting that stakeholder
banks are generally more financially stable than shareholder banks. Furthermore,
the relatively low standard deviation of the Z-score for stakeholder banks indicates
less volatility in their probability of default compared to their shareholder peers,
confirming the findings based on the main proxies for bank riskiness. A closer look
at the components of the Z-score reveals that the greater stability of cooperative
and savings banks stems from the lower standard deviation of ROA (0.454% and
0.553%, respectively), which is less than half that for commercial banks (1.345%).
Table 3.7 Summary Statistics of the Z-score and Its Components by Ownership Structure
Shareholder Cooperative Savings Stakeholder
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Z-score 2.728 1.056 3.849 0.928 3.884 0.985 3.860 0.947
ROA 0.766 1.345 0.401 0.454 0.377 0.553 0.393 0.489
CAR 12.846 13.404 7.816 4.495 7.707 6.106 7.780 5.084
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the Z-score and its components by dividing the
sample according to ownership type. Shareholder are commercial banks, while stakeholder include
cooperative and savings banks. Z-score is a proxy for distance to default; ROA is the Return On
Assets; CAR is the Capital-to-Asset Ratio.
Table 3.8 reports the results for the full period as well as for the years before and
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers with the Z-score as an alternative measure
of bank risk taking. The coefficients of the interest rate variables are qualitatively
34I also test a definition of the Z-score à la Hesse and Cihák (2007), who use standard deviation
estimates of ROA calculated over the full sample alongside current values of ROA and CAR. The
results of this exercise, not reported to save space but available upon request, are similar to the
ones presented in Table 3.8.
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similar and, as a result, the findings remain unchanged. Interestingly, while the
expansion in central bank balance sheets is associated with an increase in the pro-
portion of assets carrying credit and market risk in stakeholder banks’ portfolios,
the default probability of cooperative and savings banks appears to be reduced by
non-standard monetary interventions.35
A second robustness check is to ensure that the results are not driven by the proxy
for conventional monetary policy used in the empirical estimations. Although the
overnight interbank rate is commonly employed by the literature while studying the
risk-taking channel (Jiménez et al., 2014; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011), standard
monetary policy can be measured in a variety of ways. To this end, I enquire into
the sensitivity of the results by replacing the overnight rate with the central bank’s
official rate (central bank rate), computed as the annual average of the daily central
bank rate. For instance, this rate is the interest rate on the Main Refinancing
Operations (MROs) for the euro area, the base rate for the UK and the repo rate
for Sweden. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 3.9 and are largely in
line with those of the benchmark specifications.36
Third, since the group of commercial banks includes intermediaries of a hetero-
geneous nature, Equation 3.3 is re-estimated after excluding banks that are listed
on the stock exchange. As the literature suggests (Bhaumik et al., 2011; Iannotta
et al., 2007), market scrutiny is a key determinant of bank behaviour. On aver-
age, listed banks tend to be larger, more profitable, better capitalised, with lower
asset quality and funded through a higher ratio of retail deposits (Iannotta et al.,
2007). A possible explanation for the observed differences between listed and un-
listed banks lies in the ability of publicly quoted banks to raise additional equity
at lower transaction costs, enabling them to attain faster asset growth and higher
35The evidence of a positive relationship between central bank assets and bank stability is in line
with Lambert and Ueda (2014), who find that unconventional monetary policy measures are linked
to a decrease in some indicators of bank riskiness, namely leverage and short-term debt ratios.
36I also experiment with interest rates of longer maturities, namely the one-month and three-
month interbank rates. The results, not reported but available upon request, are again confirmed.
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Table 3.8 Robustness Test: An Alternative Measure of Bank Risk Taking
Dependent variable: Z-score
1999–2011 1999–2007 2008–2011
Lagged Z-score 0.898∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.092) (0.075)
Overnight rate 0.082∗∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.047
(0.034) (0.111) (0.054)
Overnight rate × Stakeholder -0.035∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.009) (0.035) (0.019)
Central bank assets -0.006
(0.009)
Central bank assets × Stakeholder 0.018∗∗∗
(0.006)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry-specific controls Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 40140 26319 13821
No. of instruments 63 59 58
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(1) 0.000 0.007 0.006
AR(2) 0.976 0.242 0.341
Hansen χ2 (p-value) 0.119 0.312 0.291
Notes: The table reports the results of the empirical estimations with the Z-score as an alter-
native measure of bank risk taking. Z-score is a proxy for distance to default; Overnight rate is
the annual average of the daily overnight interbank rate; Stakeholder is a dummy that equals 1
for either cooperative or savings banks and 0 otherwise; Central bank assets is the ratio of central
bank assets to nominal GDP. Coefficients on the control variables are not reported to save space.
All econometric specifications include country as well as time fixed effects. Robust standard er-
rors (clustered at the bank level) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.9 Robustness Test: An Alternative Measure of Monetary Policy
1999–2011 1999–2007 2008–2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged asset risk 0.833∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.045) (0.042)
Lagged credit risk 0.439∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗
(0.145) (0.108) (0.183)
Central bank rate -0.279∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.049 -0.003
(0.108) (0.002) (0.062) (0.003) (0.069) (0.003)
Central bank rate × Stakeholder 0.048∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.018) (0.000) (0.022) (0.001) (0.017) (0.001)
Central bank assets -0.010 0.000
(0.011) (0.000)
Central bank assets × Stakeholder 0.025∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.000)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 40256 38414 26407 25024 13849 13390
No. of instruments 63 63 59 59 58 58
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.188 0.316 0.273 0.734 0.318 0.900
Hansen χ2 (p-value) 0.100 0.149 0.207 0.154 0.229 0.118
Notes: The table reports the results of the empirical estimations with the central bank’s official rate
as an alternative measure of monetary policy. Asset risk is the ratio of risk assets to total assets;
Credit risk is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans; Central bank rate is the annual average
of the daily central bank rate; Stakeholder is a dummy that equals 1 for either cooperative or savings
banks and 0 otherwise; Central bank assets is the ratio of central bank assets to nominal GDP.
Coefficients on the control variables are not reported to save space. All econometric specifications
include country as well as time fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level)
are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
risk-adjusted return relative to privately owned banks (Barry et al., 2011). In turn,
this could provide listed banks with greater flexibility to engage in riskier projects
that carry higher expected profits (Barry et al., 2011). Therefore, a major concern
is that the ownership dummy might also capture the effects of market discipline on
bank risk taking, possibly leading to an overestimation of the role played by owner-
ship structure in the risk-taking channel of monetary transmission. To investigate
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whether differences in risk appetite between shareholder and stakeholder banks hold
among unlisted institutions, Table 3.10 presents the results of the empirical estima-
tions when listed banks are dropped from the dataset.37 The point estimates for the
variables of interest are close to those reported in Table 3.5, implying that the main
results are not driven by listed banks.
A further concern relates to the inclusion among shareholder banks of financial
intermediaries that are ultimately owned by the government or another public au-
thority. The number of state-owned commercial banks increased sharply during the
last years of the sample period, as many European banks required extensive gov-
ernment support following the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Cases in point
are the Royal Bank of Scotland in the UK, ABN AMRO in the Netherlands and
Allied Irish Banks in Ireland, which are still under the control of their governments.
According to the literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), bureaucrats—who have the
de facto control of state firms—generally pursue goals that are dictated by their
political interests rather than the generation of profits. For this reason, one may
expect shareholder wealth maximisation not to be the ultimate objective of this
type of intermediaries. Consistent with this argument, recent empirical evidence
for Western European countries shows that government ownership indeed alters the
risk-taking incentives of commercial banks (Iannotta et al., 2013). Therefore, the
baseline equation is re-run on a reduced sample that excludes state-owned commer-
cial banks. The results, presented in Table 3.11, remain substantially unaffected.
Lastly, one may observe that the sample is largely dominated by German banks.
In terms of number of individual institutions, shareholder and stakeholder banks
from Germany constitute 42.06% of the total of financial intermediaries from the
selected countries, with German cooperative and savings banks alone making up
52.81% of stakeholder banks included in the sample. A similar picture can be seen
with respect to total assets, as the German stakeholder banking sector is found to
37Specifically, I exclude banks that have been listed on the stock exchange for at least one year
over the 1999–2011 period.
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Table 3.10 Robustness Test: Exclusion of Listed Banks
1999–2011 1999–2007 2008–2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged asset risk 0.882∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.049) (0.045)
Lagged credit risk 0.546∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗ 0.358∗∗
(0.095) (0.109) (0.167)
Overnight rate -0.337∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.033 -0.003
(0.063) (0.003) (0.081) (0.003) (0.050) (0.002)
Overnight rate × Stakeholder 0.041∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.017) (0.001)
Central bank assets -0.003 0.000
(0.009) (0.000)
Central bank assets × Stakeholder 0.016∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.005) (0.000)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 38003 36236 24823 23494 13180 12742
No. of instruments 63 63 59 59 58 58
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.106 0.594 0.107 0.830 0.128 0.710
Hansen χ2 (p-value) 0.135 0.227 0.241 0.232 0.125 0.106
Notes: The table reports the results of the empirical estimations after excluding listed banks from
the sample. Asset risk is the ratio of risk assets to total assets; Credit risk is the ratio of loan
loss provisions to total loans; Overnight rate is the annual average of the daily overnight interbank
rate; Stakeholder is a dummy that equals 1 for either cooperative or savings banks and 0 otherwise;
Central bank assets is the ratio of central bank assets to nominal GDP. Coefficients on the control
variables are not reported to save space. All econometric specifications include country as well as
time fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.11 Robustness Test: Exclusion of State-Owned Commercial Banks
1999–2011 1999–2007 2008–2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged asset risk 0.853∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.044) (0.042)
Lagged credit risk 0.620∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.115) (0.121)
Overnight rate -0.327∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.005 -0.002
(0.076) (0.002) (0.063) (0.003) (0.047) (0.001)
Overnight rate × Stakeholder 0.057∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.015) (0.000) (0.022) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001)
Central bank assets -0.008 0.000
(0.009) (0.000)
Central bank assets × Stakeholder 0.022∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.000)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 39708 37934 26062 24725 13646 13209
No. of instruments 63 63 59 59 58 58
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.145 0.812 0.118 0.872 0.198 0.557
Hansen χ2 (p-value) 0.236 0.461 0.175 0.104 0.152 0.110
Notes: The table reports the results of the empirical estimations after excluding state-owned
commercial banks from the sample. Asset risk is the ratio of risk assets to total assets; Credit risk
is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans; Overnight rate is the annual average of the daily
overnight interbank rate; Stakeholder is a dummy that equals 1 for either cooperative or savings
banks and 0 otherwise; Central bank assets is the ratio of central bank assets to nominal GDP.
Coefficients on the control variables are not reported to save space. All econometric specifications
include country as well as time fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level)
are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
cover 44.56% of the sum of total assets for cooperative and savings banks in Western
Europe. It follows that the baseline results might reflect peculiarities of the German
banking sector, possibly biasing my conclusions. As a fifth robustness check, I thus
test whether the results hold when German banks are dropped from the sample.
The results of this additional exercise are reported in Table 3.12. The main finding
that stakeholder banks play a dampening role in the risk-taking channel is again
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Table 3.12 Robustness Test: Exclusion of German Banks
1999–2011 1999–2007 2008–2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged asset risk 0.873∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.048) (0.039)
Lagged credit risk 0.488∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.168) (0.089)
Overnight rate -0.303∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.040 -0.001
(0.089) (0.001) (0.076) (0.001) (0.059) (0.001)
Overnight rate × Stakeholder 0.043∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.019) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000)
Central bank assets -0.011 0.000
(0.007) (0.000)
Central bank assets × Stakeholder 0.023∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.000)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 22187 20561 14666 13455 7521 7106
No. of instruments 62 62 58 58 57 57
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.521 0.116 0.379 0.130 0.461 0.375
Hansen χ2 (p-value) 0.129 0.115 0.294 0.356 0.214 0.108
Notes: The table reports the results of the empirical estimations after excluding German banks
from the sample. Asset risk is the ratio of risk assets to total assets; Credit risk is the ratio of loan
loss provisions to total loans; Overnight rate is the annual average of the daily overnight interbank
rate; Stakeholder is a dummy that equals 1 for either cooperative or savings banks and 0 otherwise;
Central bank assets is the ratio of central bank assets to nominal GDP. Coefficients on the control
variables are not reported to save space. All econometric specifications include country as well as
time fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
supported.38
38As stakeholder banks are on average smaller than shareholder banks (Table 3.3), I also control
for possible differential effects of monetary policy on bank risk taking due to bank size by adding
an interaction term between monetary policy and size to the benchmark equation. The coefficient
on the interaction term turns out to be positive but insignificant in most regressions, leaving
the results qualitatively unchanged. In addition, Equation 3.3 is re-estimated after excluding
cooperative banks’ central institutions, since they are characterised by different business models
compared to other banks within their respective networks. The results are not materially different
when this smaller sample of intermediaries is considered. Finally, the results are robust to more
demanding specifications that include the ratio of fixed assets to total assets as a proxy for franchise
value, the percentage of firms listed on the country’s stock exchange that either merged with or
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3.4.3 Discussion
The major lesson from the empirical analysis is that bank ownership indeed affects
the transmission of monetary policy via the risk-taking channel. The evidence that
stakeholder banks alter the composition of their portfolios less procyclically than
shareholder banks suggests that they might play a useful role in stabilising the
aggregate level of risk in the economy. In a nutshell, this finding highlights the
systemic benefits to be derived from a critical mass of banks that strive to create
value for an array of stakeholders rather than almost solely for their shareholders.
A case in point are the results for the crisis period, which show that stakeholder
banks may continue to act as conduits of monetary transmission even at times of
adverse economic conditions. This notwithstanding, my argument is by no means
that the stakeholder banking model should be viewed as a superior alternative to
its shareholder counterpart. In fact, there have been instances during the recent
crisis where stakeholder banks engaged in similar risky lines of business as large
shareholder banks, thereby falling into trouble and suffering relatively high losses.39
Instead, it is the presence of financial intermediaries characterised by a plurality of
ownership structures that might be conducive to financial stability. By virtue of
their underlying differences in risk appetite and portfolio structure, the existence
of cooperative and savings banks vis-à-vis commercial banks could contribute to
lowering systemic risk. As Ayadi et al. (2010, p. 149) effectively put it, “[t]he issue
of having a financial system populated by a diversity of organisational forms is as
significant as the merits and drawbacks of each particular form of organization”.
The results feed into an intense academic and policy debate over the causes of the
global financial crisis. The primary implication of this paper is that monetary policy
is not neutral from a financial stability perspective. For this reason, my evidence
were acquired by other firms as an indicator of M&A activity and the ratio of government balance
to GDP as a measure of fiscal policy.
39One of the main examples is represented by the heavy losses in trading incurred by the Dutch
cooperative group Rabobank.
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concurs with the increasing role of monetary authorities on macroprudential regu-
lation and supervision, as epitomised by the creation—under the responsibility of
the European Central Bank (ECB)—of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
in late 2010. In addition, this study finds that heterogeneity of ownership types
in the European banking sector is important in explaining the effects of monetary
policy on bank risk taking. Therefore, the findings call for the inclusion of measures
capturing the diversity of the banking system into the central bank’s reaction func-
tion, as this is shown to influence the functioning of the risk-taking channel. Most
importantly, this research indicates that attempts to regulate the European banking
sector should not impair the biodiversity of its ownership structures. The evidence
on the contribution of a mixed banking system to financial stability suggests that
not only is such a system worth preserving, but it should be promoted through
the adoption of effective regulations. It seems vital for policymakers to ensure that
the specific features of stakeholder banks are not hindered by regulatory constraints
aimed at and devised for shareholder banks.
By providing novel insights into how bank ownership interacts with monetary
policy in shaping banks’ appetite for risk, this paper sparks a number of new ques-
tions. First, future research could move the analysis one step further and explore
what specific features of stakeholder banks help explain their different reactions to
changing monetary conditions relative to shareholder banks. For instance, it would
be interesting to shed light on the extent to which observed differences between these
two groups of banks stem from characteristics such as the geographical scope of op-
eration, the orientation towards relationship lending and the potential importance
associated with belonging to a network of similar institutions. Second, efforts could
be directed at examining the impact that conversion of cooperative banks to joint
stock companies has on their risk appetite and ensuing responses to fluctuations
in the monetary policy stance. Bearing this in mind, researchers could consider a
smaller sample of depository institutions than the one built in this study and con-
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struct time-varying proxies for bank ownership. Third, more research is needed on
the functioning of the risk-taking channel during the global financial crisis and the
eurozone sovereign debt crisis. To this end, the results of this study could be comple-
mented if the sample period were expanded to capture the effects of unconventional
monetary interventions more fully and by employing more effective indicators of the
monetary policy stance at the zero lower bound, such as the ‘shadow rate’ suggested
by Wu and Xia (2016). Fourth, a fruitful line of enquiry could be to extend the
results of this article by looking at how the interactions between banks with differ-
ent types of ownership affect the risk-taking channel. As such, one could compute
indices of ownership diversity based on the relative market shares of shareholder
banks vis-à-vis their stakeholder counterparts and test whether diversity in banking
buffers the impact of monetary policy on bank risk.
3.5 Conclusions
Recent years have witnessed a revived interest in the far-reaching effects of bank
risk taking on financial stability and economic performance. This paper adds to a
rapidly evolving line of research that contributes to a better understanding of how
financial intermediaries’ appetite for risk is influenced by the monetary conditions
prevailing in the economy. Theory suggests that a key determinant of firms’ risk
taking is their ownership structure, which ultimately affects the extent to which
multiple stakeholder claims find recognition alongside those made by shareholders.
By constructing an unbalanced panel of commercial, cooperative and savings banks
operating in 17 Western European countries over the 1999–2011 period, this study
finds robust evidence that heterogeneity in ownership types accounts for a differential
impact of monetary policy on intermediaries’ risk taking. While this impact appears
to be particularly strong for shareholder banks, the results indicate that the effects
of lower interest rates on systemic risk are dampened by the presence of stakeholder
banks. Comparison of the results before and after the onset of the global financial
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crisis shows that these findings are driven by the years prior to the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, during which commercial banks are found to alter the composition
of their portfolios towards riskier structures more actively than cooperative and
savings banks. The findings for the period since the outbreak of the crisis highlight
that standard monetary policy is no more effective in changing the proportion of
risk-related assets held by shareholder banks, possibly as a consequence of the sharp
increase in risk aversion and the average loss of trust in counterparties brought
about by the global market turmoil. Conversely, the observed reaction of stakeholder
banks to the unprecedented set of conventional and unconventional monetary policy
measures suggests their important role as vehicles for monetary transmission even
at times of financial distress, while pointing to less procyclical risk-taking policies
on the part of cooperative and savings banks relative to their commercial peers.
Taken together, the results of this study suggest that ignoring differences in
ownership type leads to partial and possibly inaccurate conclusions about the impli-
cations of monetary policy for bank risk taking. Therefore, I would hope to see more
research examining how various features of intermediaries’ ownership structures (e.g.
nature of the ultimate owner, concentrated ownership and executive compensation)
influence the functioning of the risk-taking channel. At the same time, the find-
ings emphasise that it might be systemically beneficial to have a banking sector
populated by a critical mass of stakeholder banks vis-à-vis shareholder banks. For
this reason, my hope is that the contribution advanced in this paper will help draw
greater attention to the benefits that a biodiverse banking sector might have for the
stability of the financial system and its resilience to crises. To use the words of the
American biologist Edward O. Wilson on biodiversity, “[w]e study and save it to
our great benefit. We ignore and degrade it to our great peril”.
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Table B.1 Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
Bank risk taking
Asset risk Ratio of risk assets to total assets. Risk assets
are calculated as the difference between total
assets and the sum of loans and advances to
banks, government securities and cash.
Bankscope; author’s
calculations
Credit risk Ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans.
Loans are defined as residential mortgage loans,
other mortgage loans, other consumer loans,
corporate and commercial loans and other loans
















Central bank rate Annual average of the daily central bank rate. Datastream; IFS;
author’s calculations
Central bank assets Ratio of central bank assets to nominal GDP.
For the Norges Bank, central bank assets are
computed as the difference between total assets





Stakeholder Dummy that equals 1 for either cooperative or
savings banks and 0 otherwise.
Bankscope; author’s
calculations













Capitalisation Ratio of equity to total assets. Bankscope; author’s
calculations
Deposits Ratio of deposits to total liabilities. Deposits
include total customer deposits, deposits from




Securitisation Ratio of OBS items to total assets. Bankscope; author’s
calculations
Profitability Ratio of profit before tax to total assets. Bankscope; author’s
calculations
138 CHAPTER 3. PAPER 2
Table B.1 (Continued)
Variable Definition Source
Efficiency Ratio of overheads to total operating income. Bankscope; author’s
calculations
Income diversity 1 −
∣∣∣Net interest income−Other operating incomeTotal operating income ∣∣∣. Bankscope; author’s
calculations
Industry-specific controls
Concentration Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of market
concentration. The index is calculated as the
sum of squared market shares of all banks in
the country in terms of total assets.
Bankscope; author’s
calculations
Activity restrictions Index that captures the extent to which
national regulations restrict banks from
engaging in: (1) securities activities; (2)
insurance activities; (3) real estate activities;
and (4) ownership of non-financial firms.
Regulatory restrictiveness for each of these
activities takes values between 1 and 4,
depending on whether they are unrestricted,
permitted, restricted or prohibited. An aggregate
index is computed by summing the values for
the four categories.




Capital stringency Index that measures the stringency of
regulatory capital requirements. It is
constructed by adding 1 if the answer to
questions 1–7 is ‘yes’ and 0 otherwise, while the
opposite holds for questions 8 and 9 (i.e. ‘yes’
= 0; ‘no’ = 1): (1) Are the sources of funds to
be used as capital verified by the
regulatory/supervisory authorities? (2) Is this
ratio risk weighted in line with the Basel
guidelines? (3) Does the minimum ratio vary as
a function of an individual bank’s credit risk?
(4) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function
of market risk? (5–7) Before minimum capital
adequacy is determined, which of the following
are deducted from the book value of capital?
(a) Market value of loan losses not realised in
accounting books? (b) Unrealised losses in
securities portfolios? (c) Unrealised foreign
exchange losses? (8) Can the initial
disbursement or subsequent injections of capital
be done with assets other than cash or
government securities? (9) Can initial
disbursement of capital be done with borrowed
funds?







Supervisory power Index that proxies for the power of the
supervisory authority to influence the behaviour
on the part of banks. It is obtained by adding 1
if the answer to each of the following questions
is ‘yes’ and 0 otherwise: (1) Does the
supervisory agency have the right to meet with
external auditors to discuss their report without
the approval of the bank? (2) Are auditors
required by law to communicate directly to the
supervisory agency any presumed involvement
of bank directors or senior managers in illicit
activities, fraud or insider abuse? (3) Can
supervisors take legal action against external
auditors for negligence? (4) Can the
supervisory authority force a bank to change its
internal organisational structure? (5) Are OBS
items disclosed to supervisors? (6) Can the
supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or
management to constitute provisions to cover
actual or potential losses? (7–9) Can the
supervisory agency suspend the directors’
decision to distribute: (a) Dividends? (b)
Bonuses? (c) Management fees? (10) Can the
bank supervisor legally declare—such that this
declaration supersedes some of the rights of
shareholders—that a bank is insolvent? (11)
According to the Banking Law, has the bank
supervisor authority to intervene—that is,
suspend some or all ownership rights—a
problem bank? (12–14) Regarding bank
restructuring and reorganisation, can the
supervisory agency do the following: (a)
Supersede shareholder rights? (b) Remove and
replace management? (c) Remove and replace
directors?
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Table B.1 (Continued)
Variable Definition Source
Deposit insurance Index that describes the explicit deposit
insurance regime adopted in the country. It is
determined by adding 1 if the answer to each of
the following questions is ‘yes’ and 0 otherwise:
(1) Is the explicit deposit insurance protection
system funded by the banks? (2) Does the
deposit insurance authority make the decision
to intervene a bank? (3) Does the deposit
insurance authority by itself have the legal
power to cancel or revoke deposit insurance for
any participating bank? (4) Can the deposit
insurance agency/fund take legal action for
violations against laws, regulations and bylaws
(of the deposit insurance agency) against bank
directors or other bank officials? (5) Has the
deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal
action for violations against laws, regulations
and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency)
against bank directors or other bank officials?




Private monitoring Index that quantifies the incentives for private
investors to monitor and exert effective
governance over banks. It is constructed by
adding 1 if the answer to questions 1–9 is ‘yes’
and 0 otherwise, while the reverse occurs for
questions 10 and 11 (i.e. ‘yes’ = 0; ‘no’ = 1):
(1) Is subordinated debt allowable (required) as
part of regulatory capital? (2) Is an external
audit a compulsory obligation for banks? (3)
Are auditors licensed or certified? (4) Does
accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter
the income statement while the loan is still
performing? (5) Does accrued, though unpaid,
interest/principal enter the income statement
while the loan is still non-performing? (6) Are
financial institutions required to produce
consolidated accounts covering all bank and any
non-bank financial subsidiaries (including
affiliates of common holding companies)? (7)
Are OBS items disclosed to the public? (8)
Must banks disclose their risk management
procedures to the public? (9) Are bank
directors legally liable if information disclosed is
erroneous or misleading? (10) Is there an
explicit deposit insurance protection system?
(11) Were insured depositors wholly
compensated (to the extent of legal protection)
the last time a bank failed?








Institutions Simple average of six country-level governance
indicators, namely ‘voice and accountability’,
‘political stability and absence of violence’,
‘government effectiveness’, ‘regulatory quality’,




GDP growth Annual growth rate of real GDP. WDI
Inflation Annual change in the CPI. WDI
Volatility Annual average of the daily historical volatility




House prices Annual change in the residential property price





The Role of Ownership Diversity




This study investigates the hypothesis that the ownership composition of the bank-
ing system moderates monetary policy transmission via the risk-taking channel.
Borrowing measures used in ecology to quantify diversity, this paper shows that the
impact of unexpected monetary policy shocks on banks’ probability of default is
reduced in countries with greater ownership diversity. This article also finds that
banks located in more ownership-diverse systems tend to have a lower appetite for
risk than those operating in less diverse markets. These results are robust across
several econometric specifications and emphasise the stabilising role played by own-
ership diversity in modern financial systems.






The financial crisis that erupted in 2007 has provided a vivid illustration of the po-
tential for modern financial systems to exacerbate and spread financial distress on
an international scale (Arinaminpathy et al., 2012). In the wake of the crisis, there
is increasing recognition that the resilience of the financial system is affected not
only by its aggregate exposure to risk, but also by the interconnections between in-
dividual institutions (Haldane and May, 2011). A case in point was the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers in the third quarter of 2008, which led to an unprecedented
seizure of liquidity by financial intermediaries and the ensuing collapse of the inter-
bank lending market. As a result, these events have prompted renewed interest in
addressing risk at the systemic level (Berry et al., 2015), while pointing to the im-
portant role of banks in the economy (Werner, 2014a,b). A number of studies have
recently focused on the implications of diversity within the banking sector for the
stability of the financial system and its resilience to crises (e.g. Ayadi et al., 2009;
Llewellyn, 2012; Michie, 2011). In making an interesting parallel between ‘financial
ecosystems’ and ecology in the 1970s, Haldane and May (2011, p. 353) argue that
“excessive homogeneity within a financial system—all the banks doing the same
thing—can minimize risk for each individual bank, but maximize the probability
of the entire system collapsing”. Consistent with the ecology literature (Tilman
and Downing, 1994), this view predicts that diversity with respect to ownership
structures, business models and corporate objectives should encourage resistance to
disturbance (Michie, 2011).
Despite the increasing appreciation of the need for a systemic approach to fi-
nancial stability (May and Arinaminpathy, 2010), limited have hitherto been the
attempts to examine how the interactions between banks with different forms of
ownership impact on financial stability. This is at odds with insights from ecology,
where the nature and intensity of the interacting relations (e.g. competition, pre-
dation and symbiosis) between individuals belonging to different species are known
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to have important effects on ecosystem stability (Jizhong et al., 1991). Therefore,
recent calls have been made for a better understanding of the externalities that may
stem from financial institutions’ behaviour (Groeneveld, 2012). Moreover, hardly
any studies have examined how ownership composition of the banking system in-
teracts with monetary policy in shaping financial intermediaries’ risk taking. Such
a void is surprising, as recent evidence indicates that ownership type has a bearing
on monetary transmission via the risk appetite of banks (Drakos et al., 2016). This
gap might also have significant consequences from a policy perspective, insofar as
monetary intervention may have heterogeneous effects on bank stability, depending
on the architecture of the financial system (Boot and Thakor, 1997). A key ex-
ample is the euro area, where dissimilarities in terms of ownership diversity across
countries might account for a differential impact of the common monetary policy on
bank behaviour.
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to shed new light on the link
between diversity in banking and financial system stability. The question that is
addressed concerns the extent to which ownership diversity in the banking sector
moderates monetary policy transmission through the risk-taking channel (Borio and
Zhu, 2012; Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014). There are at least three
theoretical arguments that may give ownership diversity a central role in the trans-
mission of monetary policy to bank risk. First, banks located in countries with
more diverse banking systems are likely to be in competition for providing better
customer service instead of generating return on equity (Berry et al., 2015). As the
competition between banks tends to be directed at serving customers and not at
engaging in unduly risky activities, one would expect greater ownership diversity
to translate into lower incentives for banks to take on risk in response to changes
in monetary policy. Second, enhanced competition arising from a higher degree
of diversity in the banking sector should reflect greater disciplining efforts on the
part of customers and/or depositors (Kick and Prieto, 2015). To the extent that an
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increase in market discipline restricts banks from engaging in riskier projects, mon-
etary policy will induce lower incentives for financial intermediaries to adopt risky
balance sheets. Third, the literature suggests that—above a specific market-share
threshold—the presence of non-profit-maximising banks has a positive impact on
the stability of other banks within the same system (Chiaramonte et al., 2015). It
follows that—ceteris paribus—financial intermediaries operating in countries with a
multiplicity of ownership forms are likely to be more stable than their counterparts
operating in less diverse markets, thereby reducing the potency of the risk-taking
channel.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Drawing on the field
of ecology, where the interactions between components of an ecosystem are seen as
a major determinant of its stability and persistence (Jizhong et al., 1991), it offers
novel insights into the implications of ownership diversity for financial stability. By
estimating the ownership composition of the banking system in terms of relative
market shares of profit-maximising banks (i.e. ‘shareholder banks’) alongside not-
for-profit banks (i.e. ‘stakeholder banks’), this study adds to the literature that
focuses on the bank ownership–financial stability nexus (e.g. Chiaramonte et al.,
2015; Hesse and Cihák, 2007). Furthermore, this article proposes ownership diver-
sity as an important factor explaining differential effects of monetary policy on bank
riskiness. While joining the growing debate over the moderating impact that struc-
tural features of the market have on the monetary transmission mechanism (e.g.
Olivero et al., 2011b), my contribution extends the somewhat limited literature on
the role of industry-related factors in determining the functioning of the risk-taking
channel (e.g. Kick and Prieto, 2015). In addition, this paper builds on the work by
Michie and Oughton (2013) and introduces measures commonly used in ecology to
quantify diversity into the analysis of the risk-taking channel. Given the relative
ease with which indicators of ownership diversity can be computed, these measures
could be employed by future research concerned with the implications of diversity
148 CHAPTER 4. PAPER 3
in banking for a variety of financial and economic phenomena. Importantly, this
approach allows to respond to recent calls “for a new, interdisciplinary research
agenda on the role of banks and the central bank in particular, and the monetary
system in general, which should be firmly rooted in the inductive, empirical research
methodology to produce scientific economics” (Werner, 2016, p. 377).
The remainder of the manuscript is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides
an overview of the literature on the risk-taking channel and develops the main
hypotheses. Section 4.3 illustrates the data used in the analysis and describes the
empirical strategy. Section 4.4 presents the results from the main estimations as
well as from further robustness tests. Section 4.5 discusses the implications of the
findings and concludes.
4.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis Develop-
ment
4.2.1 Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Transmission
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, a growing debate has ensued on
whether risk-taking incentives at financial institutions are shaped by the monetary
conditions prevailing in the economy. As the literature suggests (Angeloni et al.,
2015; Borio and Zhu, 2012), monetary policy might affect bank risk via two primary
channels. The first mechanism operates through changes in the composition of the
asset side of intermediaries’ balance sheets. According to Cociuba et al. (2016), a
prolonged period of low interest rates induces banks to search for yield by making
riskier assets more attractive than safe bonds. As financial intermediaries alter the
structure of their investments towards a riskier mix, a higher degree of procyclical
risk taking is introduced into the financial system (Rajan, 2006) and an equilibrium
with weakened bank portfolios is realised (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). The
second channel refers to the impact of monetary policy on the intermediaries’ funding
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side. Inasmuch as an expansionary monetary environment reduces marginal funding
costs, banks find more profitable to adjust the combination of capital and short-term
funding by increasing leverage (Valencia, 2014). However, theory predicts that the
effects of interest rates on leverage depend on the extent to which banks can change
their capital structures (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014) and the yield curve is upward
sloping (Angeloni et al., 2015).
The theoretical inferences about the risk-taking channel seem to find support in
the empirical literature. Drawing on a micro-level dataset for Spain, Jiménez et al.
(2014) show that lower overnight rates lead less capitalised banks to grant more
credit and higher loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to ex ante risky
borrowers. Similarly, Ioannidou et al. (2015) access the Bolivian credit register and
provide evidence for a decrease in policy rates raising the probability of default on
individual bank loans, while the additional risk taken by financial intermediaries does
not appear to be reflected in greater loan spreads. Findings from the US indicate that
the risk ratings of banks’ loan portfolios are negatively linked to changes in short-
term rates (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013), although the transmission of monetary policy
to bank risk is found to be particularly significant on the funding side (Angeloni
et al., 2015). Moreover, empirical evidence for the euro area suggests that the
effects of monetary policy on lending standards are more pronounced if interest rates
are kept low for an extended period (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011). Interestingly,
support is found for interest rates, together with long-term liquidity provision by
the European Central Bank (ECB), leading to a softening in lending standards even
after the onset of the recent crisis (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2013).
A number of factors have been put forward by the literature to explain the
strength of the risk-taking channel. By constructing a sample of commercial, savings
and cooperative banks in 16 eurozone countries, Delis and Kouretas (2011) submit
that the effects of loose monetary conditions on risk assets are reduced for banks
with higher equity capital and lower Off-Balance-Sheet (OBS) items. According to
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Brissimis et al. (2014), both US and European banks endowed with some degree of
market power are able to buffer the negative effects of changes in monetary policy
on credit risk, while other characteristics such as bank liquidity and capitalisation
seem to be less important for the potency of the risk-taking channel. Likewise, Kick
and Prieto (2015) focus on German universal banks and show that greater levels of
market power (as proxied for by the Lerner index) diminish the impact of monetary
policy on bank risk. In addition, there is evidence that the strength of the risk-
taking channel is dampened by stricter prudential policy on either bank capital or
Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratio (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011, 2013).
4.2.2 Ownership Diversity and the Risk-Taking Channel
Recent years have witnessed renewed interest in the ownership form of banks and its
consequences for financial intermediation (Cull and Mart́ınez Peŕıa, 2013). A major
reason behind the increased interest in bank ownership is the observation that co-
operative and savings banks have been less scathed by the global financial turmoil
relative to commercial banks (Groeneveld, 2011). The key feature of cooperative
and savings banks is that they seek to generate value for a wider set of stakeholders
and not merely for shareholders. As a result, they are not exclusively profit-oriented
institutions and pursue a ‘double bottom line’, that is, a dual financial and social
mission to benefit the community in which they operate (Ayadi et al., 2009, 2010).
While cooperative banks are owned by their members, savings banks belong either
to an organisation that is part of the government or to a private foundation (Ferri
et al., 2014). Since profit distribution is limited and stakes are generally not mar-
ketable, it is unlikely that the property right structure of cooperative and savings
banks encourages profit-maximising behaviour (Amess, 2002). Furthermore, the
lower incentives for stakeholder banks to adjust leverage in an attempt to boost eq-
uity returns (Ayadi et al., 2009) and the greater challenges—at least for cooperative
banks—to raise external funds (Casu and Gall, 2016) may make them less inclined
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to risk taking than their shareholder counterparts.
In accordance with theoretical predictions, empirical evidence highlights some
important differences in the risk appetite of shareholder banks vis-à-vis stakeholder
banks. Early findings for the US suggest that mutually owned intermediaries tend to
hold safer loan portfolios (Verbrugge and Goldstein, 1981) and lower amounts of Real
Estate Owned (REO) property (O’Hara, 1981) compared to stock associations. In a
similar vein, joint-stock banks are found to focus more on the lines of business and
geographic areas with the greatest risk (Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993), along
with having the propensity to implement high-risk strategies by investing in risk
assets and mismatching the duration of their assets and liabilities (Esty, 1997).
Additional evidence on the link between ownership type and bank risk is reported for
Europe, where shareholder banks coexist with a large—sometimes predominant—
stakeholder banking sector (Ferri et al., 2013). Support exists for cooperative and
savings banks having better loan quality (Iannotta et al., 2007), lower insolvency risk
(Garćıa-Marco and Robles-Fernández, 2008) and fewer non-performing loans (Beck
et al., 2009) relative to their commercial peers. More importantly, stakeholder banks
appear to be more stable than shareholder banks on a variety of measures, such as
volatility of earnings (Casu and Gall, 2016) and distance to default (Ayadi et al.,
2009, 2010; Hesse and Cihák, 2007).
Taking the literature on the ownership structure–bank risk nexus as the point
of departure, a handful of studies have endeavoured to uncover the extent to which
the presence of stakeholder banks has a bearing on the stability of their shareholder
counterparts. By considering a sample of banks from 29 industrialised countries,
Hesse and Cihák (2007) find that a higher share of cooperative banks (as measured
in terms of total assets) is generally associated with an increase in stability of an
average bank in the system. However, they also show that the stability of weak
commercial banks is negatively affected by a greater presence of cooperative banks.
Similar evidence is provided by Chiaramonte et al. (2015), who build a panel of
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banks from 26 developed economies and offer support for the stabilising role played
by stakeholder banks during the crisis years (yet only beyond a certain market-share
threshold). Consistent with these findings, a growing strand of the literature has
highlighted the benefits of ownership diversity for the stability of the financial sys-
tem (e.g. Ferri et al., 2014; Haldane and May, 2011; Llewellyn, 2017). Particularly
important for the present discussion are the implications of diversity for bank com-
petition. According to Berry et al. (2015), greater ownership diversity in the banking
system may induce financial intermediaries to compete for higher customer satisfac-
tion rather than increased equity returns. In addition, the findings by Kick and
Prieto (2015) suggest that improved competition due to a more ownership-diverse
banking system is likely to result in greater incentives for the private sector to dis-
cipline banks, possibly reducing the ability of financial intermediaries to shift their
portfolios towards riskier positions. Moreover, Meriläinen (2016) argues that the
nature of competition (and, thus, the degree of ownership diversity) shapes banks’
decisions over the relative weight given to profitability vis-à-vis social objectives.
Taken together, these arguments give rise to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The higher the degree of ownership diversity in the banking system,
the lower the incentives for financial intermediaries to take on risk.
It follows from the previous hypothesis that ownership diversity might interact
with monetary policy in determining the risk-taking incentives of banks. Support
for the moderating impact of bank ownership on monetary policy transmission ex-
ists in the literature. In examining the lending policies of banks with different
forms of ownership, Ferri et al. (2014) collect data for the euro area and submit
that stakeholder banks curtail their loan supply to a minor extent than shareholder
banks after a contractionary monetary policy. Within the context of the risk-taking
channel, recent evidence of the implications of ownership type for the relationship
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between interest rates and bank risk is advanced by Drakos et al. (2016). Focusing
on a sample of retail banks from 10 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
alongside Russia, they show that the risk appetite of foreign banks from the former
countries is the most affected by varying short-term rates. Therefore, insofar as the
ownership composition of the banking industry has a bearing on the risk decisions
of banks, one would expect the strength of the risk-taking channel to be diminished
in countries with more diverse banking systems.
Hypothesis 2. The higher the degree of ownership diversity in the banking system,
the lower the impact of monetary policy on financial intermediaries’ risk taking.
4.3 Data and Methods
4.3.1 Sample Construction
I collect banks’ balance sheet and income statement data from Bankscope, a finan-
cial database provided by Bureau van Dijk. The sample consists of a panel of banks
located in the 15 economies that entered the European Union prior to the 2004
enlargement (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) plus
Norway and Switzerland. I gather annual reports covering the period from 1999
(the year corresponding to the launch of the euro) to 2011 (the latest year for which
data on the regulatory variables is available).1 All financial intermediaries included
by Bankscope in the categories ‘commercial banks’, ‘savings banks’, ‘cooperative
banks’, ‘real estate and mortgage banks’, ‘specialised governmental credit institu-
tions’ and ‘bank holdings and holding companies’ were initially selected. To alleviate
survivorship bias, I used unconsolidated statements whenever available (otherwise
consolidated) for banks that were active at least one year over the 1999–2011 pe-
1Support for the use of annual data when examining the risk-taking channel of monetary trans-
mission is offered by Delis and Kouretas (2011) and Brissimis et al. (2014).
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riod.2 As the analysis involves deposit-taking and loan-making institutions, banks
that did not report data on either deposits or loans were dropped. Furthermore, the
holding company was excluded if accounts for the bank itself were available, while
subsidiaries of banks reporting at the consolidated level were not included.
Although the initial ownership categories were drawn from Bankscope, a series
of major refinements were made. First, I reclassified most of the Swiss coopera-
tives belonging to the Raiffeisen Group, given that they had been included among
savings banks. Similarly, a number of the German Volksbanken that had been cate-
gorised as savings banks were moved to the set of cooperative institutions. Several
intermediaries that were originally classified as specialised governmental credit in-
stitutions, such as Swiss Kantonalbanken and German Landesbanken, were added
to the list of savings banks. In addition, the group of cooperative banks was ex-
panded to comprise building societies from the UK and Ireland that endured the
increasing trend of demutualisation and consolidation, since they are owned by their
customers (Casu and Gall, 2016). As a next step, I ensure that the results are not
affected by Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) by examining the M&A history of
all financial intermediaries included in the sample. To this end, information on
M&As was obtained from Bankscope and supplemented with data retrieved from
Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum. Following the literature (e.g. Claessens and van
Horen, 2014), banks that were targets of completed M&As stayed in the sample
until the year preceding the takeover, whilst for the period following the transaction
only the accounts of the new entity were retained. As a result, I ended up with an
unbalanced panel of 5,677 shareholder and stakeholder banks that are located and
operate in Western Europe. The final sample consists of 1,502 commercial banks,
2,954 cooperative banks and 1,221 savings banks. Table 4.1 details the number of
2While the choice of favouring unconsolidated statements finds its main justification in the
predominance of unconsolidated data among the sample banks, the use of unconsolidated accounts
also allows to derive more accurate estimations of ownership diversity for the selected countries (in
that foreign subsidiaries are not included).
4.3. DATA AND METHODS 155
banks by country and ownership type. Whilst commercial banks are largely present
in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ireland, they are somewhat underrepresented
in countries such as Germany, Austria and Italy. In these countries, stakeholder
banks in general and cooperative banks in particular appear to be a major player.
Outside the eurozone, commercial banks are found to dominate the UK financial sys-
tem, while savings banks constitute the vast majority of banking firms in Norway,
Sweden and Denmark. In a nutshell, these cross-country differences seem to offer
preliminary support for the need to develop measures that can effectively quantify
the degree of ownership diversity in the banking system. This is one of the main
contributions of this paper and is described in the next section.
4.3.2 Variable Definition
4.3.2.1 Ownership Diversity
A long-held tenet in ecology is that the degree of diversity (or heterogeneity) of
an ecosystem can largely influence its dynamics (Tilman and Downing, 1994). As
Magurran (2004, p. 8) suggests, biological diversity—often denoted as ‘alpha di-
versity’ (Whittaker, 1972)—refers to “the variety and abundance of species in a
defined unit of study”. While richness corresponds to the number of species within
a given community (Bandeira et al., 2013), evenness captures the extent to which
the abundance is equal across species (Molinari, 1989). A well-accepted definition
of diversity is the effective number of types (Hill, 1973), according to which ‘true
diversity’ (D) of species (S ) is given by the inverse of the weighted generalised mean














156 CHAPTER 4. PAPER 3
Table 4.1 Sample Composition by Country and Ownership Type
Commercial banks Cooperative banks Savings banks Total
AT 77 171 78 326
BE 52 12 11 75
DE 183 1607 598 2388
ES 88 87 61 236
FI 10 4 8 22
FR 186 165 13 364
GR 19 2 1 22
IE 23 3 0 26
IT 220 592 47 859
LU 126 2 2 130
NL 45 1 2 48
PT 39 4 3 46
EA-12 1068 2650 824 4542
DK 62 9 64 135
GB 175 68 8 251
SE 19 0 91 110
EU-15 1324 2727 987 5038
CH 159 225 110 494
NO 19 2 124 145
Total 1502 2954 1221 5677
Notes: The table specifies the number of banks by ownership type in each of the countries included
in the sample. Values refer to the number of banks during the whole sample period (from 1999
to 2011). AT, Austria; BE, Belgium; DE, Germany; ES, Spain; FI, Finland; FR, France; GR,
Greece; IE, Ireland; IT, Italy; LU, Luxembourg; NL, Netherlands; PT, Portugal; DK, Denmark;
GB, United Kingdom; SE, Sweden; CH, Switzerland; NO, Norway. EA-12 are the founding
eurozone economies, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. EU-15 are the countries that entered the European
Union prior to the 2004 enlargement, i.e. the EA-12 economies, Denmark, Sweden and the UK.
Source: Bankscope.
where q is the order of diversity. High values (q > 1) of this parameter emphasise
abundance differences among species, whereas low values (q < 1) assign more weight
to rare species (Tuomisto, 2010).3
Among the most commonly used measures of species diversity is the Simpson
Index (Simpson, 1949). In its standard form, this index represents the probability
that two individuals chosen randomly from an assemblage will belong to the same
species. For this reason, the reciprocal of the Simpson Index (D′) is recommended
3For q = 0, all species are considered to be equally abundant and diversity equals species
richness (0D = S).
4.3. DATA AND METHODS 157








An alternative diversity indicator that has found enduring support in the liter-
ature is the Shannon–Wiener Index (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). Originally devel-
oped in the field of information theory, it measures the average degree of uncertainty
in predicting the species of unknown individuals drawn from a community. Whilst
the Simpson Index places greater weight on the evenness component, the Shannon–
Wiener Index is more sensitive to species richness (Nagendra, 2002).4 For ease of
interpretation, expression of the Shannon–Wiener Index in terms of its antilogarithm
(eH
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Besides heterogeneity indices, the literature has proposed a number of measures
aimed at quantifying species evenness. The common approach is to calculate even-
ness as the ratio between estimated and maximum diversity for a specific number
of species and sample size (Kwak and Peterson, 2007). Since evenness indicators
should be independent of species richness and take lower values within contexts
characterised by more unequal abundance across species, Heip (1974) proposes the
4Hill (1973) shows that the Simpson Index and the Shannon–Wiener Index are special cases of
the general index of diversity (Equation 4.1) with q = 2 and q = 1, respectively.
5An additional advantage of using the exponential form of the Shannon–Wiener Index is that
it tends to be approximately normally distributed (Heip et al., 1998).









Firms interact with each other and the environment in which they are embed-
ded. The outcomes of these interactions have a bearing on their profitability and
probability of survival (Baschieri et al., 2015). It follows that quantitative measures
used in ecology may constitute valuable instruments for banking research. Building
on the work by Michie and Oughton (2013), I treat ownership types (i.e. commer-
cial, cooperative and savings) as analogous to species in an ecosystem and construct
indices of ownership diversity for the loan and deposit markets. Data on bank loans
and deposits are collected from Bankscope and used to compute ownership diver-
sity measures based on the Simpson Index (SIM ), Shannon–Wiener Index (SHA)
and Heip Index (HEI ) of biological diversity.7 Table 4.2 reports the average degree
of ownership diversity over the period from 1999 to 2011 for each of the sample
countries. The values for the three indices suggest important cross-country differ-
ences with respect to the ownership composition of the banking system. Whereas
countries such as Austria, Germany and Spain are characterised by relatively high
levels of ownership diversity on both the loan and deposit sides of the market, much
less diverse banking systems are found in Greece, Belgium and Ireland. Among non-
euro-area countries, diversity in the UK loan market is almost half the corresponding
value for Switzerland. Figure 4.1 depicts the trend in the Simpson Index for the
loan and deposit markets in the largest European economies.8 At a first glance, one
6Evidence is also found for the Heip Index (E′) having considerably lower skewness and kurtosis
relative to other evenness metrics (Heip and Engels, 1974).
7Loans are calculated as residential mortgage loans, other mortgage loans, other retail loans,
business loans and other loans minus loan loss reserves. Deposits include customer deposits, de-
posits from banks, money market instruments, certificates of deposits and other deposits.
8Since for any given country and year the number of species (ownership types) is bounded
between 0 and 3, the rest of the analysis uses primarily the Simpson Index. Compared to other
measures, this index is shown to be more sensitive to changes in the maximum proportion among
categories rather than in their number (McDonald and Dimmick, 2003) and is therefore well suited
when the degree of dominance is of concern (Whittaker, 1972).
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can notice that Italy has enjoyed a sustained increase in ownership diversity with
respect to both sides of its banks’ balance sheets. By contrast, there seems to have
been a considerable loss of diversity in the UK, as tested by the 13.30% decrease in
the index for the loan market in the run-up to the crisis (from its 2004 peak). A
marked decrease in ownership diversity towards the end of the sample period can
also be observed for Spain, where the collapse of the cajas in the aftermath of the
crisis led to a significant reduction in savings banks’ market shares. Most impor-
tantly, in 2011 the diversity measure for the whole sample has fallen by 11.65% (loan
market) and 14.32% (deposit market) relative to 1999, pointing to a general decline
in ownership diversity across Western European countries.
4.3.2.2 Bank Risk
The riskiness of banks is quantified through the Z-score (Z ), a measure frequently
used in the literature to describe insolvency risk (e.g. Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Im-
bierowicz and Rauch, 2014; Laeven and Levine, 2009). One of the major advantages
of this measure is that it does not require market values, a feature that is key to the
present analysis due to the overwhelming majority of unlisted banks in the sample.
The Z-score is a proxy for distance to default and corresponds to the number of stan-
dard deviations by which bank returns have to fall before equity is wiped out and the
intermediary becomes insolvent. Accordingly, higher values indicate lower default
risk (greater bank stability). As the Z-score is highly skewed, this study follows the
literature (e.g. Dong et al., 2014) and applies its natural logarithm. Therefore, the
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Table 4.2 Ownership Diversity by Country and Market Type
Loans Deposits
Simpson Shannon–Wiener Heip Simpson Shannon–Wiener Heip
AT 2.839 2.912 0.956 2.835 2.909 0.955
BE 1.057 1.148 0.074 1.053 1.142 0.071
DE 2.553 2.720 0.860 2.608 2.755 0.877
ES 2.119 2.269 0.634 2.106 2.267 0.633
FI 1.980 2.166 0.583 1.778 2.042 0.521
FR 1.896 1.961 0.480 1.937 1.976 0.488
GR 1.043 1.111 0.075 1.076 1.165 0.109
IE 1.093 1.194 0.194 1.082 1.176 0.176
IT 1.698 2.058 0.529 1.595 1.938 0.469
LU 1.170 1.336 0.168 1.129 1.273 0.136
NL 1.659 1.799 0.530 1.709 1.832 0.561
PT 1.168 1.331 0.165 1.135 1.290 0.145
EA-12 2.354 2.630 0.815 2.329 2.619 0.810
DK 1.109 1.231 0.115 1.135 1.280 0.140
GB 1.280 1.456 0.228 1.250 1.421 0.211
SE 1.151 1.286 0.286 1.089 1.191 0.191
EU-15 2.090 2.445 0.723 2.088 2.445 0.723
CH 2.087 2.353 0.676 1.570 1.900 0.450
NO 1.830 1.948 0.569 1.705 1.850 0.515
Whole sample 2.092 2.444 0.722 2.045 2.412 0.706
Notes: The table summarises the degree of ownership diversity for the loan and deposit markets
in each of the countries included in the sample. Values correspond to the annual average of the
corresponding index over the whole sample period (from 1999 to 2011). Higher values denote
greater ownership diversity. Loans are computed as residential mortgage loans, other mortgage
loans, other retail loans, business loans and other loans minus loan loss reserves. Deposits are
the sum of customer deposits, deposits from banks, money market instruments, certificates of
deposits and other deposits. AT, Austria; BE, Belgium; DE, Germany; ES, Spain; FI, Finland;
FR, France; GR, Greece; IE, Ireland; IT, Italy; LU, Luxembourg; NL, Netherlands; PT, Portugal;
DK, Denmark; GB, United Kingdom; SE, Sweden; CH, Switzerland; NO, Norway. EA-12 are
the founding eurozone economies, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. EU-15 are the countries that entered
the European Union prior to the 2004 enlargement, i.e. the EA-12 economies, Denmark, Sweden
and the UK. Source: Bankscope.
where ROA is the Return On Assets and CAR is the Capital-to-Asset Ratio for
bank i at time t.9 Summary statistics for the Z-score are presented in Table 4.3.10
9Alternatively, a time-varying Z-score à la Lepetit and Strobel (2013) is constructed, which relies
on mean and standard deviation estimates of ROA computed over the full sample and combines
them with current values of CAR. The results of this exercise, not reported to save space but
available on request, are in line with the benchmark estimations.
10To reduce the influence of outliers, all accounting variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles of their sample distributions.
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Figure 4.1 Ownership Diversity in Selected Countries
Notes: The charts illustrate the evolution of the Simpson Index for the loan and deposit markets,
respectively, over the period from 1999 to 2011 (with 1999 = 100) in the major European economies.
DE, Germany; ES, Spain; FR, France; GB, United Kingdom; IT, Italy. Source: Bankscope.
Throughout the sample period, the risk measure has a mean value of 3.594 and a
standard deviation of 1.090. A sharp decline in the Z-score occurred between 1999
and 2004, during which the distance to default for an average bank decreased from
3.610 to 3.536. This suggests a 2.05% rise in the average risk appetite of financial
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intermediaries in the first half of 2000s. Insolvency risk experienced a slight reduction
in the period near the onset of the crisis, while it increased again during the crisis
years.
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4.3.2.3 Monetary Policy
Monetary conditions are proxied by a measure of monetary policy shocks often
used in the literature (e.g. Brissimis et al., 2014; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011,
2013), that is, Taylor rule residuals (TR). This measure captures the unexpected
component of fluctuations in policy rates (Brissimis et al., 2014), while allowing
for cross-sectional variation in monetary conditions (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2013).
For this reason, Taylor rule residuals appear to be well suited to my empirical
setting, which is characterised by identical monetary policy rates in the eurozone
but different economic conditions (e.g. in terms of GDP growth and inflation)
across euro-area countries. The residuals are computed by estimating the following
equation:
ORj,t = α + βGDPj,t + γINFLj,t + δt + εj,t (4.6)
where ORj,t is the quarterly average of the daily overnight interbank rate (e.g. EO-
NIA for the eurozone countries), GDPj,t is the growth rate of real GDP, INFLj,t is
the inflation rate (measured as the percentage change in the CPI) and δt is a time
trend. I use quarterly data for the period 1999:Q1–2011:Q4 collected from Datas-
tream and national sources (overnight interbank rate) as well as from the OECD
(GDP growth and inflation). Taylor rule residuals are estimated with a Panel Least
Squares (PLS) regression for the eurozone economies (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain) and via separate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for the other
economies (i.e. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK).11 Consis-
tent with Olivero et al. (2011a), the annual indicator of monetary policy shocks
is obtained by summing the residuals from the interest rate equation over the four
quarters in each year. Positive (negative) Taylor rule residuals denote a tight (loose)
11Following Maddaloni and Peydró (2011, 2013), I impose common coefficients for the euro area
countries due to the single monetary policy.
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monetary environment. Descriptive statistics for the monetary policy variable are
reported in Table 4.3. Figure 4.2 illustrates Taylor rule residuals over the period
from 1999:Q1 to 2011:Q4 for the economies included in the sample.12 The move-
ments in the residuals suggest high commonality in the conduct of monetary policy
among the selected countries. Taylor rule residuals declined remarkably in the pe-
riod after the dot-com bust, reaching their lowest levels around 2004. Monetary
policy became tighter in the period immediately preceding the start of the crisis,
before moving back to approximately the 2004 levels in the quarters following the
collapse of Lehman Brothers. The lowest value of Taylor rule residuals is observed
for Norway in the third quarter of 2004 (−2.041), whereas the highest is found for
the UK in the third quarter of 2007 (2.750).
4.3.2.4 Other Explanatory Variables
I attempt to mitigate omitted-variable bias by including a number of bank- and
country-level controls that are deemed to influence bank risk. Among the bank-
specific variables is a dummy for ownership structure (STAKE ), which equals 1 for
stakeholder banks and 0 otherwise. In light of the lower incentives for cooperative
and savings banks to take on risk (Ayadi et al., 2009; Groeneveld and Llewellyn,
2012), one may predict a positive relationship between the proxy for ownership type
and bank stability. The inclusion of the ownership dummy is aimed at disentan-
gling the effects that individual bank ownership has on the risk-taking incentives of
financial intermediaries from those that are associated with the ownership compo-
sition of the banking system as a whole, thereby allowing to investigate the extent
to which the presence of stakeholder banks has a bearing on the risk decisions of
shareholder banks. To capture the potential for a ‘too-big-to-fail’ phenomenon, I
account for bank size (SIZE ) by considering the natural logarithm of real total as-
12In Figure 4.2, Taylor rule residuals for the euro area are calculated as a weighted average based
on each country’s GDP.








1999:Q1 2001:Q1 2003:Q1 2005:Q1 2007:Q1 2009:Q1 2011:Q1
CH DK EA GB NO SE
Figure 4.2 Taylor Rule Residuals
Notes: The figure depicts Taylor rule residuals in the period from 1999:Q1 to 2011:Q4. Taylor rule
residuals are the residuals from a regression of the overnight interbank rate on GDP growth and
inflation. The residuals are estimated with a PLS regression for the euro area countries (Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain) and with separate OLS regressions for the other countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland and the UK). For the euro area, a weighted average is computed using each country’s
GDP. Positive (negative) Taylor rule residuals denote a contractionary (expansionary) monetary
policy. CH, Switzerland; DK, Denmark; EA, euro area; GB, United Kingdom; NO, Norway; SE,
Sweden. Sources: Datastream; national data; OECD.
sets. I do not have a clear a priori assumption about this variable, as the literature
provides conflicting evidence on the size–insolvency risk nexus (Bai and Elyasiani,
2013; Garćıa-Kuhnert et al., 2015). Furthermore, evidence exists that access to
liquidity by financial intermediaries has a bearing on their risk taking (Forssbæck,
2011; Ioannidou et al., 2015). To measure liquidity (LIQ), the ratio of liquid assets
to total assets is calculated.13 Since theory points to leverage as one of the main
mechanisms through which asset risk can be altered (Acharya et al., 2009), the ratio
of liabilities to total assets is added as an indicator of bank leverage (LEV ). Whilst
leverage might increase the target level of default risk due to the improved payoff
from risky investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), higher leverage might reflect a
13Liquid assets are the sum of loans and advances to banks, reverse repos and cash collateral,
securities classified as held for trading (excluding derivatives) and cash and due from banks.
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lower risk-taking ability on the part of financial intermediaries and discourage them
from engaging in risk behaviour (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992). Likewise, the incentives
for banks to take on risk are likely to depend on their past performance (Casu et al.,
2011; Mohsni and Otchere, 2014). For this reason, I control for the ratio of net
income to average equity (ROE ). In turn, diversification away from lending might
be related to reduced bank stability (Chiaramonte et al., 2015; Hesse and Cihák,
2007). To this end, I employ the measure of asset diversity (DIV ) developed by
Laeven and Levine (2007), which is computed as:
DIVi,t = 1 −
∣∣∣∣Net loansi,t − Other earning assetsi,tTotal earning assetsi,t
∣∣∣∣ (4.7)
At the country level, I account for market concentration (CONC ), corresponding
to the share of assets of the three largest banks in the system.14 The literature offers
little guidance on the impact of concentration on distance from insolvency, as support
is found for more concentrated markets being associated with either higher or lower
degrees of bank stability (Beck et al., 2006; Schaeck et al., 2009). To account for the
regulatory environment, I derive four indices from the Bank Regulation and Super-
vision Survey (BRSS) by the World Bank (Barth et al., 2001, 2004, 2006, 2012).15
Activity restrictions (ACT ) reflects the degree to which banks are allowed to engage
in securities activities, insurance activities, real estate activities and ownership of
non-financial firms. Greater regulatory restrictions are shown to either reduce bank
riskiness (Lee and Hsieh, 2013) or increase the fragility of the system by restraining
banks from entering non-traditional lines of business (Beck et al., 2006). Capital
requirements (CAPR) describes the stringency of regulatory capital requirements.
Although one would generally expect greater oversight of bank capital to result in
14The results of the baseline estimations are confirmed if the five-bank concentration ratio is
considered instead.
15The data used to compute the regulatory variables is available at four points in time (i.e. 2001,
2003, 2007 and 2011) and spans the 1999–2011 period (Barth et al., 2013).
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less risk taking on the part of financial intermediaries (Keeley and Furlong, 1990),
the opposite might hold if stricter capital requirements lead banks to shift their
portfolios towards riskier structures via changes in the risk–return frontier (Koehn
and Santomero, 1980). Supervisory power (SUP) proxies for the right of the offi-
cial supervisory authority to take actions aimed at changing bank behaviour, such
as initiating legal action against external auditors, ordering the bank management
to constitute provisions for actual or potential losses and superseding shareholder
rights in case of bank restructuring. I do not have an a priori assumption about the
link between supervisory power and bank risk, since the evidence available in the
literature is somewhat ambiguous (Lee and Hsieh, 2013; Vallascas and Hagendorff,
2013). Private monitoring (PRIV ) captures the incentives on the part of private
investors to monitor and exert effective governance over banks. While some find-
ings appear to indicate that greater monitoring by private agents limits risk-taking
incentives at banks (Delis and Kouretas, 2011), more recent evidence uncovers a pos-
itive relationship between private monitoring and risk assets (Drakos et al., 2016).
Moreover, the literature suggests that the macroeconomic environment is important
in explaining the risk appetite of banks (Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014; Williams,
2014). Therefore, I control for general economic conditions by including the annual
growth rate of real GDP (GDP). In a similar vein, I attempt to disentangle the
risk-taking channel from the standard ‘financial accelerator’ (Bernanke et al., 1999),
which affects bank lending decisions through financial frictions on the side of bor-
rowers. To this purpose, the empirical setup accounts for the annual change in real
stock market returns for the non-financial sector (MKT ).16
16The correlation coefficients for the variables used in the analysis are reported in Appendix
Table C.1.
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4.3.3 Model and Estimation Method
The benchmark model is given by the following equation:







ΩmCCm,j,t + ζj + ηt + εi,t (4.8)
with i = 1, ..., N , j = 1, ..., 17 and t = 1, ..., T , where N is the number of banks, j
is the country and T is the final year. The dependent variable, BRi,t, represents
the probability of default for bank i at time t and is measured by the Z-score. Ac-
cording to the literature (Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Fiordelisi et al., 2011), financial
intermediaries’ risk taking may persist over time and deviate from its equilibrium
level in the short term. If bank risk is indeed persistent, estimates based on a static
model may be biased and an econometric approach that explicitly incorporates the
dynamics of bank risk should be used. Therefore, the first lag of the dependent vari-
able, BRi,t−1, is included on the right-hand side of Equation 4.8.
17 Monetary policy,
MPj,t, is captured by Taylor rule residuals. Consistent with the literature on the
risk-taking channel (e.g. Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014), I anticipate
a positive sign on the coefficient Θ. As central banks loosen monetary conditions,
financial intermediaries react by lowering their distance to default (increasing their
risk exposure). ODj,t is one of the proxies for ownership diversity, namely the Simp-
son Index, Shannon–Wiener Index or Heip Index. Following hypothesis 1, one would
expect the coefficient Υ to be positive. To test the extent to which the ownership
composition of the banking system has a bearing on the strength of the risk-taking
channel, monetary policy is interacted with the ownership diversity variable.18 As
17I also experiment with further lags of the dependent variable among the regressors, but only
the coefficient on the first lag is found to be statistically significant.
18To reduce multicollinearity, the monetary policy and ownership diversity variables are mean-
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hypothesis 2 predicts, the coefficient Φ should be negative. All econometric specifi-
cations include a vector of K -bank-, BCk,i,t, and M -country-level, CCm,j,t, control
variables, which gauge the average impact that a number of factors at the bank and
country levels have on intermediaries’ insolvency risk in the 17 economies. Finally,
ζj and ηt are country and time fixed effects, respectively, aimed at controlling for
unobservable country-specific factors and time-varying common shocks that may
affect bank risk.
Several studies have recognised the potential for endogeneity when examining
the risk-taking channel (Altunbas et al., 2014; Jiménez et al., 2014), since monetary
authorities might also respond to the financial stability of the banking sector. In
econometric terms, this implies that the monetary policy variable, MPj,t, may be
correlated with the error term, εi,t, and that estimates based on OLS regressions
may be biased. Another source of concern is the inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable as a regressor in the econometric specifications, which may cause autocor-
relation in the residuals and lead to biased estimates (Aebi et al., 2012). To address
these concerns, Equation 4.8 is estimated with the Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM) for dynamic panel data proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blun-
dell and Bond (1998).19 This estimator allows to exploit the dynamic nature of
the relationships being investigated, while producing consistent and unbiased esti-
mates under the condition that there is no second-order serial correlation and that
the instruments are valid (Wintoki et al., 2012). Two main tests are conducted
to ensure that the econometric models are correctly specified. The first test is the
Arellano–Bond test for autocorrelation of order two, with a null hypothesis of no
second-order correlation in differenced residuals. The second test is the Hansen test
of overidentifying restrictions, which verifies that the instruments are uncorrelated
centred before the multiplicative term is formed.
19Since the GMM estimator is designed for ‘small T, large N ’ panels (Roodman, 2009), that is,
panels characterised by a relatively short time dimension and a large number of units, it appears
to be well suited to my empirical setup.
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with the error term (i.e. they are exogenous).20 In line with existing literature on
the risk-taking channel (e.g. Delis and Kouretas, 2011), I take the lagged depen-
dent, Taylor rule residuals (as well as its interaction with ownership diversity) and
all the bank-level control variables with the exception of the ownership dummy and
bank size to be endogenous. This means that their second and deeper lags can be
included as instruments. Moreover, the ownership diversity indices, bank size and
the measures capturing the regulatory environment are treated as predetermined,
implying that these variables can be instrumented with their first and longer lags.
To limit the number of instruments, all the remaining variables are considered to be
exogenous. I use the two-step procedure with Windmeijer (2005) standard errors
corrected for finite samples and clustered at the bank level.21
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Baseline Estimations
The results of the baseline regressions are shown in Table 4.4. In each column, a
different measure of ownership diversity (i.e. the Simpson Index, Shannon–Wiener
Index and Heip Index) for the loan market is used. The validity of the selected in-
struments is confirmed by the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, Hansen χ2
(p-value), while serial correlation of order two, AR(2), is rejected by the Arellano–
Bond test for autocorrelation in the error terms. The coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable reveals that bank risk taking is highly persistent, thereby rein-
forcing the need to account for the dynamic nature of bank risk. In line with the
theoretical underpinnings of the risk-taking channel (Angeloni et al., 2015; Borio and
20These specification tests, alongside the Wald χ2 test of overall model fit and the Arellano–Bond
test for first-order serial correlation, are reported at the end of each table presented in the next
section.
21The panel regressions are run with the xtabond2 command in Stata. To reduce the instrument
count, I limit lag depth and use a collapsed instrument matrix as suggested by Roodman (2009).
Prior to conducting the estimations, Fisher-type (Choi, 2001) tests are also performed to verify
that the continuous variables used in the analysis are stationary.
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Zhu, 2012), the coefficient on TR—which captures the average impact of monetary
policy shocks on banks’ probability of default among the sample countries—takes
a positive and highly significant value in all specifications. This evidence confirms
that looser monetary conditions induce financial intermediaries to operate closer to
default. Support for the first hypothesis is provided by the positive and strongly
significant coefficients of the proxies for ownership diversity, particularly when the
Simpson Index is considered (0.391). In a nutshell, these results suggest that—ceteris
paribus—banks located in countries with greater diversity of ownership types tend
to be more stable relative to those operating in less diverse banking systems. This
influence goes beyond that originating from individual bank ownership and points to
a twofold route to financial stability, in that a higher presence of stakeholder banks
in the system appears to impact on the risk-taking activities of shareholder banks.
Most importantly, this paper finds that ownership diversity buffers the effects of un-
expected monetary policy shocks on bank risk, as denoted by the negative and highly
significant coefficients on the interaction terms (0.017 − 0.017 = 0.000 if ownership
diversity is measured by SIM L). This corroborates the second hypothesis, in that,
monetary transmission via the risk-taking channel appears to be less pronounced in
banking systems characterised by a multiplicity of ownership structures.
Looking at the bank-level controls, the results indicate that cooperative and
savings banks have on average lower insolvency risk than their commercial peers,
consistent with the role of stakeholder banks as important contributors to finan-
cial stability (Ayadi et al., 2010; Ferri et al., 2014; Llewellyn, 2017). Bank size is
found to be positively related to distance to default, thereby rejecting the ‘too-big-
to-fail’ hypothesis. Whereas some evidence exists that more liquid banks are likely
to be more stable than their counterparts with less liquid balance sheets, ex ante
greater leverage does not seem to deter financial intermediaries from taking on ad-
ditional risk. As expected, past performance is found to influence risk taking by
banks, with higher equity returns curtailing the incentives on the part of intermedi-
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Table 4.4 Baseline Estimations
Dependent variable: Z-score (Z )
Independent variable Simpson Index Shannon–Wiener Index Heip Index
Lagged Z 0.952∗∗∗ 0.940∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.030) (0.028)












TR × HEI L -0.034∗∗∗
(0.004)
Bank-level controls
STAKE 0.151∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.058) (0.060)
SIZE 0.021∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
LIQ 0.002∗∗ -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
LEV -0.007∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
ROE 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DIV 0.015 0.102 0.049
(0.067) (0.077) (0.076)
Country-level controls
CONC 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
ACT 0.037∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
CAPR -0.022∗∗∗ -0.007 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
SUP -0.028∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
PRIV -0.046∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
GDP 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
MKT 0.001∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
# of observations 40088 40088 40088
# of instruments 58 58 58
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Table 4.4 (Continued)
Dependent variable: Z-score (Z )
Simpson Index Shannon–Wiener Index Heip Index
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.704 0.929 0.852
Hansen χ2 (p-value) 0.117 0.112 0.313
Notes: The table reports the results of the baseline estimations. Z is a proxy for distance from
insolvency; TR are the residuals from a regression of the overnight rate on GDP growth and
inflation; SIM L is the Simpson Index of ownership diversity for loans; SHA L is the Shannon–
Wiener Index of ownership diversity for loans; HEI L is the Heip Index of ownership diversity
for loans; STAKE is a dummy that equals 1 for stakeholder banks and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the
natural logarithm of real total assets; LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets; LEV is
the ratio of liabilities to total assets; ROE is the Return On Equity; DIV is a measure of asset
diversification; CONC is the share of assets of the three largest banks in the country; ACT is
an index of the regulatory restrictiveness on bank activities; CAPR is an index of the stringency
of bank capital regulations; SUP is an index of the power of the official supervisory agency to
change bank behaviour; PRIV is an index of the incentives for private investors to monitor banks;
GDP is the annual growth rate of real GDP; MKT is the annual change in real stock market
returns for non-financial corporations; Wald χ2 (p-value) is the Wald χ2 test of overall model
fit; AR(1) is the Arellano–Bond test for first-order serial correlation; AR(2) is the Arellano–Bond
test for second-order serial correlation; Hansen χ2 (p-value) is the Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions. All regressions are estimated with the two-step system GMM for dynamic panels
and include country- as well as time-specific effects. Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected
standard errors (clustered by bank) are reported in parentheses. The superscripts *, ** and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
aries to increase their risk exposure. At the country level, support is offered to the
concentration–stability hypothesis (Beck et al., 2006), as banks operating in more
concentrated markets tend to have less risky balance sheets than banks operating
in less concentrated ones. With respect to the regulatory environment, greater re-
strictiveness on bank activities is found to discourage financial intermediaries from
engaging in risk taking, while stricter capital requirements do not seem to be effec-
tive in limiting banks’ appetite for risk. Interestingly, a more stringent regulatory
environment in terms of the power of the supervisory agency and private monitoring
appears to have a negative impact on banks’ distance to default, possibly because
of the additional constraints it exerts on financial intermediaries’ behaviour. In ad-
dition, positive economic circumstances as gauged by the growth rate of real GDP
tend to be associated with higher bank stability, lending support to the view that
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increased economic growth is likely to lower bank risk by providing access to risk
management techniques (Williams, 2014). In accordance with expectations from
the literature (Altunbas et al., 2014), a boost in the value of collateral generated
by an increase in borrowers’ stock market returns lowers the probability of financial
intermediaries becoming insolvent.
4.4.2 Robustness Checks
The sensitivity of the results is examined in several ways. As a first robustness
check, I test whether the results are stable by changing the way ownership diversity is
measured. To this end, the three diversity indices (i.e. the Simpson Index, Shannon–
Wiener Index and Heip Index) are employed, calculating them relative to the deposit
market. Looking at both the asset and funding sides of banks’ balance sheets is
important, since there is evidence that the market shares of shareholder banks vis-
à-vis stakeholder banks may differ depending on whether the loan or deposit market
is considered (Michie and Oughton, 2013). This is also confirmed by the values
reported in Table 4.2, which point to some important differences in the degree of
ownership diversity across the sample countries according to market type. A case
in point is Switzerland, where the ownership composition of the banking system
seems to be considerably more diverse if the loan side rather than the deposit side is
considered (e.g. 2.087 and 1.570, respectively, when ownership diversity is measured
by the Simpson Index). The results of this exercise are presented in Table 4.5. The
coefficients on the variables of interest are highly significant and qualitatively similar
to those presented in Table 4.4, leaving the findings virtually unaffected.22
A further concern is that my baseline setup might not control for other variables
that could explain bank risk. For this reason, Equation 4.8 is re-run by including
three additional explanatory variables one by one. First, I account for the ratio
22In unreported regressions, I use indices of ownership diversity that are constructed with data
on either total assets or customer deposits (instead of total deposits). The results, not tabulated
to save space but available on request, are again confirmed.
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Table 4.5 Robustness Check: Alternative Measure of Ownership Diversity
Dependent variable: Z-score (Z )
Independent variable Simpson Index Shannon–Wiener Index Heip Index
Lagged Z 0.919∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.026)












TR × HEI D -0.032∗∗∗
(0.004)
Bank-level controls
STAKE 0.188∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.060) (0.041)
SIZE 0.018∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.020∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
LIQ 0.002∗∗ -0.001 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
LEV -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.007∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
ROE 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
DIV -0.027 0.086 0.026
(0.064) (0.077) (0.066)
Country-level controls
CONC 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ACT 0.044∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
CAPR -0.015∗∗ -0.008 -0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
SUP -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
PRIV -0.052∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
GDP 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
MKT 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
# of observations 40088 40088 40088
# of instruments 58 58 58
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Table 4.5 (Continued)
Dependent variable: Z-score (Z )
Simpson Index Shannon–Wiener Index Heip Index
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.443 0.637 0.720
Hansen χ2 (p-value) 0.106 0.207 0.136
Notes: The table presents the results of the empirical estimations with ownership diversity calcu-
lated for the deposit market. Z is a proxy for distance from insolvency; TR are the residuals from
a regression of the overnight rate on GDP growth and inflation; SIM D is the Simpson Index of
ownership diversity for deposits; SHA D is the Shannon–Wiener Index of ownership diversity for
deposits; HEI D is the Heip Index of ownership diversity for deposits; STAKE is a dummy that
equals 1 for stakeholder banks and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of real total assets;
LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets; LEV is the ratio of liabilities to total assets; ROE
is the Return On Equity; DIV is a measure of asset diversification; CONC is the share of assets
of the three largest banks in the country; ACT is an index of the regulatory restrictiveness on
bank activities; CAPR is an index of the stringency of bank capital regulations; SUP is an index
of the power of the official supervisory agency to change bank behaviour; PRIV is an index of the
incentives for private investors to monitor banks; GDP is the annual growth rate of real GDP;
MKT is the annual change in real stock market returns for non-financial corporations; Wald χ2
(p-value) is the Wald χ2 test of overall model fit; AR(1) is the Arellano–Bond test for first-order
serial correlation; AR(2) is the Arellano–Bond test for second-order serial correlation; Hansen χ2
(p-value) is the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. All regressions are estimated with the
two-step system GMM for dynamic panels and include country- as well as time-specific effects.
Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected standard errors (clustered by bank) are reported in
parentheses. The superscripts *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
of customer deposits to total assets as a proxy for franchise value (FRA).23 Given
that the cost of failure to owners will be greater for financial intermediaries with
higher charter value (Fortin et al., 2010; Sullivan and Spong, 2007), one may posit
that an increase in franchise value will discourage risk taking on the part of banks.
Second, I account for the relative importance of banks in the country’s financial sys-
tem (IMP), estimated as the ratio of domestic credit provided by banks to GDP.24
Insofar as financial intermediaries in more bank-based economies take on higher
risk in an attempt to meet the more inelastic demand for credit by the private
sector (Delis and Kouretas, 2011), I anticipate a negative link between the proxy
for the relative importance of banks and their distance from insolvency. Third, a
measure of institutional quality (INST ) is added, namely the Index of Economic
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Freedom by the Heritage Foundation. In line with the literature (Beck et al., 2006;
Williams, 2014), one would expect improved national governance to result in greater
bank stability. Table 4.6 presents the results of the panel estimations when these
factors are included. Consistent with a priori expectations, there is evidence that
franchise value plays a disciplining role in banks’ risk decisions. At the same time,
while intermediaries located in countries with a greater bank-credit-to-GDP ratio
are generally characterised by relatively high levels of default risk, this paper finds
somewhat limited support for a link between institutional quality and bank stabil-
ity. After controlling for these additional influences, the results are not materially
different from the baseline estimations and leave the conclusions unchanged.
23The data used to construct the measure of franchise value is collected from Bankscope.
24Data on the bank-credit-to-GDP ratio is gathered from the Global Financial Development
Database (GFDD) maintained by the World Bank (Cihák et al., 2012).










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since the outbreak of the global financial turmoil, many commentators have blamed
the ‘too-low-for-too-long’ interest rates until the mid-2000s for the changes in risk
perception by banks and the ensuing realisation of risks in the economy. In more
recent years, a related debate has unfolded on whether continued expectations of
a particularly low interest rate environment are already laying the foundation for
the next financial crisis (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013). This paper contributes to a fast-
growing strand of research that endeavours to uncover the role of diversity within
the banking sector in fostering the stability of the financial system and its resilience
to crises (e.g. Ferri et al., 2014; Groeneveld and Llewellyn, 2012; Haldane and May,
2011). Borrowing measures used in ecology to capture the diversity of ecosystems,
this article constructs indices of ownership diversity to examine how the ownership
composition of the banking system affects monetary policy transmission via the
risk-taking channel. The results, based on a large panel of shareholder and stake-
holder banks operating in Western Europe, suggest that ownership diversity buffers
the impact of unexpected monetary policy shocks on bank risk. In addition, this
study finds that—ceteris paribus—banks located in countries with greater diversity
of ownership forms tend to be more stable than their counterparts from less diverse
markets. These results, which suggest that a higher presence of stakeholder banks
in the system has a bearing on the risk decisions of shareholder banks, hold across
several econometric specifications and point to the stabilising role played by own-
ership diversity in modern financial systems. By providing novel insights into the
implications of the financial system architecture for systemic stability, my findings
concur with the benefits that could be gained from a critical mass of stakeholder
banks operating alongside shareholder banks (Ayadi et al., 2010; Llewellyn, 2012;
Michie, 2011). As the Quantity Theory of Credit (Werner, 1993, 1997, 2005, 2012)
predicts, a financial system populated by a large number of not-for-profit banks—
which tend not to extend credit for non-GDP, speculative transactions—is likely to
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deliver sustainable growth and to reduce the occurrence of asset bubbles.
The results of this paper have a number of implications for monetary authorities
and other banking regulators. One of the major lessons from the empirical analysis
is that ownership diversity emerges as an important factor accounting for differen-
tial effects of monetary policy on bank riskiness. For this reason, my evidence calls
for a closer overseeing by central banks of the ownership composition characterising
banking systems, as this is likely to moderate monetary transmission through the
risk-taking channel. Moreover, the findings of this study are of interest to banking
regulators, inasmuch as they feed into the current debate over how to design a more
stable and resilient financial system (Casu and Gall, 2016; Llewellyn, 2017; Werner,
2016). In light of the positive link between ownership diversity and bank stability,
regulators should ensure that the key attributes of stakeholder banks are not un-
dermined by regulatory initiatives directed at and formulated for their shareholder
counterparts. It follows that preserving a multiplicity of ownership types in banking
might be viewed as an important policy objective. On this front, my findings con-
cur with the view that countries where stakeholder-oriented institutions play only
a marginal role might benefit from developing a network of such institutions, for
example via the creation of municipality-owned banks and local cooperative banks
(Werner, 2010, 2013a,b). For such an objective to be achieved, competition between
different types of banks (rather than between banks of the same type) could be
encouraged and the market shares on the loan and deposit sides of banks’ balance
sheets could be distributed more evenly across ownership forms. At the same time,
the attainment of a more diverse banking system hinges on the ability of regulatory
authorities to measure, monitor and report the degree of ownership diversity in the
banking system. I hope that this paper will contribute further to the development
of such an agenda.
Future research can extend my work in a variety of ways. In light of the im-
portant role played by stakeholder banks in offsetting shocks to the credit supply
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of their shareholder peers (Ferri et al., 2014; Meriläinen, 2016), one would expect
interactions between financial intermediaries with different forms of ownership to
influence monetary policy transmission through banks’ loan supply. Therefore, ef-
forts might be directed at exploring the extent to which the degree of ownership
diversity in the banking industry moderates the transmission of monetary policy via
the bank lending channel (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, 1992). In a similar vein,
researchers could use the diversity indices proposed in this paper and examine how
the ownership composition of the banking system interacts with banking regulations
in determining the risk appetite of banks. By expanding on the literature concerned
with the implications of ownership structure for the relationship between regulatory
changes and bank risk (Laeven and Levine, 2009), these studies might shed new
light on the factors explaining the differential impact of regulations (e.g. capital
requirements, deposit insurance and activity restrictions) on risk-taking incentives
by banks. Furthermore, an interesting extension of my work would be to incorporate
spatial information into the analysis of ownership diversity. To this purpose, future
research could build on insights from ecology (e.g. Rajala and Illian, 2012) and de-
rive spatial indices of ownership diversity that can serve as valuable instruments in
banking research. I am currently looking at how the spatial configuration of banks
within and between bank types affects their appetite for risk and ensuing response
to fluctuations in monetary policy.
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5.1 Summary of Research Findings
This thesis set out to shed new light on the role of banks within the context of
monetary policy transmission by exploring how ownership structure affects mone-
tary transmission via the risk-taking channel. The study of monetary transmission
through financial intermediaries is important from both an academic and policy
viewpoint, since intermediaries play a key function in linking monetary intervention
to real economic outcomes. The implications of bank behaviour for real growth have
also become apparent in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, which has led to
a growing interest in understanding how risk-taking incentives by financial interme-
diaries are shaped by the monetary conditions prevailing in the economy. My thesis
joins this discussion by bringing concepts from the ownership structure literature
into the investigation of the risk-taking channel. To deliver the overall aim of the
work, this manuscript addresses the three research objectives specified in Section
1.2 through a series of distinct studies in the format of journal articles.
The first study aims to develop an integrated view of the role of financial inter-
mediaries as conduits for monetary policy transmission by carrying out a systematic
review of the related literature. In doing so, it delineates the boundaries of the
whole thesis and identifies some important gaps in existing knowledge. Drawing
on the principles underpinning the Systematic Literature Review (SLR) methodol-
ogy (Counsell, 1997; Tranfield et al., 2003) and a final sample of 152 peer-reviewed
journal articles published over the 1963–2016 period, this paper surveys the extant
literature to discern what is known about the mechanisms through which monetary
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policy is transmitted to the real economy via financial institutions and the condi-
tions that determine the functioning of these mechanisms. The review uncovers a
multifaceted role of financial intermediaries as mediators between central bank in-
tervention and economic performance. A key finding is that the reaction of financial
institutions to variations in monetary policy has a bearing not only on economic
outcomes, but also on the stability of the financial system. At the same time, the
findings show that only recently has the link between monetary conditions and fi-
nancial stability started to attract considerable attention by researchers, following
the pioneering contribution on the risk-taking channel of monetary transmission
advanced by Borio and Zhu (2012). As the review indicates, a major gap in the
literature pertains to the implications that ownership structure has for the relation-
ship between monetary policy and bank risk. This is the gap that is addressed in
my second and third papers.
The purpose of the second study is to reconsider the role of stakeholder banks in
monetary economics by investigating how bank ownership influences monetary pol-
icy transmission via the risk-taking channel. By constructing an unbalanced panel
of commercial, cooperative and savings banks operating in 17 Western European
countries over the period from 1999 to 2011, this paper finds robust evidence that
the risk appetite of banks with alternative ownership types responds differently to
fluctuations in monetary policy. Whilst shareholder banks tend to alter the riskiness
of their portfolios more actively over the business cycle, the findings suggest that
the impact of lower interest rates on systemic risk is reduced by the presence of
stakeholder banks. Further analysis for the years before and after the outbreak of
the global financial crisis reveals that the effects of monetary conditions on commer-
cial banks’ risk taking are stronger during the period preceding the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers in the third quarter of 2008. In contrast, there is evidence that
cooperative and savings banks follow less procyclical risk-taking policies compared
to their commercial counterparts. In fact, this paper shows that the risk appetite
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of stakeholder banks tends to be more stable relative to shareholder banks, over
the business cycle. This finding emphasises the important role of cooperative and
savings banks as vehicles for monetary policy transmission even at times of financial
distress.
The third study extends the findings of my second paper by joining a rapidly
growing strand of literature that is concerned with the implications of diversity in
the banking sector for the stability of the financial system and its resilience to crises
(Ayadi et al., 2010; Ferri et al., 2014; Llewellyn, 2012). Borrowing proxies from di-
versity of ecosystems within the field of ecology (Heip, 1974; Shannon and Weaver,
1949; Simpson, 1949), this article derives indices of ownership diversity to examine
how the interactions between banks with different ownership structures affect the
risk-taking channel. My findings, based on a large sample of shareholder and stake-
holder banks located in Western Europe, show that ownership diversity buffers the
effects of unexpected monetary policy shocks on banks’ probability of default. This
evidence implies that monetary transmission through the risk-taking channel is less
pronounced in countries where the composition of the banking system tends to be
more diverse. Furthermore, this paper finds that—ceteris paribus—banks operat-
ing in countries with greater diversity of ownership types have, on average, a lower
appetite for risk than those located in less diverse countries. These findings, which
hold across various econometric specifications and imply that a higher presence of
stakeholder banks has a bearing on the risk-taking activities of shareholder banks,
point to ownership diversity as a statistically and economically significant factor
moderating the impact of monetary policy on bank riskiness.
5.2 Contribution to Knowledge
Collectively, the findings of the three studies included in this thesis contribute to
existing knowledge in a number of important ways. These can be described at the
theoretical, methodological and empirical levels.
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From a theoretical perspective, this thesis contributes to the fast-growing line
of research around the link between monetary policy and banks’ appetite for risk
(Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2013). By
showing that financial intermediaries tend to adjust their risk exposure in response
to changes in monetary conditions, my findings are consistent with the theoretical
underpinnings of the risk-taking channel of monetary transmission (Borio and Zhu,
2012; Rajan, 2006). At the same time, my work extends this strand of research by
bringing some of the key tenets of the ownership structure literature (Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) into the analysis of the monetary policy–
bank risk nexus. Furthermore, this study speaks to the current debate over how to
design a more stable and resilient financial system (Casu and Gall, 2016; Llewellyn,
2017; Werner, 2016). By estimating the ownership composition of the banking in-
dustry in terms of relative market shares of shareholder banks vis-à-vis stakeholder
banks, this thesis shows how some of the central concepts from ecological theories
can be used to predict financial intermediaries’ behaviour. Importantly, it also il-
lustrates the financial and economic benefits that might arise from a multiplicity of
ownership types in the banking sector. Such evidence lends further support to the
argument that a financial system populated by a variety of ownership structures,
business models and corporate objectives is likely to be more stable and resilient
to crises than one where a single model dominates (Ayadi et al., 2009; Groeneveld,
2012; Haldane and May, 2011). It follows that my findings confirm predictions from
the Quantity Theory of Credit (Werner, 1993, 1997, 2005, 2012), while adding to ear-
lier evidence on the contribution of diversity in banking to a series of other outcomes
such as financial inclusion, competition and customer choice (Michie, 2011).
At the methodological level, this study is the first, to my knowledge, to sys-
tematically investigate the role of financial intermediaries as conduits for monetary
policy transmission. It is also the first to assess theoretical, conceptual and empirical
evidence on the micro-foundations of the monetary transmission process via finan-
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cial institutions using the CIMO (Context, Intervention, Mechanism and Outcome)
logic proposed by Denyer and Tranfield (2009). By means of a systematic review
of the literature (Counsell, 1997; Tranfield et al., 2003), this thesis integrates and
synthesises a highly fragmented body of knowledge to offer additional insights into
the mechanisms of monetary transmission through financial institutions as well as
the conditions underpinning the functioning of the individual mechanisms. Follow-
ing this approach, this manuscript develops a multidimensional framework that may
provide a more inclusive picture of how financial intermediaries’ behaviour mediates
the effects of central bank intervention on the real economy. Therefore, the find-
ings of my research deepen our understanding of the monetary transmission process
via financial intermediaries (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Kishan and Opiela, 2000;
Kopecky and VanHoose, 2004). This framework also enables researchers to evaluate
the extant evidence in a systematic manner and to reflect over some of the major
gaps that exist in the related literature. By doing so, it lays the foundation for
future quantitative and qualitative studies aiming at shedding further light on the
role of financial institutions as vehicles for monetary policy transmission. Moreover,
this thesis draws on insights from ecology and computes measures of ownership di-
versity for 17 Western European countries over the period from 1999 to 2011. The
development of these measures allows to extend the work by Michie and Oughton
(2013) and to contribute further to devising indices of ownership diversity that can
serve as valuable instruments in banking research.
From an empirical standpoint, the findings from the econometric estimations
indicate that the impact of lower interest rates on financial intermediaries’ risk tak-
ing is diminished for cooperative and savings banks. This evidence corroborates
recent findings from the literature (Ferri et al., 2014), which suggest that lending by
stakeholder banks is generally less influenced by the monetary environment within
which they operate compared to lending by shareholder banks. In submitting that
the risk-taking incentives of cooperative and savings banks are more stable over the
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business cycle than their commercial counterparts, this finding also concurs with
the stream of research that finds support for a less cyclical behaviour by stakeholder
banks (Meriläinen, 2016). In addition, this thesis finds that the effects of unexpected
monetary policy shocks on banks’ distance to default is reduced in countries with
greater diversity of ownership structures. This finding, which points to the stabil-
ising role played by ownership diversity in modern financial systems, complements
existing studies on the implications of industry-related factors for the functioning of
the risk-taking channel (Brissimis et al., 2014; Kick and Prieto, 2015). At the same
time, since my sample period covers the global financial crisis alongside the eurozone
sovereign debt crisis, this study redresses the paucity of evidence on the function-
ing of the risk-taking channel during times of adverse economic conditions. In this
respect, a major contribution of my work refers to the finding that crisis episodes
tend to make shareholder banks more risk averse and only marginally responsive
to changes in conventional as well as unconventional monetary policy measures.
Therefore, my research advances knowledge in the field by highlighting the need to
account for differences in ownership structure when examining the implications of
monetary policy for bank riskiness.
5.3 Implications
Besides contributing to knowledge, the findings of this thesis have a number of im-
plications for practitioners and policymakers. The main implications are described
in the next two sections.
5.3.1 Managerial Implications
A major takeaway for practitioners is that ownership structure is likely to shape the
risk appetite of financial intermediaries in response to changes in monetary policy.
For instance, the findings from the empirical analysis suggest that stakeholder banks
tend to increase their risk exposure in an expansionary monetary environment to
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a lesser extent compared to their shareholder peers. Such evidence may sensitise
bank managers about how the risk-taking incentives at financial institutions are
influenced by their type of ownership alongside the monetary conditions prevailing
in the economy. This appears to be particularly important in light of the support
found by this thesis for a statistically and economically significant relationship be-
tween monetary policy and bank risk taking. On this front, richer insights into how
the interplay between monetary policy and ownership structure affects banks’ ap-
petite for risk may be of specific interest to the management of cooperative financial
institutions that are considering processes of voluntary conversion to limited com-
pany status. In fact, my findings imply that a change in business objectives (e.g.
from stakeholder value creation to shareholder wealth maximisation) may alter the
incentives on the part of financial institutions to take on risk in response to varia-
tions in monetary policy. If effective risk management techniques are not adopted,
financial intermediaries may end up taking excessive risk onto their balance sheets
with potentially negative consequences in terms of their financial health and prob-
ability of survival. Furthermore, what is still largely hidden from the debate over
the role of financial intermediaries in monetary policy transmission is that this and
other related phenomena are ultimately explained by the strategies and actions of
organisational agents. For this reason, the findings of my research may also encour-
age greater awareness on the part of practitioners with respect to the impact that
their risk decisions have on the stability of the financial system and its resistance
to external shocks. This means that the consequences of their behaviours for the
overall system may become more transparent and easier to predict. In addition, a
key implication that this study has for bank managers pertains to the identification
of a set of factors that may allow financial institutions to shield their balance sheets
from variations in monetary policy. A case in point is the finding that banks that
make use of securitisation activity and establish long-term relationships with their
customers (e.g. via relationship lending) are generally better able to insulate their
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loan supply from changes in the interest rate environment. This may have posi-
tive effects on their financial performance, especially during periods of more volatile
interest rates.
5.3.2 Policy Implications
The findings of this thesis bear important implications for monetary authorities and
other banking regulators. A key lesson from the systematic review of the literature
and the empirical analysis is that monetary policy indeed affects the risk-taking
incentives of financial intermediaries and—as a result—the stability of the finan-
cial system. Therefore, my evidence calls for greater responsibilities on the part
of monetary authorities in terms of macroprudential regulation and supervision, for
example via the establishment of independent bodies such as the European Systemic
Risk Board (ESRB) to monitor systemic risk. Furthermore, the empirical findings
suggest that diversity of ownership structures in the banking sector is likely to mod-
erate monetary policy transmission through the risk-taking channel. It follows that
measures capturing the ownership composition of the banking system should be ac-
counted for in the central bank’s reaction function. At the same time, this study
indicates that it might be systemically beneficial to have a banking sector populated
by a critical mass of stakeholder banks vis-à-vis shareholder banks. This evidence
implies that encouraging a multiplicity of ownership types in banking might be
regarded as an important policy objective, thereby contributing to the ongoing dis-
cussion about the link between bank ownership and financial stability (Ayadi et al.,
2010; Casu and Gall, 2016; Groeneveld and Llewellyn, 2012). For this objective to
be attained, policymakers could ensure that the specific features of cooperative and
savings banks are not weakened by regulatory restrictions directed to and devised for
their commercial counterparts. On this front, the findings of my research speak to
the current debate over the role of proportionality in banking regulation (Llewellyn,
2017), in that they tend to emphasise the need for sufficient differentiation in the
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application of regulation based on—among others—ownership structures, business
models and risk profiles. In addition, it might be argued that regulators should en-
sure that competition between different types of banks (rather than between banks
of the same type) is promoted and that the market shares on the loan and deposit
sides of banks’ balance sheets are distributed more evenly across ownership types. In
this respect, this thesis advances the argument that countries in which stakeholder-
oriented institutions play only a minor role might benefit from developing a network
of such institutions, for example via the creation of municipality-owned banks and
local credit unions (Werner, 2013). Importantly, it also implies that the achievement
of a more diverse banking industry rests on the ability of policymakers to evaluate,
monitor and disclose the degree of ownership diversity characterising the banking
system. To this end, diversity indices used in the field of ecology—such as the ones
developed in this thesis—may represent valuable instruments.
5.4 Research Impact and Dissemination
As Sections 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate, this thesis has important implications both within
and outside the academic world. To ensure that my findings reach fellow researchers,
practitioners and policymakers alike, I have made specific efforts to disseminate my
research soon after starting my PhD. By working closely with my ever-supportive
supervisor, Dr Catarina Figueira, I have presented my work at Doctoral Colloquia
at Cranfield School of Management and at leading international conferences, such as
the International Finance And Banking Society (IFABS) Conference in Spain, the
European Financial Management Association (EFMA) Annual Meeting in Switzer-
land and the International Workshop on Financial System Architecture and Stabil-
ity (IWFSAS) in Canada. The findings of my research have also been disseminated
through a series of invited talks, including seminars organised by the International
Research Centre on Cooperative Finance (IRCCF) at HEC Montréal and by the
Center for Relationship Banking and Economics (CeRBE) at LUMSA University.
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Moreover, I have been committed to making an impact on the business and policy
communities by sharing my findings with practitioners and policymakers. Among
the guest lectures that I have delivered is a speech at the European Parliament
in Brussels, in which I have discussed the implications of ownership structure for
financial intermediaries’ risk taking and monetary policy transmission. On this oc-
casion, my work has also been granted the 4th European Association of Cooperative
Banks (EACB) Award for Young Researchers on Cooperative Banks. In addition,
the research reported in this thesis has received a Mobility Award from Santander
Universities to fund my attendance at the EFMA 2016 Annual Meeting and a Best
Paper Award by the Centre for Sustainable and Social Innovation (CSSI) at the
University of Victoria as part of the IWFSAS 2016. One paper originating from
my PhD work is at the Revise and Resubmit stage in the Journal of International
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money (ABS: 3), while two other papers have
been submitted to the Economic Journal (ABS: 4) and to the IMF Economic Re-
view (ABS: 3). A detailed list of my academic papers, awards and presentations
throughout my registration period is included in Appendix Table D.1.1
5.5 Limitations
Despite enriching knowledge about the role of banks in monetary policy transmis-
sion, this thesis is subject to some limitations. Since the empirical analysis is based
on a sample of Western European countries, caution should be exercised when gen-
eralising the findings and conclusions of this study. For example, it is important to
bear in mind that the majority of the countries covered in the analysis have bank-
based financial systems, that is, systems in which banks serve a central function
in mobilising savings, allocating capital, overseeing investment strategies of non-
financial firms and offering risk management services (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine,
1999). Further evidence is needed to verify the extent to which the findings about
1A reflection on my personal development during my PhD is presented in Appendix E.
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the moderating impact of ownership structure on the risk-taking channel of mone-
tary transmission apply to countries with market-based financial systems (e.g. the
US). Furthermore, there are several limitations associated with the data employed in
the econometric estimations. Ideally, credit risk should be captured by the ratio of
non-performing loans to total loans as a more direct measure of loan quality (Delis
and Kouretas, 2011). However, data on non-performing loans is only available for a
limited number of all the banks included in the sample (mostly from Italy). Another
potential concern relates to the use of annual instead of quarterly data, which might
not allow for a full identification of the effects of monetary policy on bank risk tak-
ing (Brissimis et al., 2014). Although the validity of resorting to annual data when
examining the risk-taking channel finds support in the literature (Delis and Koure-
tas, 2011), it would be worth enquiring into the robustness of the findings should
more balance sheet and income statement data for unlisted banks become available
at the quarterly level. Additionally, the novel insights provided by this thesis into
the link between diversity in banking and financial stability could be supplemented
by expanding the sample period beyond 2011, as this would further enhance our
understanding of the functioning of the risk-taking channel during times of financial
distress.
5.6 Suggestions for Future Research
By integrating predictions from the property rights (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972)
and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) perspectives into the analysis of
the risk-taking channel, this thesis opens up new and promising avenues for future
research.
A first line of enquiry would be to complement the findings of this study by
offering deeper insight into the implications of ownership diversity for the bank
lending channel of monetary transmission (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, 1992). As
the literature suggests (Ferri et al., 2014), stakeholder banks tend to smooth finan-
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cial conditions for their customers by curtailing their loan supply to a lesser extent
than shareholder banks following a contractionary monetary policy. This notwith-
standing, hardly any studies have endeavoured to investigate how the interactions
between banks with different types of ownership influence monetary transmission
via the bank lending channel. Such a void is surprising, given that existing evi-
dence on the role of cooperative and savings banks in counteracting shocks to the
credit supply of their commercial counterparts (Meriläinen, 2016) seems to imply
that the ownership composition of the banking system is likely to affect the rela-
tionship between monetary policy and banks’ lending decisions. For this reason,
I would encourage researchers to examine the extent to which ownership diversity
in banking has a bearing on the functioning of the bank lending channel. To this
purpose, researchers could build on the diversity indices that are presented in this
thesis and collect data for a sample of shareholder and stakeholder banks located
both within and outside Western Europe. By doing so, these studies would also
add to the somewhat limited knowledge of the impact that a multiplicity of own-
ership structures in banking has on monetary policy transmission in non–Western
European economies.
A second research avenue that arises organically out of my work would entail the
inclusion of spatial information into the analysis of ownership diversity. Although
the indices that are developed as part of this thesis allow to quantify the degree
of ownership diversity in the banking industry, they do not account for the spatial
configuration of banks within and between bank types. To move the analysis one
step further, researchers could borrow from the field of ecology (e.g. Rajala and
Illian, 2012) and construct spatial indices of ownership diversity that would be of
great value for banking research. Broadly speaking, these indices could be employed
by future studies dealing with the implications of diversity in banking for a number
of financial and economic phenomena. For instance, such measures would enable
researchers to explore how the ownership composition of the banking system inter-
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acts with banking regulation in shaping banks’ appetite for risk. By contributing to
the literature that addresses the moderating role of ownership structure in the rela-
tionship between regulatory changes and bank riskiness (Laeven and Levine, 2009),
this work would shed new light on the factors underpinning the differential effects of
regulation on financial intermediaries’ risk taking. At the same time, findings from
this strand of research would have important implications from a policy standpoint.
Since the attainment of a more diverse banking sector hinges on the ability of regu-
lators to measure, monitor and report the degree of ownership diversity in banking
(Michie and Oughton, 2013), this research would equip regulatory authorities with
sound and viable measures through which this objective could be effectively pursued.
A third and interesting extension of my findings would be to link the literature
around the risk-taking channel of monetary transmission with the studies on bank
business models. Among these studies, which tend to show that balance sheet and
income statement structures adopted by banks have an impact on their behaviour
and performance (Altunbas et al., 2011; Ayadi et al., 2016; Mergaerts and Van-
der Vennet, 2016), particularly insightful for future research appears to be the con-
tribution by Ayadi et al. (2016). By means of cluster analysis and an asset/liability
approach, they find support for the existence of five business models in European
banking, namely ‘focused retail’, ‘diversified retail (type 1)’, ‘diversified retail (type
2)’, ‘wholesale’ and ‘investment’. Most importantly, the work by Ayadi et al. (2016)
indicates that some business models are likely to be less stable and to generate more
systemic risk than others, thereby influencing the stability of the financial system
and its resilience to external shocks. Insofar as business models adopted by banks
have a bearing on their stability and risk-taking incentives, one would expect the
risk decisions of financial intermediaries with alternative business models to respond
differently to changes in monetary policy. It follows that a fruitful way of taking my
research forward would be to test the hypothesis that bank business models moder-
ate monetary policy transmission via the risk-taking channel. It is envisaged that
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this stream of literature would make an impact on both the business and policy com-
munities, while contributing to the academic debate over the benefits of diversity in
banking for the stability and resilience of the financial system.
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Table D.1 Research Dissemination
Year Dissemination
Papers under review
2017 Caselli, G. and Figueira, C., “The role of ownership diversity with
respect to the risk-taking channel of monetary transmission”, Journal
of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money (ABS: 3),
R&R.
Caselli, G. and Figueira, C., “Risk-taking channel of monetary
transmission and financial stability: What role for stakeholder banks?”,
Economic Journal (ABS: 4), under review.
Caselli, G. and Figueira, C., “Financial firms as vehicles for monetary
policy transmission: A systematic literature review and future
directions”, IMF Economic Review (ABS: 3), under review.
Awards
2016 Best Paper Award, Centre for Sustainable and Social Innovation
(CSSI), University of Victoria.
Santander Mobility Award, Santander Universities.
4th EACB Award for Young Researchers on Cooperative Banks,
European Association of Cooperative Banks (EACB).
Invited talks
2017 Center for Relationship Banking and Economics (CeRBE) Research
Seminars, LUMSA University, Rome, Italy.
2016 International Research Centre on Cooperative Finance (IRCCF)
Internal Seminars, HEC Montréal, Montréal, Canada.
EACB Academic Conference, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium.
Conference presentations
2016 Doctoral Colloquium, Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield, UK.
4th European Conference On Banking And The Economy
(ECOBATE), University of Winchester, Winchester, UK.
International Workshop on Financial System Architecture and Stability
(IWFSAS), University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada.
European Financial Management Association (EFMA) Annual
Meeting, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland.
6th International Conference of the Financial Engineering and Banking
Society (FEBS), University of Málaga, Málaga, Spain.
International Finance And Banking Society (IFABS) Conference,
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Barcelona, Spain.
3rd Money, Macro and Finance (MMF) PhD Workshop, University of
Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.
2015 PhD Conference in Monetary and Financial Economics, University of
the West of England (UWE), Bristol, UK.
Doctoral Colloquium, Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield, UK.
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Appendix E
A Reflection on My Personal Development
As I approach the completion of my PhD, I am amazed at how much I have de-
veloped, changed and learned since I first joined the programme. Perhaps the best
way to describe my personal development is that I embarked on my doctoral jour-
ney as a student and have now become a researcher. Looking back on my learning
experience during the last four years, I can see an exponential curve in my critical
thinking skills. My PhD has helped me become more critical, reflective and curious
about what I read, while teaching me how to put the ‘academic scepticism princi-
ple’ into practice in anything I do. The opportunity to conduct and disseminate
my research to a variety of audiences has benefited my communication skills (both
written and verbal) substantially. With the relentless support of my supervisor, Dr
Catarina Figueira, I have learned how to write academic papers and transfer my
thoughts to paper in an effective manner. By delivering a number of invited talks,
research seminars and conference presentations both nationally and internationally,
I have also improved my presentation skills and gained more confidence in public
speaking. This is one of the aspects that I have enjoyed the most during my PhD
and that has also taught me the importance of maintaining academic networks with
fellow colleagues from all around the world. To this regard, I have soon learned
that there is much to be gained from exchanging ideas and collaborating with oth-
ers, in contrast with the popular myth of PhD research as taking place in an ‘ivory
tower’. Importantly, I believe that my doctoral studies have equipped me with a
sound knowledge and experience of the academic research process. Besides working
towards my degree, I have had the opportunity to contribute to several research
projects in areas such as risk taking by academics, migrant entrepreneurship and
public-private partnerships in transitional economies. Some of these projects have
already resulted in publications in refereed academic journals and books, including
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Studies in Higher Education (ABS: 3) and Society and Business Review (ABS: 2).
For all these reasons, I am confident that my PhD has prepared me well for a suc-
cessful career in academia and I thus look forward to the next step in my professional
journey.
